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PREFACE
This report presents the reader with a view of the nation's air cargo
system of the 1990's. We believe that the system described is the best obtain-
able through an evolutionary development from today's system. In other words,
no drastic changes in technological, economic, social, or political trends are
envisioned.
The study which produced this report was conducted by a group of 20 schol-
ars representing eleven disciplines who were gathered at Langley Research Center
under the auspices of the NASA-ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program for 11
weeks during the summer of 1978. Their task, as assigned by the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA), was to examine the nation's air cargo
system and suggest ways in which it can be encouraged to make a more vigorous,
effective, and productive contribution to the nation's transportation needs.
While the topic for the 1978 NASA-ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program
was selected by Old Dominion University and NASA to be one of current interest
to NASA, neither ODU nor NASA otherwise limited or directed the study. It was
intended to be an independent view, representing the conclusions of a broadly
selected group of professionally qualified but independent outsiders, who them-
selves determined the scope and nature of their study.
This group did not begin its work in a vacuum of data; on the contrary,
abundant sources of information were made easily available. Salient among
these sources were two studies very recently completed for NASA. They were
conducted under the title, Cargo/Logistics Airlift Systems Study (CLASS). The
CLASS studies collected and analyzed extensive amounts of data from the trans-
portation community. One was performed by Lockheed-Georgia Company and one
by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. Completed in the spring of 1978, they
provided a very strong and timely basis on which this study could be grounded.
Another reason the summer of 1978 was especially timely for a study of air
cargo was the recent deregulation by Congress of much of the air freight
industry.
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After coming together early in the summer, this group struggled with the
problem of setting for itself goals which were reachable but which would non-
etheless assure that a real contribution to NASA planning was made. The
decision was made that an examination of some of the problems in the infra-
structure of the Air Cargo system might yield the desired results. The com-
ponets of the infrastructure which seemed to need the most attention were
listed as:
1. The Regulator Framework
2. The Ground Support System
3. The Nature of the Network
4. Government Involvement
5. Societal Impacts
The first four on this list evolved into chapters of this report. The
fifth was an area of concentrated study, the results of which appear as parts
of each chapter.
Griffith J. McRee, Director
Old Dominion University
Emanuel Maier, Technical Director
Bridgewater State College
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INTRODUCTION
The air cargo system is like a healthy duck which everyone expects to change
into a swan. However, despite our expectations, the duck persists in "failing"-
-it remains a duck. Does this "failure" stem from internal "tragic flaws", a
harsh environment, or our expections? The answer to this question is -- yes!
Air freight is a growing industry, but it has not grown in the manner or at
the rate forecast. Hence, we perennially perceive it as failing, and the fail-
ure to grow in the expected way is caused by an interlocking set of internal and
external factors; factors which the actors in the system control and other factors
which they do not.
Our report is both .analytical and prescriptive. We analyze the national
air cargo system and prescribe how it should appear in 1990 in order to operate
successfully through 2015; that is, through one equipment cycle.
Chapters one and two deal with elements of the system which are largely
under the control of the major actors; the airlines and the aircraft manufac-
turers. These chapters deal with aircraft, networks, facilities, and pro-
cedures. Chapter three considers the regulations which govern the movement of
air freight; what happens here is not totally under the control of the system
actors. Chapter four addresses the larger public policy interests which must
be served by the kind of system we are proposing -- the air cargo integrated
system (ACIS). Our emphasis throughout shall be upon the concept "integrated".
At many points in the report, the possible social, economic, political,
and environment impacts of the system are considered. Impacts are summarized
in a special section of our report which bears that title.i
The last major section of the report contains our summary and the team's
recommendations. These recommendations range from statements on optional air-
craft size for the system, through institutional changes which must be effected
to allow new technology to function effectively, to specifying some areas of
future research with regard to air cargo systems. These recommendations are
the "bottom line" of our report.
To understand our recommendations is one thing, to fully grasp the team's
rationale for offering them is quite another. As proponents of a systems
approach, we believe that a comprehensive overview of an entity is a prerequisite
for understanding that entity.
The system we have been studying is quite complex and richly jointed. We
do not believe that a comprehensive picture can be obtained without reading
most of the text. Therefore, to know why we have offered a particular recom-
mendation, the reader may have to go rather deeply into the report.
..,-,. "-. f*. - H • "-•>•••« .-•-,->•• ' >
report"wR'ich-'fb'TT-ows^is supported fully by all team members. Through-
out the summer, we rigorously pursued the goal of producing a report organized
around one theme. In order to reach this goal, the communication of ideas had
to be undertaken.. Design proposals, objectives, and conclusions were scrutin-
ized and evaluated by teams, and in many instances by the entire group. Some
ideas were filtered out and others interjected by this process.
Early on in the project, assumptions and objectives were fixed. The
systems design approach when applied with ultimate thoroughness would lead to
an interminable discussion of an infinitude of possible futures. This is due
to the "overlook nothing" nature of the approach. Therefore, in order to make
a begining, certain assumptions were made early in the design process which
constrained our conception of the environment in which the future air cargo
system would exist. It is important that the reader know what boundary conditions
were established before analyzing the report. Our assumptions were:
1. The increase in surface traffic over the next 15 years will result in a
degradation of service making air shipment a more attractive option.
2. Air cargo needs will be 2-3 times present levels contributing to sat-
uration of the present system by 1988.
3. Expansion of existing airports due to lack of available land will be
difficult.
4. All future aircraft and airport construction will have to meet present
environmental constraints.
5. The U.S. Government will continue to support R and T to improve air-
craft and ground support.
6. Standardized intermodal containers will become more frequent in use.
7. Advances in technology will offset rise in fuel cost so that direct
operating costs will not rise merely as a result of rise in fuel cost.
8. Peaceful co-existence will continue among the major powers and there
will be no radical shifts in spheres of influence.
9. World economic climate will not undergo major fluctuation.
10. The nations will be unable to satisfy its military airlift need com-
pletely with military resources. There will be strong governmental
support for sharing civil - military capacity.
In addition to knowing what assumptions were made, it is also important
to understand what objectives our design team set for the air cargo integrated
system. Not only did we make our objective explicit, to the best of our
ability, but we spent considerable time establishing an ordered relationship
between these objectives.
In ordering our objectives, we employed a technique called "interpretive
structural modeling", making use of software developed at the University of
Dayton.
From an initial unordered list of 56 objectives, the structure shown in
Figure 1 was developed. When our ordering and editing procedure was completed,
only forty objectives remained. The directional relationship indicated by the
arrow can be literally expressed as, the achievement of. objective. A (at
the tail of the arrow) contributes to the achievement of objective B (at the head
of the arrow) in an^ essential way.
The discussion accompanying the development of this objective structure
brought about considerable clarification of term definitions and helped formu-
late common concepts in the minds of all involved. Though the product of this
exercise is not offered as a major contribution of the design effort, the
process of its development was most helpful to us.
LIST OF OBJECTIVES FOR ACIS
1 - To meet civilian air cargo needs
2 - To meet military air cargo needs
3 - To develop an effective ground support system that will accomodate
advanced aircraft
4 - To minimize detrimental environmental impacts
5 - To minimize energy consumption of oil based fuels
6 - To have cooperative labor relations
7 - To identify air cargo markets
8 - To provide for terminal security
9 - To establish an appropriate international legal framework
10 - To establish an appropriate domestic legal framework
11 - To build elite support for an advanced system
12 - To build mass support for advanced systems
13 - To integrate all modes of cargo transportation
14 - To develop effective unitization
15 - To integrate appropriate feeder aircraft
16 - To integrate appropriate trunk aircraft
17 - To be capable of meeting national emergency needs
18 - To provide adequate terminal capacity for projected cargo volumes
19 - To establish minimal service criteria
20 - To integrate freight forwarders
21 - To eliminate terminal delays
22 - To minimize damage
23 - To provide adequate access links for other modes
24 - To provide for simultaneous civilian/military use of terminals, aircraft,
and crews.
25 - To provide sufficient reserve aircraft for military emergencies
26 - To provide secure storage for secret cargos
27 - To provide safe storage for hazardous materials
28 - To standardize weight, sizes, and shapes of cargo units as far as possible
29 - To improve profitability for air carriers
30 - To give door-to-door service
31 - To maintain U.S. superiority in scientific knowledge in air transport
technology
32 - To capture a greater share of the world freight market
33 - To improve international balance of trade and balance of payments
34 - To improve government/industry cooperation in civilian cargo transport
development
35 - To improve the profitability of aircraft manufacturing
36 - To create new markets geographically and among commodity sectors
37 - To build upon existing air terminal locations
38 - To offer containerized, package, and general cargo service
39 - To offer a reasonable system of cargo accounting and documentation
40 - To meet national air cargo needs and reduce international balance of
payment problems, while minimizing detrimental impacts
HIERARCHICAL OBJECTIVE STRUCTURE
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CHAPTER 1
NETWORK DESIGN
Introduction
A transportation network consists of areas to be served, nodal points,
and connecting lines between nodes.
An efficient network seeks to equalize service areas which should result
in more equal user cost throughout the system. Nodal points of this system
are airports and air terminals that, ideally, are capable of providing the
service called for by the service areas. Connecting lines are the routes that
connect nodal points to each other and to major hubs that serve as collection
points for whole countries or continents, depending upon size. Connecting
lines are further modified by frequency of use and balance of flow in both
directions of each link. Finally, the type of aircraft that fly the connecting
routes are part of the network and should be suited to the length of lines and
density of flow as well as being efficient to load, fly, and unload.
In what follows, node location is treated first from theoretical implica-
tions derived from central place theory (ref. 7). This is followed by a
pragmatic treatment of the closely associated problems of routing and scheduling
in Section 1.2. The routing (connectivity design) and scheduling discussion
is prefaced by a description of the needs of the shipper relative to routing
and scheduling. The discussion of routing and scheduling is followed by a
discussion of network economics in Section 1.3. This, in turn, is followed by
a discus.sion of cargo handling capacities and potential at existing airports
in Section 1.4, by the implications of intermodal transfer upon network design
in Section 1.5, and finally by the closely allied problems of aircraft payload
and fleet-size in Section 1.6.
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1.1 THE NETWORK
1.1.1. Theoretical Design of Network
The ideal air cargo transportation network has as its goal the. economic
transportation of all air-eligible cargo in the United States; it also is to
provide links, gateways as it were, with an international network comprising
the major continents of the world.
The collection point of all goods that need to be transported by air
should be located in the center of a circular area. This same center, of
course, can also serve as the final distribution point from which all goods
are delivered, at equal cost, in all directions to the final destination
within any service area (Fig. 1.1).
Origin Destination
Figure 1.1 ORIGIN AND DESTINATION
The energy required to transport all goods to or from the center is as
uniform as the terrain within the area. However, a se'ries of tangent circles
that cover all available space would leave unserviced areas between them (Fig.
1.2). Hence, for total service, the circles should overlap and divide the
space between them, producing a. system of nesting hexagons. Hexagons represent
the optimum compromise to circles. They have the advantage of covering all
space that needs to be serviced (Fig. 1.3).
12
Unserviced area
Figure 1.2 UNSERVICED AREAS
Figure 1.3 HEXAGONAL SERVICE AREAS
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The hexagon pattern applied to the continental United States represents
the lowest order of the network hierarchy of areas; this area is intended to
be serviced primarily by .surface transportation modes (Fig. 1.4). There is no
distance within any hexagon that exceeds 800km (500 miles) to a central place
for collection of cargo.
Distances between hexagon centers are closer to 1000km (600mi) which
represent distance minima where air transportation by medium sized, intermediate
distance aircraft can compete in time and cost with rail or truck. These
distances represent the next larger hierarchy of hexagons (Fig. 1.5). It is
here that the domestic air cargo industry-will make major inroads in the
surface transportation modes. The economics of the competition can be seen
from Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7, especially between trucks and long haul aircraft.
The continents as service areas represent the largest of the three sets
of hexagons. The theoretical nesting of Figure 1.8 is merely to illustrate
that all land masses can be serviced without gaps. Even if Asia and Australia
were to be separated, as in Figure 1.9 (in order to come closer to the reality
of distribution of continents),' the interesting 'observation can be made that
the distances between continents are fairly uniform (Table 1.1). The importance
of this fact is that the technology exists to link continents in an air trans-
portation network of fairly uniform service areas and distances. Aircraft
like the B-747 or the C-5 are now in service over such distances (Table 1.2).
Of course, countries like the Soviet Union and the United States have distances
within their national boundaries (Table 1.1) that approach intercontinental
distances and a detailed map would tend to show more than one super hub.
The hierarchical arrangement of service areas has the advantage of making
available to the shipper economy of scale: The larger the distance to be
shipped in any one haul, the lower the unit cost of goods shipped by any given
mode. As a corollary to this principle, the larger the carrier, the lower the
unit cost of a good shipped. The larger aircraft can negotiate the longer
hauls and, hence, reduce unit cost. Both the United States and the Soviet
Union can avail themselves of the largest aircraft over very long hauls and
thereby lower the unit cost of goods transported within their boundaries.
Over such distances, the time-cost advantage of the long air haul combined
with reduced inventory and storage needs tend to equalize direct operating
costs (DOC) between air mode and overland transportation (Figs. 1.6 and 1.7).
Transportation of a single container over a very short distance by, say,
helicopter will be costly; only extreme time pressure in a congested urban
center around a given airport would warrant such art expense.
Central places in a mixed hierarchy represent an'equilibrium of "least
work" in an energy flow system (ref. 1). Central places are concentrations
of human beings and their activities in any location ranging from villages, to
towns, to cities, all the way to metropolitan areas. The term "mixed" refers
to organization of space according to market areas, transportation routes, and
economy of size in a complex social economic society. The mixed hierarchy
here represented combines the market areas, wherein goods are collected
primarily by surface transportation, with a transportation hierarchy of larger
central places, and active airports, connected by direct air service with each
.14
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Figure 1.7
THE CONCEPT OF TOTAL DISTRIBUTION COSTS
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Intermodal Cargo Transportation System,
Russellville, Arkansas, February 1978,
p. -43.).
Profit
$0.07
Distribution
$0.28
^N
3
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
<
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
C
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
3
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
3
0
0
0
0
O
O
O
O
O
C
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
?fff,'f "f'Ss/* *
S S$A'&
/ *&'*/*"
$0.19
INVENTORY/ \
WAREHOUSING N
/ ./
TRANSPORTATION
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
3
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
3
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
3
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
3
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
C
S.
$0.23
^}
s*
Profit
$0.07
I Cost savingstn n^
Distribution
$0.25
17
Figure 1.8 WORLD SERVICE AREAS
More realistically rearranged
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Figure 1.9 WORLD SERVICE AREAS (MORE REALISTICALLY REARRANGED)
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Table 1.1
TYPICAL DISTANCES AND AVERAGES
Miles Kilometers
North Atlantic 4460 7178
North Pacific 6370* 10,252
North - South America 5320 8562
U.S. - Middle East & Africa 7000*. 11,265
Europe - Far East/Australia 10,500* 16,898
Europe - Africa 3300 5311
Europe - Middle East 2500 4023
Europe - L/Developed America 5300 8530
Japan - L/Dev. Far East & Australia 2500 4023
Japan - Africa & Middle East 8000* 12,875
Japan - L/Developed America 11,000* 17,703
Average distance 4140 8926
*usually two stops; see below
U.S. - Australia
Los Angeles - Honolulu - Sydney 2556,5067 4729,9376
New York - Honolulu - Sydney 4893,5067 9220,9376.
U.S. - Africa
New York - Dakar - Nairobi 3805,1498 7041,2722
Kinshasa - Lisbon - New York 3360,3367 6217,6230
U.S. - Asia
Los Angeles - Honolulu - Tokyo 2556,3854 4279,7131
New York - Fairbanks - Tokyo 3278,3522 6065,6517
19
Table 1.2
AIRPORTS IN U.S. AND CANADA WITH B-747 SERVICE, 1978 (Ref. 46)
Airport No. Airlines No. Airlines No. Airlines
flying B-747 flying B-747 F/C* Serving Airport
O.F. Kennedy (NYC) 18 5 72
O'Hare (ORD) 9 3 47
Los Angeles (LAX) 7 0 43
San Francisco (SFO) 7 0 33
Honolulu (HNL) 7 0 24
Boston (BOS) 5 2 36
Toronto (YYZ) 5 1 22
Seattle-Tacoma (SEA) 4 2 21
Mirabel (Montreal) (YMX) 4 2 23
Dulles (IAS) 4 0 16
Detroit Metro (DTW) 3 0 28
Anchorage (ANC) 3 1 18
Miami (MIA) 2 0 54
Houston (IAD) 2 1 2 2
Las Vegas (LAS) 2 0 15
Vancouver (YVR) 2 0 9
Hilo (ITO) 2 0 8
Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) - 1 0 2 3
Denver (DEN) 1 0 27
Philadelphia (PHL) 1 1 20
Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP) 1 1 20
St. Louis (STL) 1 0 22
Pittsburg (PIT) 1 0 14
Phoenix (PHX) 1 0 10
Montreal Int'l. (YUL) 1 0 14
Milwaukee (MKE) 1 1 11
*The B-747F and B-747C are coded as a separate category in ref. 46 as all-
freight versions with nose loading main deck. Column 3 numbers are included
in the numbers listed in Column 2, though the same airline may fly both all-
cargo and belly 747's.
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other. Each continent can be considered as having one large "hub" airport
that is connected with lower order airports as if by "spokes". Such a system
is referred to as a "hub-spoke" system, indicating a hierarchy of areas and
services.
1.1.2. "Fitting" Central Place Theory to the Reality of the American Landscape
A glance at Figure 1.4 will show that the hexagonal service areas covering
the contiguous United States are fairly equal but the transportation collection
points are not always in the centers. The specific choice of centers was
influenced by the intention to utilize existing facilities and technology as
much as possible. Another aspect of reality that will tend to distort the
theoretical lattice is that the area of a service circle, in this case a
hexagon, of either a hub or a spoke terminal will tend to be proportional to
the amount of cargo traffic generated within it (ref. 2). In other words,
sparsely settled areas tend to have larger spatial service areas than densely
settled areas, even though they may be "equal" in total service.
All of the terminal hubs selected have runways that can accommodate large
aircraft like the B-747 (ref. 3); the preferred width is 61m (200ft) although
45m (150ft) will also do (Also compare Table 1.2).
Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles are located in the western part
of their hexagonal service areas, as is Chicago. This location corresponds to
the reality of commercial, industrial, and demographic distribution of human
activity. Thus, these cities are more properly placed in the "activity centers"
of their respective areas.
Miami appears to preside over an area that is mostly water. However,
Miami ranks rather high in a hierarchy of airport activity (Table 1.3), activity
that is generated by its "central" location with respect to the active Caribbean
area which Miami serves.
San Francisco, Houston, and New York serve the dual functions of collecting
points for their respective hexagons as well as points of entry and departure
for longhaul international cargos.
Finally, hexagons that center on El Paso, Texas, and Emporia, Kansas,
might be good examples of two other considerations of "reality" that also
influence the specific location of central places of a given network:
1. Political considerations, and
2. National defense considerations.
Russellville, Arkansas, has been selected as an example of the political
process at work as it contributes to the industrial and economic evolution of
the cultural landscape (ref. 4). There are other suggestions for the establish-
ment of similar all-cargo freightports in Coalinga, California, the Pacific
International Freeport Center near Ogden, Utah, as well as the International
Air Cargo Distribution Project planned for Northwestern Nevada: "in the
21
Table 1.3
FORTY LARGER AMERICAN AIRPORTS AND THE NUMBER OF CERTIFIED
CARRIERS SERVING THEM, RANKED BY FREIGHT ENPLANED, 1977
AL AF AIRPORT FT DP F/P Pax
Chicago (ORD)
N.Y.-J.F. Kennedy (NYC)
Los Angeles (LAX)
San Francisco (SFO)
Seattle-Tacoma (SEA)
Miami (MIA)
Atlanta (ATL)
Detroit (DET)
Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW)
Honolulu (HNL)
Boston (BOS)
Denver (DEN)
Philadelphia (PHL)
Cleveland (CLE)
Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP)
Newark (EWR)
Houston (IAH)
St. Louis (STL)
N.Y.-La Guardia (LGA)
Baltimore-Washington (BAL)
Pittsburgh (PIT)
Washington National (DCA)
New Orleans (MSY)
Tampa (TPA)
Phoenix (PNX)
Las Vegas (LAS)
Anchorage (ANC)
Charlotte (CLT)
Cincinnati (CIN)
Dulles (IAD)
Fort Lauderdale
Kansas City (MCI)
Memphis (MEM)
Montreal-Int'l (YUL)
Montreal-Mirabel (YMX)
Nashville (BNA)
Portland (PDX)
Salt Lake City (SLC)
San Diego (SAN)
Toronto (YYZ)
* Not ranked in the'top 26 ** Data not available *** Half of flight movement
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
47
72
43
33
21
54
22
28
23
24
36
27
20
18
20
20
22
22
20
15
14
18
15
20
10
15
18
13
13
16
14
14
16
14
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14
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112
87
64
26
54
21
32
32
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38
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28
21
14
36
42
19
10
26
12
19
16
8
10
0
9
11
13
0
1
15
12
8
8
5
15
11
16
10
366
365
335
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evolution of transportation decision making . . . . economic importance (will)
decline in relative importance as decisions become more politicalized" (ref.
5).
The establishment of a totally new all-cargo air terminal at Russellville
was conceived by a group of businessmen and industrial leaders. They proceeded
to enlist senators and congressmen in their effort to build political support
for establishing a dedicated all-cargo, fully intermodal air terminal in their
town. Figure 1.10 illustrates the major "modes" of transportation and the
"link" between them, namely the standard container, 2.44m x 2.44m x 3.05m or
6.10m or 12.19m (8ft x 8ft x 10ft or 20ft or 40ft).
It is not certain whether the Russellville group will succeed in their
attempt; nevertheless, political clout and pull will have some effect upon the
location of modern airports as will such other factors as commercial activity,
links to other transportation modes, and available land. The same will be
true with the exact location of a. modern dedicated gateway freightport, now
called "New York" which will serve the megalopolis "BosWash" (the congested
urban landscape from Boston to Washington), and whether Dallas will get the
nod over Houston, or San Francisco over Los Angeles.
There is an established commercial airport in the vicinity of El Paso,
Texas, but not of the order of magnitude as shown on Figure 1.15. The hexagonal
grid indicates that an airport should be developed in that vicinity, if for no
other reason than strategic considerations. However, there appears to be an
adequate air force base in the area, Holloman Air Force Base, which could also
be converted to civilian use, thus serving as a model for civilian/military
cooperation in the development of a total air cargo system.
Figure 1.10 THE INTERMODAL AIR CARGO TERMINAL CONCEPT
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Such a jointly used air terminal could give rise to the rules and regulations,
security measures and civil freedom of action, training of crews for CRAF, and
other measures needed in national emergencies.
The FAA 1976 National Aviation System Plan estimates that the total
number of airports in the system will grow from 3290 in 1975 to 4066 in 1990
for publicly used and jointly used civil/military airports within the U.S. and
its territories (ref. 6), "where there is a national interest in providing
reasonable access to the nation's air transportation system".
1.1.3 The Relation of the Designated Centers to Other Modes of Transportation
The locations of most of the airports in or near the centers of the hexa-
gons have developed naturally in conjunction with nearby interstate highways
and major trunk railroads. The basic reason, of course, is that urban con-
centrations developed historically in response to fertile land and favorable
communication corridors (Figs. 1.11, 1.12, and 1.13).
As can be seen from these maps based on Department of Transportation
published maps and one sketch map, the suggested air terminals of the system
are astride the major flow of goods in the U.S. Between them, these airports
also handle the major air cargo flows as shown on the percentage distribution
map of air freight activity at major U.S. domestic airports, for 1976 (Fig.
1.14). Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington will be served by the
new airport to be built, called New York in the proposed network.
1.1.4 The Location of New, Dedicated Major Hub "Gateways"
San Francisco, New York, and Houston have been designated as "gateways"
to the international network because of their location with respect to Europe,
Africa, South America, and the Orient. The intent is to create entirely new
and dedicated cargo-only freightports that have easy access to all other major
modes of transportation, i.e., rail, highway, and water. These freightports
will have to be located away from present urban surface and air lane congestion
as none of the existing major airports in the areas concerned will be able to
absorb the expected increase in container cargo anticipated for the 1990-2015
target period envisaged for this system (See Figure 1.15 for anticipated
growth in air activity in 1990).
In view of the fact that approximately 50% of all cargo in 1990 will con-
tinue to be carried as "belly" cargo both in passenger craft and in dedicated
cargo planes, albeit in standardized containers, some provision has to be made
to link the freightports with existing mixed passenger and cargo terminals for
hub-spoke transfer of containers in either direction. Such links could be
fully automated rail links (like the San Francisco BART System) or very
limited access roads between the airports for special rubber wheeled trains or
trucks. The federal government favors the planning of land for new, large
airports. According to an act, signed by President Ford July 12, 1976, the
Federal Government will participate in 75%-90% of the cost of purchasing land
interests to insure that neighboring land use is compatible with airport
operations (ref. 6).
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Figure 1.11 INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS (Ref. 6)
Figure 1.12 CLASS A OR POTENTIAL RAILWAYS (Ref. 6)
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Table 1.4
A SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Event
Truck leaves consignor at Olympia
Truck arrives Seattle Airport
Feeder-plane departs for S.F.
Feeder-plane arrives at S.F.
Hub-plane departs for N.Y.C.
Hub-plane arrives at N.Y.C.
Feeder-plane departs for Albany
Feeder-plane arrives at Albany
Truck leaves Albany Airport
Truck arrives at consignee
Pacific Time
00
00
p.m.
p.m.
8:00 p.m.
9:30 p.m.
10:30 p.m.
30
:30
:00
;00
m.
m.
m.
m.
Eastern Time
9_:00 p,.m.
10:00 p.m.
11:00 p.m.
12:30 a
30 p
30
:30
:00
m.
m.
m.
m.
m.
m.
6:00 a.m.
8:00
9:00 a.m.
(from Olympia, Wash, to Albany, N.Y.)
Figure 1.16 DEEP WATERWAYS AT INTERNATIONAL HUBS (Ref. 6)
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The average distance flown between these major gateway hubs is of the
order of 5000-8000km (3500-5000 miles), suitable for planes like to Boeing 747
or.the DC-10. Most of the world's major airlines are now using the B-747
precisely for such missions, and at least 12 carriers employ all-cargo versions
of the B-747 (Table 1.4).
To accommodate the water mode for moving containers, there are existing
deep waterways near the proposed major hubs (Fig. 1.16). At this stage in the
development of standardized containers, the specifications for seaborne con-
tainers are not quite compatible with those called for by the air transport
industry, especially as far as tare weight and bottom surface is concerned.
While some containerships carry their own lighter barges capable of carrying
containers along canal access ways, the interchange between air and water may
not carry a significant percent of the total cargo even during the cargo
period planned for by this system. Nevertheless, there is no harm including
the possibility as long as the waterways do exist and the potential is there.
Finally, one other aspect of long range planning incorporated into the
design of freightports should be considered. It is conceivable that, by the
year 2000:
1) a fully integrated, intermodal air cargo transportation system is in
place,
2) all-cargo, long range aircraft are fully operational and fully utilized,
3) the prospects indicate a continued growth of air cargo business, and
4) an even more interdependent world industrial and commercial economy
has developed.
At that point, the need for an advanced air cargo craft such as the twin
body (C-XX) or the span loader (DLC), which are now on the drawing boards of
the major airframe companies, will have been ascertained. In anticipation
that new large aircraft will be called for, modern airports now being planned
should set aside acreage that could then be developed with appropriate runways
and buildings to form the ground support infrastructure for this new generation
of aircraft.
1.1.5. Remarks
The hierarchy of hexagonal areas provides for service to all areas, from
the smallest and least efficient units to large continents utilizing efficiency
of scale. No pure network organization will do justice to all special cases
that have developed historically; there simply is not enough flexibility in
any single system or concept. Elsewhere in this chapter special cases of net-
works have been discussed. The above network is intended to serve as a unifying
framework.
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The impact of the system upon the landscape of the United States will be
primarily in the vicinity of the proposed new air cargo terminals, i.e., the
San Francisco, the New York, and the Houston regions. The U.S. Secretary of
Transportation sees need for at least ten new major airports for the year 2000
(refs. 5,7,8,9). It is here proposed that the three hub freightports be
placed in uncongested, rural settings, preferably utilizing wasteland, certainly
not prime farmland. It may be necessary to build additional limited access
roads which will produce the usual consequences for nearby populations, streams,
and wild life (see Section 5.3). The separation of this cargo traffic from
passenger traffic at existing mixed-use airports will contribute to an easing
of congestion both of air lanes and urban access roads. Subsequent development
of industrial parks around new hubs can be monitored carefully and controlled
by local authorities as part of the overall planning and design of the new
airports.
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1.2 CONNECTIVITY AND SCHEDULING
The preceding section of this chapter considered the probable locations
of the cargo ports. These locations represent the nodes (terminals) of the
network. In this section, the edges (links or routes) connecting the nodes
are considered. In addition to the problem of edge determination, the closely
allied problem of scheduling is treated in this section. Important considera-
tions relative to scheduling include such disparate concerns as backhaul,
shippers needs, air freight carrier (AFC) network, competitive AFC's, airport
authorities and terminal availability, curfews, regulations, and the Postal
Service. These topics will be discussed at some length.
Out of this deliberation will come important implications for aircraft
size. In fact, several air carrier planners (notably Pollack, ref. 10 and 11,
and Glenn, ref. 12) allude to the almost parallel planning required to solve
the scheduling and fleet planning problems. This is depicted in Figure 1.17.
Additional details regarding aircraft mix will be discussed in Section 1.6.
The intimate relationships between network connectivity, scheduling, and fleet
sizing, however, are discussed in this section.
It is worth noting that even though the network, fleet-sizing, and sched-
uling problems should be solved simultaneously (or in concert), any formal
combinatorial optimization approach is computationally infeasible. For a
simple combined problem consisting of a 40-node network and two different air-
craft sizes, the combinatorial design space is of dimension nearly 13 000.
Considering that a combinatorial design space problem of dimension 40 can take
weeks to find the extremum on a high-speed computer, it becomes understandable
as to why the combined, total optimization problem cannot be solved. It must
be solved as a collection of subproblems, each of whose dimensionalities is
considerably reduced by heuristic design rules. It becomes necessary, therefore,
to treat these subproblems in concert and separately as well. They are con-
sidered jointly here and dealt with as isolated subproblems later.
In addition to scheduling aircraft, the total scheduling problem also
involves the use of any surface transport required to move the freight from
the shipper's dock to the freightport and from another port to the consignee's
dock. Thus the total scheduling problem requires coordination of the operations
of the air carriers with that of the surface carriers, all of which must be
tailored to the shipper's needs. In this design, the freight forwarder is
assumed to handle the surface transport, and the freight forwarder adjusts his
schedules to accommodate both shipper and air carrier. Even so, the air
carrier's schedule can be fitted appropriately into the transportation windows
needed by the freight forwarder to satisfy the customers. It is conceded that
a vertically integrated carrier system may be operational by 1990 in which one
company handles all surface and air transport, but this certainly is not the
usual case today. The total system is depicted in Figure 1.18. It is apparent
that surface transport and air transport schedules must be coordinated.
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In what follows, a discussion of the needs of the shipper is followed by
a discussion of connectivity design in terms of direct versus hub-spoke
approaches. Formal network designs are proposed which are compatible with the
needs of the shipper, the air carrier, and other interested parties.
1.2.1. Characteristics of the Shipper (Consignor)
At the outset of the scheduling and connectivity design process, it seems
appropriate to consider the needs of the shippers in order that-the cargo
system will accommodate their transportation requirements. As pointed out by
Pollack (ref. 10), cargo tends to arrive at the airline during a short con-
centrated period in the latter part of each workday. The airline, in turn,
has strong pressures to fly at night so that the cargo is ready to.be delivered
to the customer in the morning of the next workday. Both the departure and
the arrival distributions are thus sharply unimodal. The allowed cargo shipping
time is approximately one half day, and then it usually increases .in increments
of 24 hours.
Glenn (ref. 12) also characterizes the shipper in an analogous way.
"He wants as many flights as possible in the late evening, so that
he can clear the products manufactured that day. As a rule, he
is not interested in flights on weekends, when his plant is not
producing. He wants through flights, as he recognizes that, on
occasion, the paperwork which accompanies his shipment sometimes
goes astray when the shipment must be transferred from one flight
to another."
These sentiments are corroborated by similar statements found in Taneja
(ref. 13) who also maintains that shippers prefer late afternoon and evening
flights which are nonstop or direct. Taneja maintains that the Postal Service
is interested in flight departures ranging from 6 P.M. to 1 A.M. and in
arrivals from 4 A.M. to 6 A.M.
In addition to in-transit time, the shipper is also concerned about cost
of transshipment and possible losses due to breakage, theft, and pilferage.
With the exception of cost, all of these factors comprise the quality of
service which the shipper receives from the total air cargo system including
the air carrier, the freight forwarder, any terminal processors, etc.
1.2.2. Connectivity Trade-offs: Direct vs Hub-Spoke
Previously, a network was described as consisting of nodes and edges, as
shown in Figure 1.19 below. It is customary to speak of connectivity as the
degree to which the nodes of the network are connected by edges. The minimum
number of edges in the network is the number of edges required to connect all
the nodes. A minimum edge network is one with very low connectivity, whereas
a network with a great many redundant edges, such as one in which an edge pro-
ceeds from every node to every other node, possesses a very high degree of
connectivity. From Figure 1.19, the similarity between a network with low
connectivity and the hub-spoke construct is apparent, whereas a network with
35
Low Connectivity High Connectivity
Figure 1.19 SIMPLE SIX-MODE NETWORKS ILLUSTRATING THE TWO EXTREMES
OF CONNECTIVITY
high connectivity approximates our understanding of direct routing. Note that
in the hub-spoke network, there are five edges, whereas in the direct network
there are fifteen.
Clearly, the hub-spoke arrangement lessens the number of routes. For a
fixed number of aircraft, .this allows a greater frequency of flights; con-
versely, for a fixed frequency of flights, the number of aircraft required to
service the network increases as the connectivity of the network increases.
If the number of aircraft and frequency of flights are fixed, then load factors
will be higher in the hub-and-spoke arrangement.
Gordon and de Neufville (ref. 14) developed a network model based upon
the concept of schedule delay, D, which is a measure of frequency of service.
The objective is to minimize D on all i routes in a network through appropriate
assignment of the number of aircraft, N., to each route. Thus, N. is their
only decision variable.
This is a legitimate problem when the regulatory environment is as rigid
as it was during the late 60's and early 70's. At that time, the airline
routes were pretty well fixed. The type of aircraft were fixed. About the
only variable that an airline had at its disposal to manipulate to give it a
service advantage over its competition was frequency of service, determined,
of course, by the number of aircraft assigned to a route. Stated mathemat-
ically, their problem was
minD = a }..v. (1-p. )
subject to (1.1)
I N.ct. < S,
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where a = proportionality constant,
v. = volume of passengers along a link or route i
p. = load factor along link i, 0<p-<l
c = aircraft capacity in terms of seats,
t. = distance of link i,
S = total capability of the aircraft fleet in terms of seat-miles in a
given day, and
s = undetermined constant, usually picked to be 1.
The model assumes (1) the line-haul time is relatively fixed, (2) the
delay in the movement of any item through the transportation network is an
important element in its level of service, (3) delays occur at the nodes of
the network and are independent, (4) demand is stochastic and therefore load
factors are stochastic as well, and (5) the level of investment capital is
fixed, fixing the number of aircraft.
Implications for network shape and aircraft size which are derived from
solving this optimization problem are of interest. The analysis suggests that
the network which minimizes schedule delay is often, but not always, the one
with the smallest number of links connecting all points. Further, it shows
that, as a given network becomes more saturated (i.e., as load factors are
increased), the network should become more highly connected in order to mini-
mize delay D. The analysis also shows that when there are many parallel links
that are possible between two groups of cities, schedule delay is minimized
when the number of such links is reduced to one, and one city in each group
acts as a hub. Also, it must be recognized that low connectivity networks
will necessarily require more tonne-kilometers -- some of the traffic that,
could be routed directly on more connected networks has to be detoured on the
other. Thus for low connectivity networks, both load factors and tonne-
kilometers are higher than for high connectivity networks serving the same
geographic area.
In terms of aircraft, the model shows that the immediate effect of intro-
ducing larger aircraft on the network is, in general, to increase delays,
assuming the capital investment in aircraft remains fixed. A.concurrent,
effect of larger aircraft is to increase the desirability of less-connected
networks for any given level of traffic.
Two types of networks were compared using the Gordon and de Neufville
model -- the so-called hub-spoke networks (that form minimal edge networks)
and networks with more direct service. As expected, the results show that
s
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hub-spoke networks are preferable for minimizing total schedule delay D. This
is because there are fewer routes to service and therefore more aircraft are
available per route. The increased number of aircraft available per link
diminishes total schedule delay D because D=f(l/N.) -- that is, D is inversely
proportional to the number of aircraft per link N..
Another consideration is that of cargo connections at the nodes of the
network. The more numerous the aircraft and flights, the more opportunities
there are to schedule connecting flights.
Finally, to minimize schedule delay D, the model shows that the number of
aircraft allocated to a link is a direct function of the volume of traffic,
vehicle size (number of seats or cargo capacity), and length of trip, roughly
according to
J- =!l + K.FT, where K = ^ Vl ,
c Vt, —!
(1.2)
which requires that load factors p^ be greater for longer trips and in denser
markets. The expression above is the closed-form solution to the problem
expressed by Equation (1.1) for s = 1.
In this context, the concept of optimal connectivity takes on meaning in
the sense that the total network schedule delay may not be the overall optimum
if there is a high volume route that would consequently have to connect with
other flights through a hub. In this case, that cargo might most appropriately
be linked directly (in terms of origin-destination pairs). Thus low connectivity
networks require more transfers and handling of cargo, whereas high connectivity
networks greatly diminish the number of available flights. An optimal tradeoff
between these two extremes is required.
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1.2.3. Toward a Network and Network Design Procedure
Formal networks are proposed for both the domestic and the international
settings which incorporate these concerns. These are presented in Figures
1.20, 1.21, 1.22, and 1.23 on the following pages. Figure 1.20 exhibits the
domestic trunking network illustrating the necessary total connectivity among
domestic hubs. Figure 1.21 illustrates the domestic regional networks which
connect the various "spoke terminals with each hub. Figures 1.20 and 1.21
represent the minimal edge network required to connect all nodes shown on the
network. To accommodate heavy traffic routes, the direct network shown in
Figure 1.22 is superimposed upon the minimum edge network shown in Figures
1.20 and 1.21. The direct network allows for better service between paired
cities experiencing heavy traffic volume. It is estimated that roughly 50% of
the domestic freight will fly nonstop with this network, 25% of the freight
will require one transfer, and 25% of the freight (by weight) will require two
transfers. No freight will ever require more than two transfers while it is
in the possession of the air carrier; however, two additional transfers will
generally be required to deliver it door-to-door.
Figure 1.23 exhibits what is considered in ref. 15 to be the necessary
route structure between international, hubs. In addition to the three domestic
hubs previously chosen, the international network requires hubs cited in
Columbia, Japan, Malaysia, Europe, South Africa, Middle East, and the Soviet
Union.
At least as important as the networks proposed here is the methodology by
which they were arrived at. The steps of our method are discussed below:
1) Use central place theory to locate the nodes of the network -- i.e.,
the hubs and spokes.
2) Connect the hubs with a network of edges of maximal connectivity.
3) Connect the spoke nodes to their respective hubs, where each spoke
node is associated with the hub closest to it.
4) Study the demand volume between city-pairs and connect by means of
direct links those city-pairs with the heaviest demand volume. (Those
city-pairs whose aggregate demand volume represented 50% were connected
in this design).
The approach is evidently quite heuristic and should be contrasted with
more formal optimizing approaches that could be used. Even for an optimization
problem involving network design (edge determination) alone, the dimensionality
of the combinatorial problem is still quite high. The literature suggests
that heuristic design schemes hold more promise than do optimizing ones. In
any case computer-assisted approaches, if used at all, have their outputs
modified strongly before being placed into service (refs. 10, 11, 12).
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Figur& 1.20 DOMESTIC TRUNKING NETWORK BETWEEN HUBS
Figure 1.21 DOMESTIC REGIONAL NETWORK CONNECTING SPOKE TERMINALS
WITH EACH HUB
40
Figure 1.22 DOMESTIC DIRECT NETWORK CONNECTING CITY-PAIRS WITH HEAVY
TRAFFIC
cy*
Figure 1.23 INTERNATIONAL NETWORK SHOWING ROUTES BETWEEN HUBS
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1.2.4. Scheduling Considerations
Scheduling refers to the manner in which an existing or proposed aircraft
fleet is assigned to a predetermined network. There are, according to Pollack
(ref. 11), two ways in which heuristic scheduling can be accomplished; however,
only one of these is at all practical. The practical scheme described by
Pollack is discussed later in this section, as is one optimizing scheme. The
scheduling problem has two principal components -- route or cycle determination
and frequency of service. The scheduler must decide what aircraft will fly
which routes and how frequently each route will be flown.
The two heuristic approaches which could be employed are described briefly
here. In the first method, one assumes the fleet sizes are given and the
problem is to determine the best possible flight departure times. This method
is very complex and is not treated in any of the published literature. In
the second method, one begins by specifying a departure range for each flight.
The problem is to determine the actual departures such that fleet sizes are
minimum. This is the method that will be discussed later.
According to Glenn (ref. 12) an air carrier schedule is a compromise
which must consider the interests of many parties as shown in Figure 1.23 (the
abbreviation AFC refers to Air Freight Carrier).
Shipper
AFC Network
AFC Fleet
Back Haul
SCHEDULE
Receiver
Airport Facilities
Government Regulation
Competition Postal Service
Curfews
Figure 1.24 FACTORS WHICH AFFECT AN AIR FRIEGHT CARRIER'S SCHEDULE
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In addition to the factors listed above, still other factors enter into
the scheduling problem, including:
1. aircraft operational conditions and restraints (no two aircraft types
are alike),
2. integer variables,
3. seasonal demand,
4. station restraints,
5. marketing continuity
6. nonlinear revenues,
7. nonlinear costs,
8. fixed and variable costs,
9. major (non-aircraft) cost expenditures, and
10. route authorities
Some of these factors are treated in ref. 10. The implication of these
myriad considerations is that computer-assisted scheduling has enjoyed only
limited success in the airline industry as pointed out by Glenn (ref. 12).
From this extensive list of factors, this discussion will treat only
three important topics -- the AFC network, the problem of backhaul, and fleet
size. The shipper's concerns relative to scheduling were dealt with-previously.
Discussions of the remaining considerations are found in refs. 10, 11, and 12.
It is important to include as well the scheduling concerns of those
freight carriers in the air cargo system that are not dedicated air freight
carriers --namely, the trucking forwarders, and the use of belly space to
transport freight on the air passenger carriers. It is assumed here that
scheduling of air passenger carriers will be accomplished without significant
consideration being given to cargo. And trucking schedules will be determined
after dedicated air cargo schedules are established.
The effect which the AFC network has upon scheduling was also considered
in the previous section. That discussion is summarized by stating simply that
as the connectivity of the network goes up, the frequency of flights must go
down and conversely for a fixed capital investment in aircraft. In addition,
an increase in connectivity causes decreases in tonne-kilometers and load
factors for a fixed captial investment in aircraft.
1.2.4.1. Backhaul
Backhaul refers to loading imbalances that are either characteristic or
periodic on certain routes. An aircraft may be almost fully loaded along cer-
tain directional links and nearly empty along others. The problem is partially
solvable through judicious selection of (1) aircraft size, (2) routing design,
(3) frequency of service, (4) real-time rescheduling or reassignment. The
backhaul problem is treated in ref. 15 from a scheduling viewpoint. References
15 and 16 provide excellent analyses of the hub and wheel scheduling problem
taken in the context of trucking.
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'However, the backhaul problem also has implications for marketing as
well. At each node where serious imbalances exist, the air freight carrier
must attempt, through legitimate marketing strategies, to solicit air-eligible
cargo that is currently being transported by surface transport systems.
Briefly summarized, air-eligible cargo is containerized cargo (as opposed to
bulk cargo). More on the subject of marketing is discussed elsewhere in this
report.
1.2.4.2. Fleet Planning
Glenn (ref. 12) illustrates the enhanced profitability that can come from
the use of smaller aircraft flying more frequently and making fewer stops on
routes where demand is not high. In fact, Glenn cautions against the use of
aircraft that are too large. Large aircraft may be less profitable for the
following reasons:
1. "additional expenses are incurred with the large airplane
when it is stopped unnecessarily, and
2. the fleet size relative to the airplane size is more attractive
with the smaller airplane, because of increased frequency and
opportunties for direct routing."
These points are illustrated by the example shown in Figure 1.25 (adapted
from ref. 12). In this example, there are four population centers located
roughly 320 kilometers apart and roughly in line.
For the network shown in Fig. 1.25, small aircraft provide many direct
flights, whereas large aircraft require many intervening stops. As shown, the
smallest aircraft is the most profitable for this network. In Glenn's experi-
ence, the long-haul flights are most profitable than the short-haul flights,
so that it is desirable to not destroy the profitability of the long-haul by
carrying it on a series of short-haul route segments. Finally, the increased
amount of direct routing possible with the smaller aircraft provides better
service to the shipper because of the diminished probabilities of loss, pil-
ferage, or damage due to handling and because of possible diminished schedule
delay as discussed previously.
1.2.5. Scheduling Design Procedures
In this section, several schemes for schedule determination are discussed.
The first of these schemes is taken from ref. 11 and is heuristic. In this
method, one specifies a departure range for each flight and then determines
the actual departures such that the fleet size is a minimum.
It is also assumed that the complete set of all flights is given, includ-
ing the aircraft type, the itinerary, the block, and through times. (Block .
time is the sum of flight-time and taxi-time between cities. Through time is
the time the aircraft is parked at the terminals.) Assuming each aircraft is
capable of 9.5 block hours per day, it is possible to estimate the fleet size
required by the frequency plan. Since departure ranges are specified in terms
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of a triplet consisting of minimum, preferred, and maximum for departure
times, the problem is to select a good triplet for each flight and to deter-
mine the minimum active fleet size required to undertake the flights.
The actual schedule construction process is iterative in nature, where
each iteration consists of four steps. (1) A triplet of departure times is
assigned to each flight. (2) The flights that are compatible in the sense of
requiring comparably sized aircraft are linked to form a minimal number of
strings (each string corresponds to the set of flights assigned to one aircraft
for one schedule period). (3) The cycle diagram is constructed for each air-
craft type (the cycle diagram represents the sequence of strings that one air-
craft undertakes on successive days or weeks). (4) The total result is evalu-
ated, changes are made to certain parameters, and the process is repeated.
The procedure is predicated upon the following propositions. Initially,
each string of flights consists of a single flight with one aircraft assigned
to it. Since an aircraft is required for each string, the objective is to
form the smallest number of strings. This is done by linking flights together
at each city. In this method, the number of unlinked arriving flights is
always equal to the number of unlinked departing flights at each city. By
linking arriving flights to departing flights, an optimal fleet solution
results.
The procedure consists of three phases. Using the preferred departure
times, each unlinked arriving flight is linked to the closest unlinked departing
flight at eacji city in the first phase. In the second phase, the actual
departures are allowed to shift for those flights that are unlinked at a city.
An unlinked pair is picked and the arriving flight is shifted backward as far
as possible, while the departing flight is shifted forward as far as possible.
If the respective times are in proper relationship to each other, the pair is
linked. For flights which have previously been linked, the entire string must
sometimes be shifted. The second phase terminates when all unlinked pairs
have been chosen and no further linkages are possible.
In the third phase, a city is selected and every linkage is broken at
this city. The linking procedure in phase two is then reapplied. This may
result in more or fewer linkages being formed at the city in question. If
fewer, then the original linkages are restored.
This heuristic procedure works better when the shift ranges are small.
Since some loss in utility or performance results from not departing at the
preferred departure times, it is desirable to keep each actual departure time
as close as possible to the preferred time. A good criterion is a minimum for
the sum of squares of the deviations, where a deviation is the difference
between the actual and preferred departure time.
Next the flight scheduling problem is formulated as an optimization
problem. Let there be M different types of flights to be performed and A
aircraft available. Flight type j (j = 1, . . . . , M) takes time w. and must
J
be performed r. times. The intent is to allocate flights to aircraft in such
J
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a way that W (time of completion of the total job) is minimized for a given A.
This problem is the inverse of the trim problem. The trim problem is well-
known in the operations research literature.
minimize W
x e X
M
 " n ^
subject to I x.. wxW for i=l, . . . , A U-^
i = 1
A
,- = i x^r. for all j=l, . . . , M
x.,^0, integer, for i=l, 2, . . . , A and
'J -i=i 9 Mj • i » ' - » • • • »M
Here x.. refers to the number of flights of type i flown by aircraft j and X
' J
is the matrix of all x..'s. The quantity w- represents the block time required
IJ J
of flight j and the first constraint above insures that no aircraft gets
scheduled for more than W time periods. The second constraint above insures
that each flight or link gets flown r. times.
v)
The trim problem is an integer programming problem whose solution would
be difficult to obtain in any reasonable amount of computer time for M larger
than 40. Also, there may be additional constraints in terms of aircraft
assignments to flights. The problem is solvable using cutting plane and
branch-and-bound methods discussed in refs. 17 and 18. Of particular applica-
bility is the method due to Balas (ref. 19). In some respects, this model
resembles that found in ref. 20. Analogous or related models are described in
refs. 21-26.
The inverse trim problem posed above is much easier to solve, as its
solution can be approached heuristically. Preston (ref. 20) shows that an
optimal solution to the more interesting trim problem can be obtained from the
optimal solutions of a sequence of inverse trim problems.
47
1.2.6. Toward a Feasible Domestic Schedule
For the shipper's interests to be accommodated, what is suggested below
is a schedule intended to deliver any airfreight item, which enters the air
freight system by 6:00 p.m. local time, before noon the next day if its destin-
ation is within the continental United States. For shippers who do not require
overnight delivery, a 36-hour service could be provided at a lower cost. We
consider first the feasibility of overnight service — the sort of service
which is now being provided by Federal Express.
In most cases, perhaps as many as 90%, it would be possible to deliver
before 9:00 a.m. the next day. Consider, for example, an item that must be
transported from a site near Olympia, Washington, to a site roughly an hour's
drive from Albany, New York. The freight moves first by truck to a spoke air-
port at Seattle. From there it is transported to San Francisco by feeder
aircraft. From San Francisco it proceeds via hub aircraft to New York; from
New York it is transported by feeder aircraft to Albany. At Albany it is
placed on a truck and taken to its consignee at Schenectady. This is a worst
case because the freight is moving from west to east, losing 3 hours (the
difference in local times) in the process.
Apparently, this move requires two truck hauls each of one hour duration,
two feeder-plane hauls of roughly 1.5 and 0.5 hours duration, and a hub-
aircraft long haul of roughly four hours duration. In addition, there are two
truck-to-plane transfers and two plane-to-plane transfers, each of which is
assumed to take one hour. (Lufthansa unloads and loads its 747's in 45 minutes,
ref. 28). The total time required to accomplish this delivery is roughly 12
hours. Add to this the three hours of lost time accruing from west-to-east
travel, and it becomes clear that a package placed on a truck in Olympia at
6:00 p.m. can be delivered in Schenectady by 9:00 a.m. the next day.
An appropriate schedule for this case must insure that enough time between
the arrival of one leg of the trip and the departure of another leg is allowed
to accomplish the transfers. Such a schedule is shown in Table 1.4. In light
of this worst-case situation, general guidelines, such as the following,
relative to domestic overnight cargo movement can be drawn.
1. Feeder aircraft should arrive at the hub airport not later than 9:30
p.m. for west-coast to east-coast movements. Feeder aircraft should
arrive no later than 11:30 p.m. at the southern hub, and no later than
12:30 a.m. at the eastern hub.
2. Hub aircraft must depart no later than 10:30 p.m. for west-coast to
east-coast movements. Hub aircraft must depart no later than 12:30 a.m.
from the southern hub, and no later than 1:30 a.m. from the eastern
hub.
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1.2.7. Feeder Aircraft Routing and Scheduling Considerations
The routes flown by the feeder aircraft should be judiciously chosen so
as to minimize the fleet size required while maintaining adequate service. It
seems appropriate to attempt routing of one aircraft through two hubs. In
terms of hub-spoke hexagons, this may be accomplished in several ways as shown
in Figure 1.26.
Both routes possess twelve flight legs or four flight legs per aircraft.
In some respects, the route network B is preferable because each spoke stop
has an intervening hub stop. This would permit complete unloading and reloading
at each stop, allowing for the use of smaller aircraft than in network A.
However, additional scheduling problems result as it becomes impossible to
deliver freight at the spokes in the early morning hours and to pick-up freight
in the late afternoon hours, consistent with the needs of the shipper.
In order to achieve efficient utilization of the air cargo facilities
(terminals, aircraft, access lanes, etc.), it will be necessary for the air
freight carrier to provide incentives (such as lower fares) to encourage the
shipper to move his freight at times other than the peak demand period (the
early evening hours). If the total demand were distributed more evenly through-
out each day, better utilization of the facilities would result and less total
capital investment would be required to accommodate those peak periods of
demand.
If air cargo demand is seasonal, then dynamic demand scheduling would
serve to mitigate this problem by permiting portions of the existing schedule
of routes and flights to be changed to accommodate fluctuations in demand.
Demand scheduling allows the shipper the opportunity to make a deposit, designate
the amount of his shipment and the day the shipment is to be transported about
three months in advance. On the day in question, the freight forwarder picks
up the shipment, receives the remainder of the transport price, and containerizes
the cargo (if it hasn't already been containerized) before delivering it to
the air cargo carrier. In this way both the freight forwarder and the cargo
carrier can schedule their resources in accordance with demand. If the shipment
is not ready on the designated day, the shipper forfeits his deposit and must
transmit his shipment at times which suit the convenience of the cargo carrier
and freight forwarder. Such an approach would result in generally higher load
factors compared to traditional approaches.
A computerized reservation system much like that used for airline passenger
travel would have many advantages in this.context. First, it would insure-
that space would be available on the required connecting flights. Second, it
would enable the shipper to know each departure and arrival time. Third, it
would enable the air freight carrier to utilize dynamic demand scheduling.
The computerized reservation system should have an "intermodal capability".
Given the desired departure and arrival times, the system should determine
several different transportation plans, each with different levels of service
at different fares. Each plan would consist of: (1) the route (and its total
cost and time), (2) the links of the route, and (3) the transportation mode
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BFigure 1.26 TWO METHODS FOR ROUTING THREE AIRCRAFT OVER A HEXAGON HUB-
SPOKE NETWORK
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used during each link and the time and cost associated with that link. In
this way it would be possible to schedule the entire route required to move
the freight from dock to dock. All required links in the move could be reserved,
and the reservation system would be free to pick only those modes on which
vacancies existed.
1.2.8. Frequency of Service
Since at least some of the cargo must be moved during the day, and in
view of the domestic schedule developed in Section 1.2.6., it appears that
departure times can be scheduled around the highest departure frequencies of
the passenger carriers at the airports where both passenger""and dedicated
freight flights are arriving and departing. This is depicted in Figure 1.27.
Current and projected air cargo demand indicates that as many as six
separate daily flights of hub aircraft may be required to handle the heaviest
direct routes between city pairs.* Specifically, for one of the heaviest
routes — Los Angeles (LAX) to New York City -- roughly six flights per day on
the average will be required to accommodate the projected cargo volume in
1990. This number split among several (say 3 to 5) competitive air freight
carriers becomes quite reasonable. It is anticipated that there would be
roughly two departing flights of hub aircraft in the morning and four departing
flights of hub aircraft in the evening around 10:00 p.m. There will, of
course, be many other departing and arriving flights at LAX but certainly not
more than 100 additional all cargo flights. If these flights are scheduled as
shown in Figure 1.27, then no additional expansion of the airport capacity
would be required. Similar consideration apply to other airports which would
transport both passengers and freight.
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1.3 ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS
1.3.1. Factors Influencing the Economics of Networks
The number of parameters involved in the study of the economics of any
transportation network is tremendous. To complicate the situation, many of
the parameters are not independent; that is, changing one parameter to determine
its influence on the network also automatically causes a change in some other
parameter, thus disguising the desired results. Even so, studies in which
parameter variations are made will indicate trends useful in network planning.
If the air cargo system is to offer door-to-door pickup and delivery
using various modes of transportation, the following considerations might be
included in an economic study. Some of these are much more influencial than
others in determining the economic stability of the system.
a. Demand - The requirements for shipping cargo vary from season to
season and from city pair to city pair, affecting service, rate
structures, and transportation requirements.
b. Currency Value - The cost statistics for economic analyses will quite
often be formulated over several years. Since the value of the dollar
varies yearly, the figures must be weighted to allow comparability.
c. Mix of Transportation Modes - The number of vehicles making up each
mode of transportation will influence frequency of service and
scheduling as well as investment costs.
.d. Route system - Terminal locations and the routes connecting them are
of prime importance in cost analyses (See Section 1.2).
e. Frequency of Service - User demand and shipper rates will depend on
how often a mode of transportation arrives at and departs from a
terminal (See Section 1.2).
f. Freight Density for Each Mode of Transportation - 'All modes of trans-
portation will have limits on shipments, both in volume and in weight,
but different modes are affected in different ways by cargo density.
Ideally, each shipment will have the optimal density for the mode
used; actually, the loads will be either smaller, lighter, or both.
Thus, the full potential of the transportation mode will not be
utilized resulting in higher costs per unit volume or unit weight.
g. Types of Cargo - Certain cargo, such as hazardous materials, live
animals, perishable goods, and outsized items may require special
handling. This would warrant special rates.
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h. The Backhaul Problem - This problem occurs when any container or mode
of transportation is utilized for only one-half of a round trip (see
Section 1.2).
i. Balance in the Use of the Modes of Transportation - Any program ana-
lyzing network economics must insure that vehicles in any transporta-
tion mode that arrive at a terminal also depart from that terminal.
j. Location of Consolidation and Break-Bulk Facilities - If these
facilities are not located at the transportation terminals, additional
links in the hub-spoke system must be added, thereby increasing costs
and delays.
k. Reservations and Sales Costs - Selling and reserving space on a
particular mode of transportation for special size or quantity ship-
ments will be a part of the services offered.
1. Advertising and Publicity Costs - To encourage maximum utilization,
businesses and the public will have to be made aware of the services
rendered by the air cargo system.
m. Administrative Costs - These are the costs related to the personnel and
equipment required to make the system function.
n. Transportation Rate Structure - Because of competition or its possible
role as a public utility, the air cargo system may have rates
established by federal regulation rather than by the free market
system.
o. Investment Costs - These include the costs of the modes of transpor-
tation, the way, and supporting equipment.
p. Transportation Mode Operation Costs
1. Direct Operating Costs
(a) Fuel and oil
(b) Crew or operators
(c) Insurance
(d) Maintenance labor
(e) Maintenance material
(f) Maintenance burden
(g) Depreciation
2. Indirect Operating Costs
(a) Supporting equipment maintenance
(b) Supporting equipment maintenance burden
(c) Supporting equipment depreciation and amortization
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q. Revenues - The total income from all sources must be accounted for if
earnings are to be maximized.
r. Sub-optimal Performance - Weather or mechanical failures may force a
cancellation of shipments or a change in schedules.
s. The Effect of Competition - Competition tends to force a reduction in
rates and must be taken into account in forecasts.
t. The Atmosphere of Regulation - If the government controls rates and
routes, a less cost effective system will result (See Section 3.2).
u. Shipment Priority - The inclusion of more than one shipment priority
will add to the complexity of the system and thus raise costs.
1.3.2. Network Economic Optimization Models
The economic analysis of any type of air cargo network is an extensive
problem. Add to this the network requirements of door-to-door pick-up and
delivery and the problem is compounded further. The quantity of factors
affecting costs is extensive and their level of influence varies from critical
to almost negligibile.
Simple and complex computer programs have been written by airframe manu-
facturers, airlines, and government agencies to study network economics; all
have their shortcomings. Primary among the problems of a program is the
inability to place a correct, if any, value on time. Attempts have been made
to equalibrate the value of time to the value of warehouse storage, duplicate
inventories, depreciation and obsolescence, and tie-up of capital. Useful as
this might be, it still fails to account for human desires and needs, particu-
larly during emergency situations. At such times, the value placed on time
may be so high that the cost of shipment, no matter by what means, will be
negligible in comparison. While time obviously has value, that value varies
widely and can be specified only for specific shipments under specific con-
ditions.
The analytical and algorithmic methods used in determining the most cost
effective network are generally classified as optimization and heuristic
methods. These procedures may be used either to minimize costs or to maximize
earnings. The latter effort is more extensive since earnings may be assumed
to equal revenues less costs. Thus, to insure maximum earnings, costs must be
minimized and revenues maximized. A brief description of several techniques
follows.
The classical transportation problem: This type of linear network optimi-
zation is useful primarily for the planning of the physical network, i.e.,
route determination. Its goal is to minimize total transportation cost.
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The mathematical description of this problem (ref. 29) is
m ,,
• • • V V r- v Urtnmmize \ I c... x^
in which c.. is the shipping cost per tonne from point i to point j and x.. is
' J I J
the number of tonnes shipped from point i to point j. The model restrictions
are stated as
n
I xij IS. i = 1, 2, . . . , m (1.5)
indicating the supply limitations on the number of tonnes shipped,
I x..j >Di j = 1, 2, . . . , n (1.6)
indicating the demand limitations on the number of tonnes shipped, and
x. . _> 0 for all i and j (1>7)
implying that no negative quantities may be shipped. If the total supply is
at least as large as the total demand, it is always possible to find a feasible
transportation network in which no more than (m + n-1) routes are utilized
and an optimal solution in which no more than (m + n-1) routes are employed.
Application of this technique to the hub-spoke system proposed in Section
1.1 would be most beneficial to the pickup and distribution of freight in the
spoke regions. The remaining network routes are established from the selection
of hub and spoke terminals.
Linear programming: A combination of analytical and graphical procedures
may be used to determine which modes of transportation should be used for the
various links of the network as well as how long these links should be. The
requirements for using this technique are that the equations of cost for the
various modes of transportation be linear and constraints be indicated in the
form of equalities, or inequalities (ref. 30).
An example of the analysis of a hub-spoke system, based upon the central -
place theory discussed in section 1.1, follows. In this example, the cost is
minimized with respect to the distances through which the various modes of
transportation will move the cargo. It is assumed that one unit of cargo,
which is evenly distributed throughout the region served by hub A, is transported
to the region served by hub B and evenly distributed throughout it (Fig. 1.28).
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Figure 1.28 THEORETICAL HU6-SPOKE 
Further restrictions or constraints include:
a. The pick-up and transport to a spoke terminal and the delivery from a
spoke terminal to the destination is handled by truck. From the
CLASS report (ref. 31), these vehicles have total operating costs given
by
CT = |g RT + 60 (1.8)
where CT is the cost of shipping by truck and RT is the distance
traveled. The maximum range is considered to be 550km (340mi). The
constant (60 for truck) is the minimum fixed cost characteristic of
a single trip by the vehicle.
b. The transportation between spoke and hub terminals is by intermediate-
payload freight aircraft having a maximum range of 2400km (1500mi) and
a cost curve estimated to be
0.9)
in which Cr is the cost of shipping by feeder aircraft and Rp is the
distance traveled. The minimum range is assumed to be 1100km (685mi),
an arbitrary choice determined by the point at which the line haul costs
are equal to the sum of the remaining costs.
c. The transportation between hub terminals is by long-range, high-payload
freight aircraft having a cost curve of (ref. 31)
CL = §5 RL + 17° (1-10)
where C, is the cost of shipping by long range aircraft and R. is the
distance of shipment. This aircraft is assumed to have a maximum range
of 6400km (4000mi) and minimum range of 1400km (870mi), for the same
reason as indicated for the feeder aircraft.
d. The total trip length is 8000km (5000mi).
These transportation costs and constraints may be stated analytically as
total cost = C = 2CT + 2 (y)* Cp + CL
= 2 (5 RT + 60) + 2 () (g- RF + 170) + §- RL + 170 (1.11)
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subject to the constraints:
2R? + 2Rp + RL = 8000 (1-13)
0
 1 RT 1 55° (]>14)
1100 £ Rp £ 2400 (1.15)
1400 < RL <_ 6400 (1.16)
Solving equation (1.13) for Rr and substituting into equation (1.12) yields
(1.17)
Since the cost is now expressed as a function"of Ry and Rp, graphical procedures
may be used to find the minimum cost, as illustrated in Figure 1.29.
The dashed lines representing solutions of constant cost, obtained from
equation (1.17), indicate a minimum cost of $1535.14, occurring when Ry = 550km
(340mi), Rp = 1100km (685mi), and RL = 4700km (2900mi). This solution is com-
patible with the hub-spoke system based upon the central-place theory.
If the same basic problem were solved with the constraints on the truck
and feeder aircraft changed to
0 <_ RT <_ 1000 (1.18)
0
 1 RF 1 240° (1-19)
the minimum cost would be $1461.43 occurring when RT = 1000km (620mi), Rp = Okm,
and RL = 6000km (3700mi). The savings over the previous example would be $73.71.
This is only a 4.8% decrease in price in conjunction with a probable two-day
delay in transit due to the elimination of the feeder aircraft as a mode of
transportation and the lengthening of the truck link. Whitehead (ref. 24)
obtained a similar result. Weakness in this model and Whitehead1s is the
failure to place a value on time.
*0nly six of the seven hexagons in the hub region (See Fig. 1.26) are served by
feeder aircraft.
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If an arbitrary value on time were set at $480 per unit load per day, the
shipping costs in the last example would rise by $960 to $2421.43. This is a
65% increase over the cost when the feeder aircraft is used and a 57.7% increase
over the cost of the first linear programming example where the more restricted
range constraints were imposed. Thus, the usefulness of assigning time a
value is illustrated as is the need for feeder aircraft in the hub-spoke system.
A second approach to placing a value on time is to introduce a cost per
unit time value into the cost equations for each mode of transportation. If
this value were set at $20 per unit load per hour, the equations of cost for
the three modes of transportation would become
CT=20<8875> RT +2V Rt + 6°
in which 88.5 is the average speed in km/h (55mi/hr) for trucks,
CF = 20 <8875> RF + ^ 5 RF +
where 885 is the average speed in km/h (550mi/hr) of the feeder aircraft, and
•» •
—^ R + — R + 170 (1-22)KL 25 KL i/U
In this last equation, the 950 represents the average speed in km/h of the
long haul aircraft (590mi/hr).
Substitution of equations (1.20), (1.21), and (1.22) into equation (1.11),
using the constraints indicated in equations (1.13), (1.14), (1.18), and (1.19),
and following the graphical procedures outlined above, yields a minimum cost of
$1734.23. This cost occurs when Ry = Okm, Rp = 800km (500ml), and RL = 6400km
(4000mi). This answer, though mathematically correct, is not realistic since
it implies that every user will have a feeder aircraft airport at his door.
Only by further constraining the minimum range of the feeder aircraft may this
pitfall be avoided.
Modified forms of equations (1.20) and (1.21) may also be used to allow the
shipper to determine how much his time must be worth to use both truck and feeder
aircraft economically for either the first or last two links of the hub-spoke
system, as opposed to use of truck only. For this method, the cost of truck
transportation from origin to hub terminal (or from hub terminal to destination)
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becomes
in which C is the cost per unit load per hour, a variable, and D is the distance
from origin to hub terminal (or hub terminal to destination), also a variable.
The cost between the same points using both truck and feeder aircraft becomes
CT-F = 17° + + 85> <D - DT> + 6° + ( + 8lhr> DT
in which Dy is the distance from the point of origin to the spoke terminal (or
from the spoke terminal to the destination). Equating (1.23) and (1.24) yields
25 885 25 " 885
_
"
 1/U
For each value of DT (a parameter), a curve of distance from origin to hub
terminal (or hub terminal to destination) versus cost per unit load per hour
may be obtained, as shown in Figure 1.30. Thus, if a shipper is, for instance,
1000km (620mi) from the nearest hub terminal and is 300km (190mi) from the
regional spoke terminal, his value on time must be at least $31.61 per unit
load per hour before the use of feeder aircraft becomes economical. Values on
time of less than $31.61 per unit load per hour indicate that only trucks should
be used.
Gradient methods: Gradient methods or methods of steepest descent or
ascent are numerical methods characterized by iterative algorithms for improving
the estimates of independent variables so as to satisfy the condition for a
maximum or minimum. A complete description is given by Bryson and Ho (ref. 30).
These methods would allow an optimal solution if the cost functions for the
various modes of transportation were nonlinear and the constraints of the
problem were of the equality or inequality type.
1.3.4. Remarks
As'has been implied previously, the trade-off between cost and time must
constantly be remembered. Though the mathematics of the problem may indicate
one solution, the value placed on time by the user of the system must not be
forgotten. A theoretical model of a network may be suitable for initial studies,
but the analysis of a specific network of routes and terminals and insertion
of time cost values will yield more reliable data.
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No matter how sophisticated, any economic model which uses the forecasts
of future situations is susceptible to error. Major and occasionally minor
errors in estimating future demands, capabilities, and operations could negate
all results of an economic analysis. As a result, it is not unusual to find
that "gut feelings" may reveal trends just as accurately as a complex computer
program.
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1.4 CURRENT CARGO CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL
1.4.1. Existing Airports and a New System
A great deal of information on the cargo capabilities of existing airport
facilities should be known before any attempt is made to select an optimal set
of airports in any coordinated network of air freight delivery. Because they
represent, largely, undeveloped regions of the country where expansion is
possible and investments exist, the current and idle military air facilities
could augment the generally more desirable but constricted civil airports.
Description of airport freight capacity is complicated by the fact that,
except for military airfields, there is no airport cargo capacity, but rather
a series of cargo capacities, one for each of the airlines or other freight
forwarding firms located at the airport. At any one field, the various firms
•may be almost anywhere on the continuum from passenger service only, through
small parcel and major belly cargo carriers, to freight-only firms. Large
fields tend to have several large cargo firms, but some smaller firms as well.
Smaller fields may be strategically located and have high cargo requirements
or have none at all.
The amount of detail desirable for assessing the current and potential
value of a given field in the overall air freight system depends also on the
basic system philosophy. A few major hub freightports fed by truck have
entirely different implications from a multihub system or one that uses a
relatively large number of feeder airports with or without major freight hubs.
The network design assumptions may require, say, three U.S. hub air
freightports. The constraints on airport capacity could conceivably rule out
this design because the locations needed for efficiency could not be modified
to handle the projected volume of cargo. An alternative might then be a
point-to-point network made up of more feasible cargo capacities at a larger
number of airports.
To allow for network design tradeoffs and contingencies, and for the
selection of those best suited to the system requirements, an inventory of
factors influencing freight capacity of existing air facilities is needed for
a relatively large number of airports. No such inventory exists with the
kinds of current, detailed description desirable. A preliminary version of a
questionnaire which would collect these data is found in Appendix C of this
report.
Even if all the desired Information were available, of course, there is
no authority which can suddenly impose a design on the providers of air service
in the U.S. A new system must evolve from its current status to one which
meets the needs of the changing world in terms of demand and economics. For a
rough notion of the current cargo picture, some information on current airports
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is given in Table 1.3.
Before the "ideal" system can be conceived, it is informative to examine
the way the present needs are met. In this space age of pocket computers and
automated Mars explorations, it may be surprising to discover that much of the
air cargo is handled with little beyond 1950 technology. Newer planes are
used, and the computer helps in the paperwork, but the progress of mechanization
in moving goods has been modest. The next few pages describe what goes on
today. After a brief status report, the operation in a moderate-sized airport
is described in detail. While a few airports around the world handle much
greater volumes, the total moved by all the moderate-sized airports is what
makes the whole system work and gives potential for the future.
A brief look at a proposed military air cargo terminal is given next for
possible insight. This is followed by a look at what many might have expected
was typical -- automatic container handling and storage at a major airport.
This section concludes with a discussion of the direction in which our current
system is likely to go. The forces which mold evolutionary change are not
likely to change in the near future. They include occasional step-wise improve-
ments but are more often incremental improvements on current conditions until
fundamental changes are forced on the system. These changes are triggered by
growing inefficiencies or daring innovators who threaten the status quo.
1.4.2. Today's "Non-System" of Cargo Service
The U.S. Airlines, all carrying some kind of cargo, operate about 13 000
scheduled flights daily. This amounts to 20 million freight shipments annually
involving 600 American airports and 100 foreign airports. In the U.S., over
10 000 communities are served by truck and air. Air freight totals about 3.3
million tons a year, half of it in all-cargo aircraft, the other half in the
bellies of B-747, DC-10, and L-1011 passenger aircraft.
The problems in the use of air for cargo arise in the lack of convenient
point-to-point delivery service. Brochures discuss the service provided by
"some airlines" (ref. 32) but not all. "Often, there are signs at the airport
directing shippers to the ticket counters accepting the small packages," but
usually not; some charge "a flat fee to move a package anywhere in its system,"
according to the brochures, others charge according to route segment; pick up
or delivery can be arranged by "some airlines" and "there are some provisions
for interlining" (pre-arranged transfers among two or more airlines). The
exceptions make the system most useful for exchange between major population
centers and for emergency shipments where the complexity is acceptable because
of urgent need for speed.
Through an organization called Air Cargo, Inc., air carriers in North
America have developed a fairly widespread system of delivery by air and truck
to small communities. A bi-monthly directory listing these thousands of
cities is available. There are 32 certified airlines, 160 motor carriers, and
30 commuter airlines participating in the Air/Truck Programs. Speed and
reliability, as well as cost, are likely to vary widely in such a conglomerate
which lacks integral coordination of operations.
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In contrast, Federal Express Corporation (FEC) was organized in 1973 to
offer the same kind of service where speed and reliability of delivery for
small packages was the main objective. This single organization of trucks and
small aircraft with highly flexible and efficient routing and mostly night
flights allows service not possible in a multi-firm cooperative effort. For
small shipments (up to 701b, routinely), FEC has a near monopoly on point-to-
point delivery over much of the U.S. Many small communities continue to lack
service, but an expanding air cargo demand demonstrates the need for a system.
The $50 million initial capital investment - the largest ever arranged in the
U.S. - created a system which started from nothing and turned a profit in only
two years. There is little chance that a direct competitor will appear in
this market;, however, the system of heavy routine and emergency shipments in
which air freight is economically feasible constitutes a separate, complementary
market which is now being served to some extent but is not being developed to
anywhere near its potential.
For efficiency with larger volumes of air cargo, containerization must
eventually be developed. This requires not minor improvements, but revolutionary
redesigns in facilities and large investments. Whether individual airlines
can continue (or will decide to) make these investments or consolidate into
airport-wide cargo systems is yet to be decided.
1.4,3. The Air Cargo Complex at Baltimore-Washington International Airport
(BWI)
There are 15 certified airlines now serving the cargo needs at BWI and
several more are expected in the next few months. Only 25 airports in America
have more than BWI (See Table 1.3). It also has 26 air forwarders serving it
and only 11 airports exceed this number. This makes BWI a "large" airport,
probably typical of the major feeder airports which would make up any future
organized cargo network. It is enlightening to discover how freight is now
being handled at such a "major feeder".
As in any civilian air terminal, there is really no airport cargo handling
system, but only a series of separate, widely divergent airline cargo systems
which represent the present cargo shipping practice. The cargo complex at BWI
consists of three buildings which are essentially back-to-back docks with a
small floor space between them. Trucks back up to one side and unload and,
after a sorting process, other trucks back up to the other side to deliver
freight to the airlines or airplanes. All packages are in and out in a matter
of a few hours, often a few minutes. While there is the usual series of small
cargo facilities or offices for each air carrier, separate buildings are used
by three major cargo carriers.
In addition to the 15 scheduled cargo-hauling air carriers now serving
BWI, several major and smaller freight carriers are said to be considering
locating there (ref. 33). These include Iberia, Lufthansa, KLM, Flying Tiger,
and others. Piedmont recently moved its entire operation there, and North
Central Airlines moved there in August 1978.
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The runways at BWI are capable of handling all aircraft including the C-
5A which has landed there, but the Concorde and the DC-8-61, for example,
should have longer runways for routine operations which involve maximum loads
and all weather conditions.
BWI is about fourth in U.S. air freight growth rate, but there are problems
in ranking airports. For example, BWI, with 20 795tonnes (22 923tons) of
freight enplaned in 1977, ranks about 20th. Yet the freight deplaned at BWI
was almost twice as much, 38 570tonnes (42 520tons), and another 20 SOOtonnes
(22 375tons) of mail was enplaned or deplaned (almost equally) in 1977. For
capacity analyses, it could be argued that the ranking should be based on the
sum of the larger of the cargo enplaned or deplaned plus the larger of the
mail enplaned or deplaned. This is more closely related to current operating
capacity than other combinations of these figures. Since some airports have
greater incoming loads than outgoing loads and others are the opposite, neither
figure can be used for overall comparisons. In the same way, totals of incoming
and outgoing freight are misleading since an even balance is more efficiently
accommodated than unbalanced cargo flows, so a freight flow of 50 units in and
50 units out probably requires less investment and staff than one with 70
units in and 30 units out, even though the total freight handled is 100 units
in each case.
National Airport near Washington, D.C., will have a curfew imposed soon,
according to its operator, the Federal Aviation Administration. This will
tend to make air cargo firms shift to BWI. Several firms have indicated they
will make this move, and BWI expects to double cargo volumes in the next few
years. Deep water containership ports are 8 to 10 miles away, Conrail comes
near a current runway terminus, and the interstate system is easily accessible,
making a truly multimodal operation possible. However, airline marketing
efforts, with a few exceptions, show little expertise in cargo handling or
knowing the customer's needs. The air forwarders are now the biggest customer
of the airlines, doing the marketing for them. The forwarders, if they buy
planes, could become the biggest competition of airlines. This fact seems to
have aroused little anxiety among airline executives.
At BWI, United Airlines Cargo system is the largest of the cargo carriers,
and the only one with regular air freighter aircraft. BWI is a major truck
terminus for United, gathering freight from Philadelphia, Washington, Norfolk,
and Richmond areas since none of these has air freighter service. Two DC-8
freighters leave BWI at 12:30 a.m. and 02:20 a.m. Tuesday through Saturday.
Other freight is sent by belly cargo in B-737, B-727, and DC-10 (widebody)
passenger flights with belly cargo during the daytime, depending on destination,
schedules, and expected freight volumes. The decision as to which plane will
carry a package is largely dependent on the cargo agent's knowledge of flight
alternatives, rather than a formal routing or decision system. Presumably
poorly routed packages would not result in feedback to this agent unless a
serious (to the shipper) delay, resulted. This system also implies that different
agents often make different judgments. While actual routes are documented
after a decision for tracing, it seems likely that improvements could be made
if it were shown to be desirable.
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Cargo can arrive almost anytime of the day or night at the terminal,
though the bulk arrives after 4 p.m. and continues to come in until after 11
p.m. About 10 p.m., the container filling begins, with men obtaining empty
containers from the storage area outside the plane docks, and moving them in
on dollies either by hand or by electric truck. Freight from pallets or loose
boxes and crates are stuffed into the containers. Heavy items are moved by
forklift truck, but most packages are manually arranged in the containers for
the main deck of the DC-8, or the various LD (lower deck) shaped containers
for use in the B-747 or DC-10 bellies. This requires the loaders to climb
into.the container to fill the volumes as they see fit. Each container is
loaded with material for one ultimate or intermediate destination.
As each item arrives at the cargo terminal, an airbill is made out showing
origin, destination, contents, number of items, weights, and airbill number.
Copies of this airbill are attached to the package in an adhesive envelope.
As the pallet or container is filled (unitized), the airbill numbers and
weights are written on a sheet which will be placed in a cargo pallet tag
(envelope) which is attached to the outside of the container with a wire
twist. As containers are made up, the content lists are sent to a weight and
balance agent who must that the aircraft will bly well as loaded and that the
total weight is not excessive. It is usually the volume rather than the
weight capacity that limits the load. About 240kg/m3 (151b/ft3) density
would be required for just filling both weight and volume limits, and freight
often average less than 160kg/m3 (101b/ft3). With the loss of useable volume
in the aircraft and empty spaces in containers, the density may drop even
further, to 96kg/m3 (61b/ft3) perhaps.
As containers are filled, the order of aircraft loading is determined for
weight and balance purposes, and the containers are staged for loading. A
mechanized system allows a pallet or container with its dolly to drop into a
pit for loading. This pit is also used to fit the cargo nets over pallets for
securing the loads. One or two filled units are placed on each of nine motor-
ized roller tables. When the plane is ready, the elevator loader is moved
into position at the plane's cargo door and a loader vehicle shuttles each
container to the elevator in the required order. The loader vehicle is driven
up to one of the nine staging lines, the operator reaches out of the cab
window and pushes a button on a switchbox suspended conveniently from a cable.
This moves a container to the loader, which is then turned around and driven
to the lowered elevator. The container is moved electrically on to the elevator;
it is raised, after which the container moves forward to the plane-level
platform. The elevator can then be lowered ready for the next container while
the one just delivered is moved into the plane and pushed manually into its
assigned position. A round trip by the vehicle takes less than 30 seconds.
While the containers are being loaded, electric carts have been "busy
hauling loose cargo and mail sacks to the fore and aft belly compartments. As
the total load becomes, known, the pilot may decide to add fuel since the load
is estimated, often quite inaccurately, prior to receiving all the outgoing
cargo. Fuel is taken on for the estimated load, but excess fuel weight is
avoided for economy. The entire loading and aircraft checkout process requires
about 30 minutes after the containers are ready. Some containers for other
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flights may be moved to the passenger aircraft belly loading areas at any
timas well.
Meanwhile, documentation is proceeding in the office and in the cargo
area. Information from the airbill is entered into a computer display system
for tracing each item. Its location and schedule can be called up in any of
United1s cargo offices, and the delays in entering information are short since
the work progresses as freight is containerized and during loading. The
information is transferred manually several times for making up the containers,
for the pilot's manifest and the weight and balance calculation, for container
labeling, and for the tracing and billing system. Recording errors are fairly
common, but redundancies allow resolution with little delay in most cases.
Where there are several pieces in one shipment, a stencil is cut and each car-
ton is printed with a hand-held inking device.
One is impressed with the apparent confusion during the loading period
and the apparently successful sorting, routing, billing, handling, timing, and
packing decisions which must be coordinated in the process. Little mechaniza-
tion is involved. Staff experience is obviously crucial, though the computer-
ized information on routes, loads, United's office hours around the world,
transfer points, other airlines' schedules, customer identification and needs,
cargo type, special handling, etc. helps. The staff must keep track of perish-
able items in the cool (4 C or 40 F) room, live animals and pets, dry ice
shipments (which cannot be in the same airplane compartment with animals
because of the suffocating carbon dioxide it gives off), hazardous materials,
and other special considerations.
Although the operation is very uneven, the area is very busy during the
loading of an aircraft so this terminal seems to be working close to its
practical capacity. Another plane perhaps could be handled if scheduling were
convenient, and if more passenger aircraft belly volume were to be moved, but
a large increase in freight volume could easily swamp the present system.
More staff would probably not help much because of the increased coordination
that it would entail. A larger aircraft would tax the staging area and slow
the loading process. It might also require new containers which could make
some of the handling equipment useless. The decision and documentation phases
would undoubtably suffer seriously. These are the kinds of problems which
must be faced before a larger air cargo business can be handled. The larger
air freight systems are essentially different, not only in scale but also in
kind.
1.4.4. Military Air Cargo
Military Needs: Military air cargo needs are different from civilian
needs in several important aspects. First is cost: the military must deliver
to a wide variety and quality of airfields on short notice and must unload
without specialized ground equipment. The cost of providing such versatile
designs is high and generally not feasible in a profit-making operation.
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Air freighters similar to the C-130, C-141, and C-5A were designed for
freight use with a high wing and "kneeling" landing gear so that the cargo
doors could be near ground level. Lower ramps and loaders are simpler and can
be carried in the aircraft or built into it without large weight penalties.
Nose or tail doors allow vehicles to drive in (or through), and long loads or
other oversize cargo which could not fit in side doors can be accommodated.
The rear door also allows military cargo drop by parachutes.
In contrast, the B-747F and B-747C have nose doors but not tail doors,
and the doorsills are 4.9m (16ft) above the ground. The standard Air Force
436L system 40K Loader can reach a height of about 3.7m (12ft), sufficient for
loading the biggest military aircraft, the C-5A; however, a 1.2m (4ft) adapter
platform must be placed under the 40K loader in order to load B-747F/C. A
second 25K Loader is used to shuttle cargo from the assembly area to the 40K
Loader on the platform, which lifts the freight to the nose door level.
A second area of difference in military cargo needs is related to load
density. The C-5A is designed to carry tracked vehicles and the battle tank
(M-60). It thus has a much stronger floor than the 747F. Density of air
cargo in commercial transportation averages well under that required to make
use of the maximum lift available. Containers use (and waste) more space, so
that the 747F with 2.44m x 4.90m (8ft x 16ft) crossection plus lower deck for
LD containers, and the proposed "lifted" version with two 2.4m x 4.9m (8ft x
16ft) decks, are more efficient for a system based on the standard intermodal
container, than the C-5A which measures 4.0m (13ft) high and 4.9m (16ft) wide
in one large cabin.
A military cargo system called the 453L is based on the 2.24m x 2.74m
(88in x 108in) pallet loaded up to 2.44m (96in) high or 4750kg (10 5001b).
This is different from the "Igloo" commercial container and from the ISO con-
tainers, so that there .is little hope of an efficient interchange of cargo or
cargo capability between the current military system and the proposed integrated
cargo system.
Military Air Cargo Facilities: The need is greater to standardize material
and units in a world-wide military operation than in civilian operation because
of the single source of supply and critical planning requirements. It is also
more feasible, since there is one overall authority. The Air Force cargo
system, while it is based on a pallet size which is not compatible with the
ISO intermodal container* is based on one standard, so the handling concepts
are, in theory, transferable. In fact, however, the military cargo systems
have different demands, routes, and schedules. They are not especially efficient
in the terms important to commercial users because of the costs, peak needs,
and lack of established routine operations.
A new U.S. Navy Air Freight Terminal Facility, which might offer ideas
for terminal design, is being developed for the Naval Air Station (NAS) in
Norfolk, Virginia. A concept study (ref. 34) determined that a gross area of
5700m2 (61 000ft2) at a cost of about $3 million would be appropriate. However,
the best concept was relatively unsophisticated, at least compared to the
Lufthansa operation in New York, which will be discussed in Section 1.4.5. It
71
will be more like the United Airlines cargo operation in Baltimore (BWI). The
NAS terminal is to have six originating and seven terminating truck docks and
21 docking positions for K-loaders, each with a pallet conveyor. Up to 100
pallets can be on conveyors, and any pallet can be moved to another conveyor
station by means of a motor transfer cart, manually controlled. Maximum
design volume is ISOtonnes (200tons) per day, one-third of which is terminating
at NAS. There are spaces for customs and for refrigerated and hazardous
materials. A staff of 50 can be accommodated.
While this new design for NAS may be advanced in terms of the systems
used in the military and may meet their needs very well, it does not provide
the kind of innovation necessary for a high-volume containerized cargo operation.
The forklift truck, an integral part of the NAS concept, is limited in container
handling because of size, weights, and damage potential. While the forklift
will continue to be used in the loading of each container, the containers
themselves need more efficient means for guiding their movements and for
documenting the contents.
1.4.5. An Example of Containerized Freight Movement
In contrast to the great majority of current cargo handling techniques,
there are a few operations which are now capable of handling cargo in the
manner envisioned for the nodes of an integrated cargo system, in which a
small number of standard container types are handled routinely. One major
problem in the growth of this capability is the intermodal character of the
containers. The intermodal-ocean container began with the Sea-Land operations
in 1956. By 1968, despite widespread predictions to the contrary, over 100
vessel companies were involved. Containers became more popular, and by 1976
there were 1.6 million 6.1m (20ft) ISO container equivalents in service (ref.
35).
The sea-going containers are stacked six high in the hold and extend
above the main deck of the containership. This requires a strong, and thus
heavy, box which is costly to move by air. Even though the container could
weigh almost as much as the cargo without overtaxing the lift capacity in
today's low density air cargo, the added weight does increase fuel costs.
A lighter intermodal-air container has been in use since 1975. It can be
stacked only two high, which limits its use in ships. Nevertheless, 380 of
them are in use in 1978, and 800 are projected by 1980.
Aircraft now available to handle the ISO containers include 58 B-747's
with main deck cargo capability delivered in mid 1978 and in service with 26
operators. Of these, about 36 are cargo-only aircraft. The B-747 is now
serving the continental U.S. and 32 other airports around the world. Table
1.5 lists the carriers flying cargo versions of the B-747 at this time (see
also Table 1.2).
In 1973, Lufthansa (ref. 28) became the first to carry ISO standard con-
tainers in B-747 aircraft in regular service. The Frankfort to Kennedy (NYC)
service required a considerable investment in handling equipment and facilities.
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Table 1.5
CARRIERS FLYING B-747 AIRCRAFT IN U.S. , 1978
Rev**
8
14
6
15
11
3
7
12
4
10
2
13
9
5
Code
AA*
AC
AF*
AI
AZ
BA
BN
CP
FT*
IB
JL*
KE
KL
LH*
LY*
NW*
OA
PA*
QF
SB*
SK
SN
TP
TW
UA
Airline
American Airlines
Air Canada
Air France
Air India
Alitalia
British Airways
Braniff International Airways
CP Air
Flying Tiger
Iberia
Japan Air Lines
Korean Airways
KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines
Lufthansa German Airlines
El Al Israel Airlines
Northwest Orient Airline
Olympic Airways
Pan American World Airways
Quantas Airways
Seaboard World
SAS - Scandinavian Airlines
Sabena-Belgian Airlines
TAP
Trans World Airlines
United Airlines
* All-cargo versions B-747 are used by this airline. Cargolux, Iraqi, and
World lines also have them.
** World rank in revenue ton-miles for cargo, 1976. Aeroflot is number 1.
(Ref. 46, 48).
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The 9000m2 (97 000ft2) terminal at NYC cost $16.2 million. However, it
requires only 45 minutes from the opening to the closing of the nose door to
remove and replace about 90tonnes (lOOtons) of freight in a load of 28 containers,
each 3.05m (10ft) long. These are handled on a regular six-day per week
basis. A computer-controlled oversize storage machine handles ISO containers,
igloos, and various pallets in its 227 storage openings which rise to 15m
(50ft) above the floor. All transfers are powered, and transfer platforms can
raise and tilt to mate with the aircraft doors and floors, though the telescoping
dock never actually touches the relatively delicate aircraft nose structure.
Each freight unit is numbered. The transfer platform operator enters the
numbers via an on-board CRT terminal for storage and the various transfer
operations which the computer controls. Containers are emptied and sorting is
done with the machine serving as a transfer cart to tow carts and work stations.
Five conveyors at the work stations transfer material to or from the 26 truck
docks via tow carts. On command, the carts move to customs or truck docks
with the destination determined by mechanical probes which are read automatically.
Full containers or those too large for tow carts are forklifted directly to
the heavy storage areas.
Entering freight from trucks goes by roller-bed truck to container storage
or to work stations for containerization and then to storage. Cart numbers
and cargo identification are assigned by the dispatcher from the airbill. A
photoscanner reads cart numbers for controlling their movements by computer.
The DEC single-process computer takes inputs from optical scanners and
load sensors and from various operators in the terminal. As a cart leaves
storage, the computer prints out the previous cart's destination, so the
operator can manually set the mechanical probes for the next destination. The
computer keeps track of the contents of the storage area, the airbill numbers
of the contents, the total inventory, status reports on loading and load
staging operations, and other routine information, as well as controlling the
movements of the carts and the storage machine. Two CRT terminals, five tele-
type units, and a telephone net complete the system.
Lufthansa ranked fourth in world cargo revenue ton-miles in 1976 (See
Table 1.4), and now (ref. 36) flies two B-747F and six B-747-200B combination
aircraft. The utilization of specialized, computer-controlled systems is thus
not yet very intensive, though Lufthansa also flies the same aircraft to
Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Amsterdam. Growth, based on
the experience of mechanized container operations such as Lufthansa's, is
needed before a world-wide air cargo system can be said to exist. In 1977,
there were 115 all-cargo (including 14 widebody B-747F) aircraft, 303 other
widebody combination aircraft, and 1842 other combination aircraft being flown
by U.S. scheduled airlines. The all-cargo aircraft served 49 airports and the
widebody combination aircraft served 53. Of the 631 airports served in the
U.S., with their 1007 airline operations facilities, 702 freight operations
areas were maintained separately from passenger facilities. Only 3 were
reported which had off-airport freight facilities. In .1976, only 6.7% of
freight shipments were containerized by the shippers, though 17.7% of all
freight volume was shipped in containers. As mentioned before, the load
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factors were not especially good, with 50-60% usual and an occasional 70% seen
(ref. 37).
1.4.6. Potential and Problems in Expansion of Air Cargo Business
While growth in air cargo demand has not been as rapid as most of the
predictions of the past few years, the potential continues to exist as demon-
strated by the fantastic growth of firms such as Federal Express, Burlington
Northern Air Freight, and many other freight forwarders. Where new service is
provided, the demand seems to be generated.
A basic problem in expansion of air cargo capability is the capital which
must be risked on the promise of new business. Federal Express Corporation
needed $50 million before one cent of revenue was received. Lufthansa invested
$16.2 million in the New York facility alone in order to handle intermodal
containers more efficiently, and similar investments will be needed in Frankfort,
Amsterdam, Bogata, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and other major
terminals if the system is to be fully exploited.
This kind of investment and the innovation which results in rapid growth
is not typical of the passenger-oriented major airlines. On the other hand,
according to one airport cargo manager, Seaboard World Airlines has a facility
in which a B-747F .can have its belly compartments being loaded, its nose and
side door in use unloading the main deck, and an engine being changed, simultan-
eously, in one large building. Innovation has its risks, of course, and
Seaboard apparently had an automated tow-cart system with drag cables in the
floor which did not prove practical and had to be abandoned. There have been
other failures in automation, where reliability or cost were not controllable
or the real needs of the system were not being met, either initially or as the
conditions changed with time.
Cargo handling and loading is widely recognized as a bottleneck area
which limits the productivity of air shipping. As in all production systems,
the decision to remain manual or to automate depends largely on volume or
throughput. Expansion is possible only to a degree, after which automated
approaches are necessary for both capacity and efficiency. Given a current
capacity of 100%, improvements, more staff, and greater stresses can result in
larger throughputs, perhaps to 140% or 160%. Further increases can be gained
only by a change in the system: larger, automated facilities provide, in one
step, perhaps a 300-500% capacity increase. Some of this new capacity will go
unused for a time resulting in higher unit cost, but none of the new capacity
is available without a large investment, risk, and disruption of current
methods.
Improvements in loading are illustrated by the various methods used in
main deck loading of the DC^IOF. An on-board loader is available which can
load or unload the aircraft in 137 minutes (ref. 37). This can be speeded up
to 93 minutes by use of a light-lift forktruck. If specialized mobile or
transporter loaders are available, the time can be cut further to 64 minutes
or 50% of the original. However, a loading dock which allows direct transfer
from a dock into the aircraft main deck can reduce this time to 48 minutes or
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34% of the original. This requires the cost of mechanization to a narrower
range of equipment and of specific aircraft taxiing and parking requirements.
Loading and handling technique, of course, is primarily dependent on the
container or mix of containers involved. Where aircraft which take the large
inter-modal air freight containers are in use (see Table 1.2), specialized
equipment is necessary and feasible. Improvements are being made in transporters,
A-frame cranes, elevator-conveyor-ramps, computer-controlled movements, etc.,
and the number of lift-transfer-slide operations is being reduced for any one
container as standardization becomes routine. On-board ramps and lifts require
weight and design sophistication that are justifiable only for military needs.
Duplication of cargo handling equipment at a large number of freightports also
requires a larger investment as the sophistication of the techniques increases
and makes the greatest possible standardization and interchangeableity of
equipment desirable.
Alternatives can be devised for many of the methods now in use, though a
distinction must be retained between the freight facilities handling large
containers and those handling belly types or bulk. For example, in main deck
loading of aircraft like the B-747F, it is possible to raise each container to
the nose door 4.9m (16ft) above the ground or to build the container handling
equipment to deliver units at that level. The high dock not only is a potential
safety hazard, but the availability of an aircraft like the lower L-500 would
make such a high dock unnecessary and even unuseable. An aircraft elevator,
designed to support the landing gear, may be more practical than the mechanism
for a variable height output from an automated system handling long, heavy
containers full of fragile materials. The engineering of elevators is a more
routine process than the design of handling equipment, and the flexibility for
aircraft types is retained. The rear-loading aircraft would still present a
problem with tail clearance, however.
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1.5 INTERMODAL TRANSFER
1.5.1. Transmodal Movements and Multimodal Systems (Adapted from ref. 5)
Throughout this report, the assumption is implicit that well integrated
transportation systems with good methods for intermodal transfer would make it
possible to use each mode optimally. For each transportation mode there are
sets of circumstances under which it is superior to the alternatives. When a
mode is used under less favorable conditions, it is less satisfactory in some
sense than an alternative. Where a movement of either people or goods, has
some portion of the journey outside the optimal "window" of the selected mode,
then a transfer to the optimal mode is suggested. Whether such multimodal
movement is executed depends on whether the cost of transfer is less than the
additional cost of operating suboptimally for a portion of the journey. The
word cost here refers to costs of all kinds including time value for the cargo
involved.
This line of reasoning suggests that the performance at the node or con-
nection between two or more transportation modes is an important determinant
of the degree of network optimization that is possible. In general, the per-
formance at the connection points is the weakest link today for reasons that
are perhaps more institutional than technical.
There are two aspects to transfer terminal (nodal) performance. The
first is the transfer facility itself, its efficiency, safety, and amenities.
The second is how long a person or cargo has to wait for the next process or
the next vehicle that is to move it. Terminal performance largely determines
link performance. How long a person or shipment spends in the terminal also
is a function of the frequency of service and the scheduling on the links. A
large part of what appears to be an inordinate amount of time cargo spends in
terminals may be less dependent on design or efficiency, than on the scheduling
and size of the vehicles. Further, the average speed of the links is a function
of how long the vehicle is stopped at the terminal to load and unload, which
is a function of terminal efficiency.
Another determinant of the degree of network optimization possible is the
magnitude of the difference in the cost and performance of one mode and that
of the next best alternative. For example, if long haul air is already
marginally superior to long haul truck, there is no incentive for large invest-
ments in fast, efficient terminal transfer terminals. Only the promise of
substantially superior air performance would provide that incentive.
Our transportation system has evolved with each mode operating essentially
independently. Each mode attempts to serve as large a market as it can. This
places a premium on versatility, a preference for a wide window of "not too
bad" performance rather than a narrower window of superior performance. This
blind competition is a disincentive to developing a good intermodal transfer
capability.
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Thus, the penalty the nation pays for poor intermodal transfer goes beyond the
currently perceived costs and inconvenience; it has also been an inhibitor of
maximizing the potential of the individual modes.
This observation implies that there is a cyclic aspect in moving toward
truly multimodal networks: Current modal design and operation tends to even
up the levels of performance among alternatives and decreases the incentive
for building good intermodal transfer facilities. In turn, the absence of
such facilities inhibits the narrowing of modal service for more efficient
operation and thereby decreases the efficiency of that mode.
This suboptimization of each mode rather than the optimization of a
multimodal network is largely the result of the lack of overall organization.
If multimodal transportation companies or consortia were permitted and encouraged,
the perceived incentives would shift toward network optimization. There are
also potential disbenefits to permitting such organization. The various
existing interests deserve careful attention, but the potential efficiencies
and national benefits of an optimal network also deserve consideration.
1.5.2. Progress in Intermodality
The advanced cargo system is designed to provide mass air movements on
routine schedules based on the needs of large-volume shippers. Small-volume
shippers will have their packages consolidated into containerized lots, after
which the shipments will follow the same procedures as larger shipments.
The NASA-Lockheed "Cargo/Logistics Airlift Systems Study (CLASS)" (ref.
49) describes the future air cargo transportation scenario as a coordinated
surface-to-air-to-surface operation. The motor carrier industry will perform
connecting services between units of the air mode as well as direct service
and connecting services with rail and water transport. The air phase will
have full intermodal compatibility with the surface transportation modes. A
family of all-mode cargo load devices will have been developed for both air
and surface use. The load devices will not be captive of any single mode but
will be covered by equipment interchange agreements on all domestic and interna-
tional routes. The system will handle shipment to be packed in truck-load or
container-load lots by shippers, forwarders, and surface carriers.
Unitized loads will be trucked to and from airport centers for distances
up to several hundred miles. In the "Summary Report on Intermodal Cargo
Tests" (Project INTACT) by Lockheed-Georgia (ref. 38), it is shown that large
all-cargo aircraft can be designed and operated so that direct operating costs
will be low enough to provide attractive freight economics relative to surface
transportation. The analyses also conclude that the present system of air
movement of small shipments will not develop to a point where the productivity
of a fleet of large cargo planes would be utilized effectively. Four observa-
tions that support this conclusion are;
(1) Small packages and emergency shipments will not provide sufficient
volume to justify a fleet of large cargo aircraft.
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(2) Large cargo aircraft require large unit cargo loads for high overall
efficiency.
(3) The cost of handling individual shipments can be reduced through an
optimized cargo unitization system with compatibility between the
internal dimensions of the aircraft and the external dimensions of
the unitized cargo.
(4) Large unit loads must be truly intermodal for direct interchange with
surface transportation. The motor carrier is the way to optimize most
of the interchange between the modes.
In terms of customer service, the present mode of air service, which is
primarily small package emergency service, is now approaching maturity. This
air cargo service does meet the needs of small shippers and will continue to
do so. However, it does not nearly meet the needs of large shippers with
routine volume shipments. Achievement of a viable large-volume air cargo
service will depend on the following:
(1) Use of large containers that can be filled by shippers, surface
carriers, or forwarders at off-airport sites.
(2) Complete compatibility with the surface freight systems to allow
efficient ground interface and connecting service for onward freight
movements.
(3) Cargo airplanes designed specifically for freight service and uncom-
promised by passenger considerations.
1.5.3. The Intermodal Aircraft
For good intermodal transfer, the ideal air freighter would have these
characteristics:
(1) Cargo compartments and doors located and of such dimensions that
speed in loading and unloading are facilitated.
(2) Height of sill (distance between ground and bottom of cargo door)
compatible with other modes of transportation or standardized for
loading equipment compatibility.
(3) Dimensions of cargo compartments and doors large enough to accommodate
all standard containers.
In general, the ideal air freighter would have cargo doors to allow nose
or tail loading (preferably both), compartments large enough to receive and
secure a 2.44m x 2.44m x 12.19m (8ft x 8ft x 40ft) container, height to sill
of 1 to 1.5m (3 to 5ft), and a ramp available for loading.
Comparing flight characteristics, load limits, and dimensions of present
and future cargo aircraft with the required characteristics of the ideal air
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freighter, it can be seen that an aircraft similar to the Lockheed L-500
(civilian version of the C-5A "Galaxy"), one similar to the Boeing 747-200F,
and an air freighter similar to the Lockheed L-100-50 "Hercules" stretch
version are the acceptable aircraft for dedicated air cargo. The L-500 type
and the B-747 type have similar payload and range characteristics. Choosing
on the basis of intermodal suitability, it would appear that an aircraft
similar to the L-500 is preferable because of the ease of loading. It is
assumed that the defects in the current C-5A landing gear and wing will be
corrected and the aircraft will be completely airworthy. The aircraft fleet
for dedicated air cargo would consist of the L-50C type for long range and
heavy loads, the L-100-50 for medium ranges and loads, and motor trucks and
trailers for short range containerized cargo. Although this system concept
does not include provisions for small individual packages, the regularly
scheduled passenger carriers have ample capacity for belly cargo and will
continue to transport small packages for some time to come.
1.5.4. Transfers Between Aircraft and Other Carriers
Standardized intermodal containers will facilitate the transfer of cargo
between carriers. Standard containers in this* study have been assumed and are
described in Chapter 2 (ref. 39). They are the "M-l" containers measuring
2.44m x 2.44m x 3.05m (8ft x 8ft x 10ft) and the "M-2" container measuring
2.44m x 2.44m x 6.10m (8ft x 8ft x 20ft).
Figure 1.31 POSSIBLE AIR CARGO TYPES AND ARRANGEMENTS (Source:
Courtesy Boeing Commercial Aircraft Co.).
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Figure 1.32 SIDE LOADING AN AIR FREIGHTER (Source:
Courtesy Boeing Commercial Aircraft Co.).
Although this is the adopted standard, provisions ought to be made to utilize
the 2.44m x 2.44m x 12.19m (8ft x 8ft x 40ft) container as well in order to
optimize truck-trailer use and to expedite the transfer of trailer-load lots.
The longest container, which is the actual trailer body, is the heart of
ground transportation on roadway, rail; and water. Complete intermodal
transfer of trailer-size loads already exists between truck-trailer, rail,
and water carriers. Many other sizes and shapes of containers and pallets
are available as well.
Figure 1.31 (courtesy of Boeing Commercial Airplane Company) shows a
cutaway view of an air freighter fully loaded. Various sizes and shapes of
containers, pallets, and other cargo are shown stowed in the aircraft.
Included are three of the standard-size containers mentioned above. Not
shown are "roll-on roll-off" type cargo such as trailers and motorized vehicles
and equipment. Though not necessarily of standard size, this type of equipment
is truly intermodal and must be considered in air cargo system design. This
is especially true since the system design includes provision for transporting
military cargo including motorized equipment
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military cargo including motorized equipment. Ramp loading is essential in
these cases for rapid and efficient loading and unloading. In the case of an
entire load of fully motorized equipment, nose and ramp openings would allow
simultaneous rapid loading and unloading.
Figure 1.32 (courtesy of Boeing Commercial Airplane Company) shows an M-2
container being loaded through the side door of an air freighter. On-board
mechanized floor rollers shown here are designed to expedite loading with
minimum use of outside equipment. The figure further illustrates the limitation
of side door loading. The M-2 container shown is the largest that can be
loaded in this fashion, and even it could be loaded much faster through a nose
or tail opening. The figure further indicates that the opening shown is the
smallest allowable since it can barely accommodate the standard container.
Figure 1.33 NOSE LOADING AN AIR FREIGHTER (Source:
Courtesy Boeing Commercial Aircraft Co.)
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Figure 1.33 (courtesy of Boeing Commercial Airplane Company) showing a
nose-loading operation illustrates three salient features, two positive and
one negative.
(1) An M-2 container is being nose loaded, indicating the relative ease
and rapidity of this "straight-in" loading method. The 12.19m (40ft)
trailer-size containers could be loaded just as easily in this manner.
The Boeing Company's Air Freight Systems Office reports that the
B-747's main deck.can be fully loaded with containerized freight
through the nose door in 25 minutes and through the side door in 30
minutes.
(2) The figure illustrates one type of loading equipment widely used and
recommended for the typical situation in which ramps or platforms are
either not available or at a height too low for the aircraft opening.
This motorized transport loader can pick up the container at one
location, transport it to the air freighter, elevate the load to sill
height and, with its mechanized rollers, move the container into the
aircraft opening. Many loaders of this type are available, such as
the Kornylak Corporation high-lift "Karry All" scissors-lift truck.
The same kind of equipment can just as readily load and unload trucks
and trailers and, in fact, is ideal for loading intermodal containers
between truck or trailer and aircraft.
(3) The figure illustrates the disadvantage of an air freighter whose
opening is much higher than other modes of transportation. An aircraft
with the recommended sill height of 1 to 1.5m (3 to 5ft) would allow
for much faster loading and without the need of the expensive loading
device shown.
Figure 1.34 shows container-loading operations at dockside, illustrating
intermodal terminal transfer methods between rail, truck-trailer, and ship.
These ideal facilities include provisions for loading rail cars, ships, and
truck or trailer beds. In the foreground, a container is being loaded by a
dockside crane with telescopic spreader. This spreader, similar to the one
manufactured by A.S. Bromma Smides and Mek Verkstad of Stockholm, is electrically
and hydraulically operated and can handle all sizes and types of containers.
In the left foreground of'Figure 1.34 is shown the versatile straddle-
container carrier that can load M-type containers up to 12.19m (40ft) in
length from and to rail cars or trailer beds, can transport them to other
locations, and can stack them three high. The type of straddle-container
carriers suitable for the air cargo system are the Clark Company model 830L
van carrier, the Valmet Oy of Helsinki "Valmet stacking straddle carrier," and
the Mitsubishi, Tokyo, V-SC 4023 straddle carrier.
In the background of Figure 1.34 is shown the dockside rail-mounted
container crane very useful for moving containers to and from ships and onto
or off of cars, trailer beds, and warehouse platforms. Cranes suitable for
use in intermodal transfer are those similar to the "Universe" multipurpose
dockside container crane manufactured by Ishikawajima-Harema of Tokyo.
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Figure 1.34 INTERMODAL TRANSFER EQUIPMENT FOR RAIL, TRUCK AND
SHIP (Source: Courtesy Boeing Commercial
Aircraft Co.).
All of this container-loading equipment is illustrated and described in Jane's
Freight Containers (ref. 39).
The Project INTACT study (ref. 38) stressed two major underlying assumptions
to characterize intermodal transfer:
(1) All freight entering or leaving the air cargo terminal will be by
means of motor carrier.
(2) Cargo will be loaded into highway vans or intermodal containers at
off-airport sites. These load devices will be driven to the airport
and loaded aboard aircraft with a minimum of handling.
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Optimum efficiency in intermodal transfer is obtained by loading con-
tainers, or even the trailer itself, aboard a C-5A type aircraft ramp or by
using docks compatible with trailer-trucks and with the height of the sill of
air freighters, facilitating rapid loading and unloading. Guide rails for
wheeled vehicles and containers, container lift gantries, and self-contained,
wheeled container-loading shuttles are devices illustrated in Project INTACT.
1.5.5. Off-Airport Consolidation
Intermodal transfer is based on the premise that all cargo to be trans-
ported by air freight is containerized. For some time to come, however, there
will be shippers of less-than-container-size loads or shippers with container-
sized loads of small packages who do not wish to bother with or do' not have
facilities for containerization. With more than half of air cargo tonnage
consisting of small packages, some means for containering, sorting, and. docu-
menting them must be part of the intermodal transfer function.
The ideal cargo terminal or freightport should be divided into two or
more areas (ref. 40) since the cost and scarcity of airport real estate directs
the use of off-airport facilities for the receiving, storing, sorting, con-
solidating, and breaking down of freight units. Pallet and container loads
would be trucked to the airport for flight consolidation, staging, and loading
into freighters. Off-loaded containers simultaneously would be stripped from
the aircraft and immediately dispatched to some remote handling and breakdown
facility or truck distribution center. The off-airport parts of the terminal
would consist of truck docks, a high-speed sorter capable of handling 6000
packages per hour, one igloo and container storage complex, one office complex,
several automatic encoding stations and collating lanes, mechanized pallet
build up devices, pallet and container stations, and outbound trailer loading
docks. This portion of the terminal is essentially a transfer operation.
Individual shipments are logged in and identified. It is desirable to have an
"interrogate tag" by which the package could be machine sorted by type or by
destination.
All storage is accomplished outside the building in semi-trailers. It is
assumed that pallet breakdown and segregation is accomplished at a local
delivery warehouse. Another invention necessary for this concept is a device
to consolidate and breakdown random packages to and from container or pallet
modules. A number of palletizers already on the market efficiently build
uniform cartons into pallet loads. By combining the interrogable tag, a
package size measuring machine, mechanical handling devices, and a computer,
much more efficient cargo consolidation operations would be possible.
Michael L. Mastracci writing in the October 1968 edition of "Interavia"
(ref. 40) described and illustrated an elementary air cargo distributions
center. The center, designed, engineered, and installed by the American
Machine and Foundry Company, turns around belly freight in 30 minutes. It
utilizes the latest sorting and electronic devices to process 34 000kg (75
OOOlb) of mixed cargo per hour. It accommodates loose and palletized cargo
and includes an electronic accounting system that weight-manifests cargo by
flight and destination.
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In general, intermodal transfer concerns not only the handling problem,
but economics, the operational environment, personnel and time limitations,
and all constraints. With the help of a few new developments, this ideal can
be approached and a much more efficient cargo system realized.
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1.6 AIRCRAFT MIX
1.6.1. Existing Aircraft and Derivatives
An air cargo system of greater capacity and efficiency obviously depends
on the characteristics of the components which make it up. While designers
can incorporate almost any features desirable in an aircraft, the time and
capital investment involved in new design is such that any new aircraft must
be assured of replacing a major portion of current ones in use to be economic-
ally justifiable. For the next few years, we must use designs that are already
in production. In three to five years, derivatives of current models (wider,
longer, taller, new doors, larger engines, etc.) could be available in quantity.
New designs (ref. 41), once justified by demand, require several years for
development, while features desired in a cargo aircraft but not compatible
with the needs of passenger model raise the investment risk.
The following sections will present the candidates for cargo use among
aircraft in use today and describe the features that are desirable or avail-
able for the various needs of an integrated cargo system of the immediate
future.
1.6.2 Quick Change and Combi Concepts
In recent years, there has been an upsurge of interest in the air freight
industry which is being served by (a) dedicated cargo aircraft, (b) the belly
holds of passenger aircraft, (c) "combi" in which a wall is installed in the
main deck so that a section of it is for cargo while the remainder is for
passengers, and (d) QC (quick change) aircraft which can be converted quickly
from an all-passenger to an all-cargo configuration and vice versa.
The aircraft offers the prospect of increasing utilization by extending
the period of daily use. It can be employed as a freighter during the night
when there is relatively little requirement for passenger operations and con-
verted quickly to passenger use each morning. It also permits freight services
to be offered in situations where demand is insufficient to utilize a freighter
fully. However, some of the potential of QC aircraft has diminished in recent
years as more airport authorities have imposed restrictions on night operations,
particularly by jet aircraft. This poses problems for the air freight industry
in general, but is particularly serious to the QC carrier. In addition, the
greater risk of damage to the interior of the QC aircraft, coupled with the
frequent complaints of residual odors, reduces its appeal for passenger use.
The combi appeals to some air carriers because of its ability to consol-
idate freight and passengers, now being carried by two smaller aircraft, into
a single aircraft. An obvious example is the B-747 combi which is capable of
accommodating pallets as well as standardized containers up to 6.10m (20ft)
in length in the tail section while providing passenger services in the forward
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section. Again, it is not as good as it seems. Freight and passengers have
different flight schedules, passengers primarily during the daytime and freight
primarily at night. In addition, passenger traffic often leads to the provision
of separate terminal facilities located at different parts of the airport.
Upon arrival at the passenger apron, freight vehicles would be hampered by,
and add to, the congestion around the aircraft.
1.6.3. Desirable Aircraft Features
Until the introduction of wide-body jets into commercial use, there was
little capability for moving the intermodal containers by air. The shape of
the belly holds of aircraft and the door sizes did not permit large unitized
loads, making freight handling slower and more expensive. Freight had to be
handled as individual consignments placed in position manually and then
secured with nets. This inefficient process of handling freight presents
difficulty especially when turnaround times are short. The main deck cargo
containers like the Igloos (Type A containers) used in the DC-8 and other
aircraft provide an intermediate step, but the trend towards large consignments
means some freight cannot be accommodated on narrow-body aircraft, and greater
efficiency is needed.
Unlike narrow-body aircraft, the wide-body jet's are capable of accommo-
dating unitized loads in the lower holds and on the main deck if used as
freighters. Due to the shape of the lower holds, the type of containers that
utilize hold space most effectively are neither interchangeable with those of
other aircraft nor compatible with other modes of transportation (a detailed
discussion of containers will be given in Section 2.1.1.). The introduction
of the intermodal container concept represents a positive step towards event-
ual standardization of all containers in the cargo industry.
With the increasing need for intermodal transfer of large containers,
ground handling of large volumes of freight traffic will have to use the nose
or tail for access to the aircraft. Nose and tail loading provides the fastest
rate of handling since freight can be loaded and unloaded simultaneously. The
C-5A is an example of this type of loading, and as a military freighter, it is
equipped with a tail ramp to allow loading without ground equipment. Civilian
freighters normally do not have a tail ramp as such flexibility can be achieved
only at the expense of substantial reduction in payload. Nose or tail loading
eliminates the need to rotate freight as it enters the aircraft as is usually
required with side door loading. On aircraft with large payloads, the increase
in handling time due to rotation will increase the turnaround time. Nose
loading can be used only when the flight deck is positioned above the main
hold, as in the B-747-200F, since pre-flight checkout must take place during
loading for short ground times. The L-100-30 Hercules was designed with tail
loading through a door just 104cm (41in) off the ground to allow unloading
directly to a truckbed or the ground with little or no equipment.
Access to an aircraft often poses a problem in relation to its sill
height above the ground. Most aircraft require lifting equipment to raise
freight to the aircraft sill. For example, the sill height of B-747-200F is
4.9m (193in), L-100-30 Hercules is 1.0m (41in), and B-707 is 3.2m (125in).
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The variation in sill height simply means that adjustable lifting equipment
covering at least this range must be provided for different aircraft types at
the airport terminals. The need for such ground equipment will result in
additional handling costs. In the case of C-5A, the nose .and tail can "kneel
down" to facilitate loading directly from truckbed level. But such flexibility
can't be accomplished in large aircraft without being a burden to the total
aircraft cost. Thus, it is economically feasible for only the feeder aircraft
to be designed with a cargo floor at the same level as the truckbed. This
will obviate the need for lifting equipment at a large number of smaller
airports.
The above discussion points out the advantages of (a) standardization of
containers, (b) nose or tail loading, (c) compatibility with existing ground
equipment, and possibly (d) aircraft sill at truck height, if it is aero-
dynamically and economically feasible. The future dedicated cargo aircraft
should incorporate in its design all of these desirable features, in addition
to defined performance characteristics.
1.6.4. Medium- and Long-Range Transport
Accurately predicting the future course of the air freight industry is at
best precarious, as has been demonstrated by poor predictions in the past. In
view of the uncertainty in the future and the subsequent "go slow" attitude
among air freight carriers, it is not unreasonable to assume that the wide-
body jets will remain in service during the next decade. The large-capacity,
long-range aircraft, such as B-747-200F, will be handling the freight traffic
between the hubs, and the medium-capacity aircraft, such as some of those
.listed in Table 1.6 (ref. 42) will serve the traffic between major and minor
hubs or major city pairs. The B-747 design especially appears to have flexi-
bility for derivative growth. The B-747-200F and its stretched version will
most likely continue to provide services in the 1990's, though there will be
requirements for smaller freighters. As in the past, these short/medium-range
freighters probably will be derived from then existing passenger aircraft.
As the advantages of containerization become more widely accepted by the
shipping community, a larger share of the freight will be unitized in larger
containers. Consequently, the narrow-body jets would gradually be phased out
of the prime markets and replaced by more efficient freighters capable of
carrying loads in the large containers. A new generation of smaller cargo
aircraft may also result as the demand justifies them.
The consensus seems to be that by 1990 there will be a dedicated freighter
equipped with quieter, more efficient engines capable of carrying at least
lOOtonnes (200 0001b) payload over 6500km (4000mi) range. It will be nose or
tail loading with a main deck which will accommodate intermodal containers up
to 12.2m (40ft) long. The lower holds will accommodate contoured containers.
For the medium range, there will be a freighter with quieter, more efficient
engines which will carry a payload of 36 000kg (80 OOOlb) over a range of
2400km (1500mi). Loading will be through a tail or nose door, approximately
3m (10ft) wide by 2.7m (9ft) high to accommodate standardized intermodal
containers. Payload and range are chosen in accordance with the hub-spoke
concepts discussed earlier.
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1.6.5. Limited Role of Crane Helicopter (ref. 43)
A special NASA/Army/Navy committee examining a renewed interest in the
heavy-lift helicopter has said that a heavy-lift civil helicopter derived from
a military version could fill "civil needs in construction, logging, energy
resources development, and cargo container distribution" (ref. 44). This
statement is in line with the view that a crane helicopter could be used, on a
selective basis, specifically for moving containerized cargo to and from con-
gested cities within a radius of, say, 160km (lOOmi) from the terminal area.
The helicopter has the inherent advantage of being immune to surface delays
and it can fly over lakes, canals, and industrial areas rather than having to
go around them. It thus can be operated with a high degree of schedule reli-
ability. In addition, it is capable of serving any area without the necessity
of large and expensive landing facilities and it operates below most regular
air lanes. It can accommodate any truck-load size container so long as the
loads are within its weight limitation. The configuration of the helicopter
makes it ideal for rapid loading and unloading and will provide a unique
interfacing unit if it proves economically feasible.
Air shipment is a comparatively expensive but superior form of trans-
portation of goods. Its future growth will depend on the shipper's willing-
ness to pay for the high transportation cost in return for short transit time.
The latter allows a reduction in inventory and warehouse costs, lowers the
danger of damage to goods in transit, and provides the opportunity for faster
response to changing market environments. The future growth will be stimulated
when the air freight industry is able to provide guaranteed overnight or even
second day service between any two domestic .cities. The crane helicopter has
the speed capability necessary to make an overnight system operational in
certain physically isolated or congested areas.
The crane helicopter being considered may be similar to the Sikorsky S-
64F Skycrane (ref. 42), capable of picking up one or more standardized inter-
modal containers by means of the dual rails on the underside of the body. The
containers, loaded at the terminal, could be moved by forklift or conveyor to
the loading dock and loaded directly under the helicopter. Large shippers,
and possibly air-freight forwarders, may load the containers themselves, in
which case the containers can be picked up from their loading platform with a
minimum of ground handling.
Upon arrival at the destination city or freightport, the containers can
be released directly onto a flatbed truck for direct trucking to the consignees
within the local delivery zone. In the case of a large shipper, the container
will be deposited directly on the firm's loading platform.
"Reorganized and revitalized U.S. rotary-wing research effort is entering
an intensive phase marked by the advent of advanced flight and ground-based
facilities that will help provide this nation's helicopter operators with
much-needed new technology." (ref. 45) Against a background of imminent
advances in rotary-wing technology, coupled with the further deterioration and
congestion of highways in the vicinity of possibly saturated airports in the
1990's, it is reasonable to assume that the future crane helicopter will be
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more competitive with the truck and will play a more viable role in the air
freight industry. Despite the well-publicized problems associated with high
operating costs and noise level, it is believed that the limited role of crane
helicopter in the short haul transportation should be explored. This will
present a great challenge to current helicopter researchers and manufacturers
to come up with a truly fuel-efficient and low-noise crane helicopter in the
future. The other aircraft required to make the integrated air cargo system
function already exist, though modifications are desirable and new designs,
will follow inevitably as demand dictates.
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1.7 IMPACTS
1.7.1. Introduction
The purpose of this section 'is to establish the extent of the benefits or
disbenefits which are likely to accrue from the actual implementation of a
dedicated air freight system. In particular, the emphasis is upon the delet-
erious or undesirable affects which are likely to result, since an understanding
of these impacts will improve management of the development and implementation
of the advanced air cargo system. It is noted that a previous report (ref. 3)
has already been produced on this subject.
This discussion is concerned only with those impacts which the air cargo
system has upon the larger societal-ecological system in which it is embedded.
The focus here is largely upon the network routes, schedules, aircraft choices,
and fleet size. In later sections, the impacts of other components of the air
cargo system will be treated.
1.7.2. Physical Impacts
Network design weighs rather substantially upon the fuel consumption
requirements of the total air cargo system. A low connectivity hub-spoke
network means the cargo must be transported over more kilometers, but larger
aircraft requiring less fuel per tonne-kilometer of transportation will be
used.
In addition, the Gellman report (ref. 3) suggests that large cargo aircraft
might be used to transport minerals and ores. If this happens, it would
result in lower in-transit inventories of these goods-, in quicker response
times to changes in market demand, and in shifts in domestic employment.
There has been no indication that large cargo aircraft would be used to trans-
port raw fuel resources such as coal, oil, or gas. As a partial solution to
the backhaul problem, refs. 31 and 49 suggest only that refined minerals will
become eligible backhaul cargo for select regions.
Network routes will roughly parallel those in existence today. These
corridors will sustain higher traffic densities in the next 25 years without
measurable impact.
Dedicated air cargo flights can be scheduled around existing passenger
arrival and departure peak densities, thereby necessitating few additional
airport runways. It is anticipated that such scheduling will not degrade
service to the shipper or to the passenger.
Choice of dedicated freight aircraft to be deployed will have important
impacts upon the associated airframe and engine manufacturers as will the
fleet sizes and mix. At this time, it is difficult to determine' whether
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existing airframe manufacturing facilities will be able to handle the required
production rate of the dedicated freight aircraft without expansion.
1.7.3. Environmental Impacts
The environmental impacts of new air freightport construction and existing
airport expansion are discussed elsewhere (see Section 2.7.2.). Treated here
are the impacts of the links of the network rather than the impacts of the
nodes, for the reasons cited previously. The links or routes of the network
determine where the aircraft will be flying. For the population located
beneath these links there will be some slight environmental degradation in the
form of vapor trails and noise. Fortunately, major international hub-to-hub
routes are over water.
The development and use of new aircraft engines which are more energy
efficient and quieter should allow routes over heavy population centers pro-
vided the aircraft is 2000m (6500ft) or more above the ground. These engines
may permit night-time arrivals and departures into some airports.
The effects of the air cargo system upon air and water pollution are con-
sidered tolerable and in most cases preferable to the resultant air and water
pollution accruing from transportation of the same cargo by surface modes.
Solid-waste pollution by the air cargo system is considered negligible (see
Section 2.7.2.2.).
The impacts of the air cargo system upon land use are considered else-
where (see Section 2.7.2.2. and 2.7.2.4.).
1.7.4. Societal or Cultural Impacts
As the air cargo system grows and becomes more profitable, it is antici-
pated that organized labor will become more adamant and insistent upon its own
terms. This poses the possibility for international labor organizations with
extraordinary power -- enough to prevent an entire country from getting the
food supplies it needs. Since this fleet of dedicated cargo aircraft could be
used to airlift emergency medical supplies to disaster areas, to airlift much-
needed weapons, foods, fiber, or precious minerals, an international labor
organization which could stifle such operations might become a considerable
political entity.
Second, the immensity of this system also gives rise to the possibility
of increased international crime. The hijacking of a single freighter could
have international implications. There may also be increased opportunities
for smuggling (of drugs, for example).
Mechanization, inherent in containerization, raises the skill levels of
the required employees at the same time it reduces their numbers. The current
practice among leading air cargo firms seems to be to hire the best qualified
people available for "unskilled" jobs such as local truck drivers in order to
maintain versatility and judgement on all levels. As competition increases,
the pressures to economize by hiring less competent employees could jeopardize
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the system through inefficiencies and increased mishandling.
Finally, it would be possible for a country to launch a surprise attack
on another country by airlifting a large number of weapons and soldiers into
the country under the guise of air cargo carriers (the old Trojan horse trick).
Thus it must be reckoned that although this technology carries with it
considerable opportunity to benefit society, it also increases the possibility
for massive abuse.
The impacts of an air cargo system upon such other societal factors as
international politics, foreign policy, domestic growth, employment, inter-
national trade, imports, exports, jobs, quality of life, distribution of
wealth, health, new business, population migration, lower freight rates, and
marketed goods are considered later in this report.
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1.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Following is a list of conclusions emanating from the network studies
described in this chapter.
1.8.1. Conclusions Related to Connectivity, Routing, and Hub Location
1. A hub-spoke infrastructure should be used for movement of the cargo.
This concept applies both to surface transport links and to air transport
links. Thus trucks move the cargo to its first consolidation point -- the hub
or feeder freightport -- and deliver it to its final destination. A hub-spoke
arrangement lowers the connectivity of the network and increases the frequency
of service for a fixed capital investment in aircraft.
2. Superimposed upon the pure hub-spoke network are numerous direct
routes between city pairs over which heavy volume is transported — enough to
permit 50% of the total volume to be transported by direct routes.
3. Three large, efficient freightports should be developed in the vicinity
of San Francisco, Houston, and New York. These dedicated freightports will
serve as international hubs or "gateways" for movement of both domestic and
international freight.
4. Central place theory may usefully serve in locating hubs and spokes
for the network. The hierarchy of hexagonal areas provides for service to all
areas, from the smallest and least efficient units to large continents utilizing
efficiency of scale. No pure network organization will do justice to all
special cases that have developed historically; there simply is not enough
flexibility in any single system or concept.
5. An organized gathering of information on existing civilian and selected
military airports should be undertaken so that rational decisions can be made
on expansion potential in accommodating the larger freightports and consolida-
tion facilities needed for hub and feeder portions of the system and for
locating new intermodal nodes in which air cargo may or may not be the initiating
force.
6. The economics of an advanced air cargo system should be studied from
the point of view of its infrastructure; that is, compatible network, sched-
uling, and fleet sizing designs should be developed, and from these designs,
the economics of the system can be outlined more comprehensively. This is the
approach that is employed by the air passenger carriers.
7. Statistics and ranking of airports for cargo should be based on the
larger of the enplaned or deplaned cargo moved. This is a more equitable base
across airports since, unlike passenger traffic, cargo flows are often strongly
unbalanced. This base would retain the peak handling nature of the airport's
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cargo operation, though total volume would still determine the ranking for
revenue purposes.
1.8.2. Conclusions Related to Aircraft
1. The use of extraordinarily large aircraft may, in spite of their
economies of scale, have important routing and scheduling disadvantages. In
particular, they:
A. lessen the frequency of flights, thereby
1. lessening demand which is sensitive to frequency of service,
2. lessening the number of connecting flights,
3. increasing the delays at.the nodes of the network, and
4. increasing the terminal storage required at each node.
B. lessen the number of direct flights, thereby increasing the amount
of consolidation and breakbulk handling required,
C. increase the number of kilometers (miles) over which the freight must
be carried,
D. increase the length of time required to deliver the freight.
2. Aircraft which are too small also have decided disadvantages for
routing and scheduling. In particular, they dictate highly connected networks
over which many more aircraft are required in order to achieve reasonable
frequency of service because of the larger number of routes.
3. Large cargo aircraft (such as the 747-200F, the 747-11/11F, L-500)
appear especially appealing because developmental costs have already been
largely amortized by previous sales of the aircraft, thereby lowering the
price which the airframe manufacturer must charge.
4. The combined and quick-change aircraft concepts have particular
appeal from a scheduling point of view. Their increased flexibility should
permit greater utilization of the aircraft and should facilitate solution of
backhaul and related scheduling problems.
5. Research activity should be directed toward the development of quiet,
fuel efficient engines which could be retrofitted into existing large cargo
aircraft.
6. The future dedicated air freighter should, if aerodynamically and
economically feasible, incorporate in its design such features as (a) nose or
tail loading, (b) compatibility with existing ground handling equipment, (c)
compatibility with other modes of transportation, and possibly (d) aircraft
sill at truckbed height.
7. Despite the well-publicized problems associated with high operating
costs and noise level, it is believed that the limited role of the crane
helicopter in the short haul transportation should be explored. This presents
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a great challenge to current helicopter researchers and manufacturers to come
up with a truly economical, fuel efficient, and low-noise crane helicopter in
the future.
8. A more formal study of air cargo density may be required to insure
that future aircraft designs are aimed at the optimal volume and lift combin-
ation. Few of today's air cargo loads tax the lift capability when the volume
is filled, but the increased demand for air transport may or may not result in
significantly greater average densities of air cargo.
1.8.3. Conclusions Related to Scheduling
1. Through appropriate scheduling, it should be possible to blend addi-
tional dedicated air freight movements with passenger movements, in those
airports where both passengers and freight are both being accommodated, without
necessitating additional airport runway expansion before 1990.
2. A computerized reservation system for movement of cargo over all
modes should be developed and implemented. This would be highly compatible
with the independent commission agent concept to be discussed later (Chapter
3).
3. The use of demand-sensitive dynamic scheduling, as would be particularly
compatible with a computerized reservation system, may serve to increase load
factors substantially with no degradation of service. Such a technique might
serve to reduce the problem of backhaul and would certainly contribute to
increased profits.
4. Even though air freight shippers want their cargo moved at night, at
least some of the cargo (35%) will have to be moved during the day to enable
the air freight carrier to obtain adequate aircraft utilization, unless these
aircraft can be converted almost daily for use as passenger carriers.
5. Because of the dimensionality of the scheduling and routing problems,
algorithms to assist planners in such activities are more likely to be heur-
istic than optimizing.
1.8.4. Conclusions Related to Facilities and Operations Design at the Nodes
Delays in the system occur at the nodes, therefore the nodes warrant
special attention. Containerized cargo handling at the nodes is a key to
speeding up loading and unloading. Further progress in standardization of
containers is indicated.
1. Alternative containerizing, loading, and storage designs should be
explored to insure maximal utility of investment over the next decade in which
radical changes in the air cargo industry will probably occur. For example,
an aircraft elevator may be preferable to an adjustable loader for the high B-
747 and the lower L-500 which may become available and offer several advantages.
For some time, both aircraft may have to be accommodated, and facilities built
for one may be inefficient or useless for a mix of the two.
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2. Past and current automated techniques should be cataloged and analyzed
in order to determine where the successes and failures have occurred in past
profit-making operations. The tendency to assign all functions to machines,
even where the human operator is more efficient, must be avoided. Long-term
reliability and versatility may be more important than short-term handling
capacity.
1.8.5. General Conclusions
The mechanisms by which a significantly different, rational air cargo
system could be brought about merits further study. Clearly interfirm, inter-
modal coordination is needed for deriving a single cargo organization at each
airport, but the various competing agencies must somehow be brought under one
evolving hierarchy, probably a trade association, in order to derive the
benefits a single system promises. In the process, the incentives of free
enterprise must be retained.
The trade-off between cost and time must constantly be remembered.
Though the mathematics of the problem may indicate one solution, the value
placed on time by the user of the system must not be forgotten.
A theoretical model of a network may be suitable for initial studies; but
the analysis of a specific network of routes and terminals will yield more
reliable data.
To simplify the economic analysis of a complex air cargo system, it may
be necessary to optimize each phase of the network.
If the railway network in this country is revitalized, its effect on the
proposed air cargo system could be substantial. The truck link and, in
particular, the feeder aircraft link could be replaced by a rail link if that
revitalized system is rapid, reliable, and economical.
Advances in helicopter fuel efficiency and in range could certainly make
this mode of transportation more attractive for the pick-up and distribution
of containerized cargo. This would decrease the use of trucks for the first
and last links of the cargo movement.
No matter how sophisticated, any model which uses the forecasts of future
situations is susceptable to error. Major and occasionally minor errors in
estimating future demands, capabilities, and operations could negate the
conclusions of an economic analysis. As a result, it is not unusual to find
that "gut feelings" may give useful indications of trends just as accurately
as a complex computer simulation.
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CHAPTER 2
GROUND SUPPORT
Introduction
While traffic on the system flows through the network, it must enter that
network through a ground support system. This support system includes the
standard business practices used to attract cargo to the air mode, the legal
and regulatory framework by which freight is interfaced between surface and
air, and the terminal facilities which expedite transfer. The purpose of this
chapter is to review these elements of the ground support system and prescribe
how they should appear in the 1990-2015 system. It will proceed from the
general design requirements of a cargo terminal, through the institutional and
legal practices needed to support 1990 operations, to an analysis of the
impacts of such a system. Some operating premises beyond our basic assumptions
were used in this section. First, it was accepted that a number of companies
would be carrying air freight at airports of any size. Hence, terminals are
usually built for or by individual airlines, not to handle the total cargo
volume of an airport. Second, the assumption of "no new airports" was taken
literally. While new terminal facilities might be built at existing locations,
the contingency of a major hub grade dedicated cargo airport was not considered.
The attendant surface access problems were subsequently not addressed in a
design context. Arguments against a dedicated freightport, however, were
advanced. Third, the committee did not feel it was possible to offer a
specific terminal design, because site idiosyncracies would preclude any
acceptable general configuration. What was reported are the general elements
and size of an advanced terminal facility.
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2.1 CONTAINERIZATION
"In my opinion, the relationship or need for intermodality on an inter-
changeable containers basis between surface carriage and air freight trans-
portation is virtually non-existent today."(ref. 1)
"Achievement of a viable large-volume air cargo service is dependent upon
the use of a large unit load device . . . , and complete compatibility with
the surface freight system . . ."(ref. 2)
2.1.1. Introduction
Perhaps the best way to start a discussion about containerization is to
define it. This is done by the Containerization Institute in the following
manner:
"Containerization is the utilizing, grouping, or consolidating of
multiple units into a large container for more efficient movement."
In the present day cargo transportation industry one can find extensive
use of containers. Containers of all sizes and shapes are transported by
trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes. Since everyone is using containers,
one might ask why all the interest in the subject of containerization? That
question is best answered by Eric Rath's statement:
"Containerization is a systems approach to transport service. It
represents the dawn of an era, in which all modes of transportation
will be subjected to integration into a single, world wide system."(ref. 3)
The key word in this statement is integration. This should be taken to
mean that a container is a container, is a container, etc. irrespective of the
transportation mode used to move it.
An effort has been underway since the end of World War II to develop
standardization in containers. This effort has met with some degree of success
with the surface modes of transportation (highway, rail, sea). However, the
air freight industry has not participated in this standardization. Thus, an
air freight container is generally considered to be uni-modal, even though
these containers are transported by truck between the customer and the airport.
Is the fact that its containers are uni-modal detrimental to the air
freight industry?
If we return to the quotes given at the beginning of this section, we may
well find the answer to this question. McNulty indicates that there is no
need at present for air freight to have an intermodal container. His reason
is that, since most of the air freight business is small packages in less than
truck load quantities and since the standardized containers are large in size
(2.44m x 2.44m x 6.1m or 12.19m), there is not sufficient demand to justify
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going to a standardized container. If we look at the quote from Lockheed, we
see that they suggest that sufficient demand is dependent upon intermodal air
containers. We are thus left with "the chicken and the egg" problem: What
comes first, the demand or the containers?
In the remainder of this section, we will examine some aspects of contain-
erization with primary emphasis on its use in the air freight industry.
2.1.2. History
The idea of containerizing cargo is not new. It probably dates back to
the days of the Roman Empire when containers (cages) were used to transport
animals. However, the modern day concept of containerization got started
after World War II. The first step was the use of pallets for unitizing
cargo. Of course, pallets are still used extensively today. Next came the
TOFG (Trailer on Flat Car) or piggyback concept developed by the railroads and
the Trailers on Ships or RO-RO (Roll on - Roll off) developed by the shipping
industry. Both of these concepts were initiated in the early 1950's. Note
that in both cases the conventional wheeled truck trailer was used.
The next logical step was to take the wheels off the trailer thus yielding
a container. By the mid-fifties, containers were being moved on container
barges. Soon to follow was the containership and COFC (Container on Flat
Car). With trucks and trains to move the containers over land and barges and
containerships to move them over water, the freight forwarder quickly generated
and sold the door-to-door service idea. In doing so, the freight forwarding
industry was instrumental in the setting of standards for containers.
During the 1960's, the use of and the tri-modal (truck, train, and ship)
standardization of containers soared. Even though the use of containers was
also growing in the air freight industry, there was no standardization of
these containers with the other modes of transportation.
2.1.3. Standardization of Surface Mode Containers
Primarily through the efforts of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
there have evolved standards for intermodal containers. There will be no
effort made here to discuss in detail these standards. Basically, however,
these standards deal with dimensions, strength, and the corner fittings of
containers. Figure 2.1 illustrates some of the standardized containers and
Table 2.1 (ref. 4) summarizes basic data on them.
At present, in order to conform with ISO standards a- container must be
strong enough to be stacked six high and also be capable of withstanding the
stress and strain of normal transportation conditions.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the corner fitting. For exact dimensions of the
top and bottom corner fittings, one is referred to the ISO Draft Recommendation
No. 1019, a copy of which may be found in Jane's Freight Containers 1969-70
(ref. 5). The corner fittings allow for standardization of container handling
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Table 2.1
DATA ON STANDARD INTERMODAL CONTAINERS
External Material
Dimensions
meters
(feet)
2.44 x 2.44 x 3.05 Steel
(8 x 8 x 10)
2.44 x 2.44 x 6.1 Steel
(8 x 8 x 20)
2.44 x 2.44 x 6.1 Glassfibre/Steel
(8 x 8 x 20)
2.44 x 2.44 x 6.1 Aluminum/Steel
(8 x 8 x 20)
2.44 x 2.44 x 12.19 Steel
(8 x 8 x 40)
2.44 x 2.44 x 12.19 Glassfibre/Steel
(8 x 8 x 40)
2.44 x 2.44 x'12.18 Aluminum/Steel
(8 x 8 x 40)
2.44 x 2.59 x 12.19 Steel
(8 x 8.5 x 40)
2.44 x 2.59 x 12.19 Glassfibre/Steel
(8 x 8.5 x 40)
2.44 x 2.59 x 12.19 Aluminum/Steel
(8 x 8.5 x 40)
Internal
Vol urne
m3
(ft3)
15.0
(529.7)
33.0
(1165.3)
30.3
(1069.9)
31.0
(1094.6)
63.0
(2224.6)
61.7
(2178.7)
63.0
(2224.6)
67.0
(2365,8)
66.0
(2330.5)
67.0
(2365.8)
Pay load
Capacity
kg
(lb)
8992.0
(19,823.6)
18,040.0
(39,770.7)
18,320.0
(40,388.0)
18,643.0
(41,100.1)
26,880.0
(59,259.3)
26,960.0
(59,435.6)
27,229.0
(60,028.7)
26,789.0
(59,058.6)
26,880.0
(59,259.3
27,216.0
(60,000.0)
Tare
Weight
kg
(lb)
1340.0
(2954.2)
2280.0
(5026.5)
2000.0
(4409.2)
1677.0
(3697.1)
3600.0
(7936.5)
3520.0
(7760.1)
3254.0
(7173.7)
3682.0
(8117.3)
3600.0
(7936.5)
3266.0
(7200.2)
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equipment, storage equipment and tie-down fittings on the transport vehicles.
Also, smaller length containers can be joined to make larger length containers.
For example, joining two twenty foot containers to make an equivalent forty
foot container can be done.
Even though much progress has been made toward standardizing containers,
compliance with recommendations made by ISO, ANSI, and others is completely
voluntary. There still exist some companies within the freight industry who
do not conform to ISO standards. For example, Sea-land uses a non-standard
2.44m x 2.59m x 10.67m (8ft x 8.5ft x 35ft) container. Matson's containers
are 2.44m x 2.59m x 7.32m (8ft x 8.5ft x 24ft).
2.1.4. Types, Materials, and Ownership of Surface Mode Containers
There seems to be an almost endless supply of different types of con-
tainers. Many of these containers exist for very specific needs. Generally,
containers are rectangular with a width of 2.44m (8ft), a height of 1.22m,
2.44m, or 2.59m (4ft, 8ft, or 8.5ft) and a length of 3.05m, 6.1m, 7.32m,
9.14m, 10.67m, or 12.19m (10ft, 20ft, 24ft, 30ft, 35ft, or 40ft). Below are
listed some of the container types presently available:
(1) Dry freight (6) Tilt
(2) Open-top (7) Open-side
(3) Insulated (8) Flat
(4) Refrigerated (9) Half-height open-top
(5) Tank (10) Pressure tank
"The materials being offered in containers vary from ultraheavy to ultra-
light, and from ultrafragile to ultrastrong."(ref. 3) There are a number of
factors which must be considered when choosing what material or combination of
materials to use in constructing a container. These factors include strength,
weight, cost, maintainability, working life, and corrosion and rust resistance.
The following is a list of some of the materials that are used in .the construc-
tion of containers:
(1) steel (5) reinforced plastic
(2) aluminum alloys (6) reinforced fiberglass
(3) glassfibre (7) composite
(4) reinforced plywood (8) balsa wood laminate
As one might suspect, a container represents a large investment. Depend-
ing on the material used in its construction, a twenty foot container can cost
$3 000 or more. For the large volume shipper, such investments can often be
justified. However, for smaller volume shippers owning their own containers
is economically impossible. For these shippers, the answer is to lease or
rent containers. The shipper may lease or rent a container from carriers,
container manufacturers and/or container leasing companies. The arrangements
and rates depend on such factors as length of lease, type and size of contain-
ers, and one way or round trip use.
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2.1.5. Containerization in the Air Freight Industry
The use of containers in the air freight industry is not new. At present,
it is estimated that between 30 and 35% of the revenue tonne-kilometers gen-
erated by domestic air freight is shipped in containers (ref. 6). This should
not be surprising since the use of containers offer both the shipper and
carrier advantages, such as:
(1) They greatly reduce the processing time by eliminating the veri-
fication, weighing, checking of labels, inspecting, etc. of many
individual items.
(2) They greatly reduce the documentation required.
(3) They reduce the chance of pilferage.
(4) They reduce damage to the shipment. This includes ground handling,
line haul, and weather damage.
(5) They eliminate the handling of the actual cargo at the air freight
facility. Only the container is handled.
(6) They reduce the door-to-door shipping time.
(7) If the shipper loads the container and the receiver unloads it,
additional cost savings can be achieved. A high volume shipper can
also save money by purchasing his own container.
There are disadvantages of containers such as high initial cost, high
maintenance cost, high tare weight, and increased storage space, but in general,
the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
By the mid 1960's, air freight containers had evolved into three basic
sizes. They were called types A, B, and D. There were, however, a number of
problems associated with these containers.
(1) They were not interchangeable among aircraft.
(2) They were large and hard for the shippers to handle.
(3) They were accessible only to jet airports since-their contours fit
only the jet freighters.
(4) They were expensive for the shippers to buy.
(5) They were fragile.
Since the average size shipment by air was 122kg (2691b) and 92% of the
domestic air freight shipments were under 226.8kg (5001b) in 1974 (ref. 7),
the air freight industry developed the smaller type Q and E containers in
order to meet the shipper's needs. These containers were also much easier to
handle.
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During the development of the air freight containers, no effort was made
to make them compatible with surface transportation. In more recent years,
there has been an effort to develop and use containers that are compatible
with the surface mode, especially trucks. At present, there are two sizes of
rectangular container used in the air freight industry, the M-l and the M-2.
The M-l is 2.44m x 2.44m x 3.05m (8ft x 8ft x 10ft) and the M-2 is 2.44m x
2.44m x 6.1m (8ft x 8ft x 20ft). Some of the current road blocks in developing
air containers that are totally compatible with the surface modes are:
(1) Tare weight: in order to have the strength necessary to stack con-
tainers six high on containerships, the containers must be con-
structed of materials which cause high tare weights and are thus
undesirable for air freight purposes.
(2) The ribbed construction of the bottoms of surface containers make
them incompatible with the roller conveyor systems used to load and
unload aircraft. These containers may be placed on pallets and
rolled in and out of the aircraft but this increases tare weight.
(3) The corner fittings of surface containers often protrude from the
container bottom up to ,02m (3/4in) which cause overload conditions
for the floor of the aircraft (ref. 8).
(4) There are only a few commercial aircraft capable of handling
2.44m x 2.44m (8ft x 8ft) containers.
(5) Current air freight demand is not sufficient to justify the use of
large rectangular containers nor to justify the purchase of airplanes
that can carry them.
There are efforts currently under way by several organizations to stan-
dardize air freight containers. Both the Air Transport Association (ATA) and
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) are working to standardize
containers within the air freight industry. This effort has met with some
success. There are a number of containers which have been standardized to
make them interchangeable among the widebody aircraft: B-747, DC-10, L-1011,
and A-300. However, there still exist some containers which are specifically
designed for a particular aircraft. For example, the LD-1 container fits only
in the B-747.
An effort is also underway by these same two organization, along with
ISO, ANSI, and SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers), to develop standards for
the rectangular intermodal containers. This effort has led to the designation
of the M-l and M-2 containers. These containers are quad-mode (air, rail,
truck, ship) containers but are capable of being stacked only two high instead
of the ISO/ANSI standard of six high.
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2.1.6. Types, Materials, and Ownership of Air Freight Containers
As was alluded to in the previous section, there are a number of different
types of containers used in the air freight industry. Figure 2.2 illustrates
some of these containers and Table 2.2 summarizes specific data for them.
Tare weight of the air freight container is a very important factor in
the selection of construction material for the container. An effort is made
to achieve a tare weight of less than 24kg/m3 (1.51b/ft3) (ref. 3). At
present, air freight containers are made of materials ranging from corrugated
cardboard to steel. However, in order to achieve high strength and low tare
weight, the industry has turned to containers made of composite materials,
such as balsa wood laminate, reinforced fiberglass, reinforced plastics, and
aluminum alloys. Containers with a tare weight of 21.15kg/m3 (1.321b/ft3)
and with good strength characteristics have been obtained.
The M-2 container which is intermodal (except for stacking limitations)
has the ISO/ANSI corner fittings and a smooth, flat undersurface for interface
with the roller system of loader and airplane (ref. 9). It weighs approximately
988kg (22001b) and cost approximately $8500. (This is half the weight and
three to four times the cost of the same size ISO marine container.) This
container achieves a tare weight of 27.5kg/m3 (1.721b/ft3) which is approxi-
mately half the 54.4kg/m3 (3.41b/ft3) achieved by ISO marine containers.
As was the case with surface container ownership, air freight containers
may be owned by the shipper, the airlines, or a leasing company. In general,
the larger containers (types A, LD3, LD7, LD11, M-l, M-2) are owned or leased
by the airline and the smaller containers (types B, D, Q, E) are owned or
leased by the shipper. In general, the larger containers mentioned above do
not require additional processing by the carrier if loaded by the shipper
since they are air-worthy. This is not the case for the smaller containers.
2.1.7. Cube Utilization
Cube utilization or stacking efficiency (ref. 11) has been a driving
force in moving the air freight industry away from pallets and toward containers.
Cube utilization is defined as "the percentage of the interior volume of a
container that is actually taken up by the packages stowed within." (ref. 12)
The lack of high cube utilization is a major contributing cause to the fact
that the freight airplane usually cubes-out before it weighs-out. Simply put,
this means that the cargo is not of sufficient density to fully utilize the
airplane's weight carrying capability. There are two ways to prevent the
cube-out problem. One way is to increase the average density of the cargo
carried. However, in a 1968-69 international survey, Douglas (ref. 12) found
that the average density of a cargo package was 229kg/m3 (14.31b/ft3). Since
the shipper decides what to ship by air and since the air freight industry is
not in a position to be particular about what they accept for cargo, there is
little chance that the density of the cargo shipped by air can be increased by
the air freight industry.
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Table 2.2
DATE ON AIR FREIGHT CONTAINERS
Type
Q or QD
LD-1
LD-3
LD-7
LD-11
Length
m
(inches)
3.02
(119)
2.13
(84)
1.07
(42)
1.00
(39.5)
1.07
(42)
2.34-1.56
(92-61.5)
1.91-1.47
(75-58)
3.18
(125)
3.18
(125)
Wi dth
m
(inches)
2.13
(84)
1.47
(58)
1.47
(58)
0.70
(27.5)
0.74
(29)
1.52
(60)
1.45
(57)
2.24
(88)
1.52
(60)
Height
m
(inches)
1.93-1.22
(76-48)
1.93-1.14
(76-45)
1.14
(45)
0.53
(21)
0.65
(25.5)
1.63
(64)
1.50
(59)
1.60
(63)
1.63
(64)
Internal
Vol ume
m3
(ft3)
10.08
(356)
5.04
(178)
1.61
(57)
0.34
(12)
0.46
(16.2)
4.84
(171)
4.25
(150)
10.48
(370)
6.85
(242)
Tare
Weight
kg
Ob)
258.6
(570)
149.7
(330)
68.0
(150)
18.1
(40)
22.7
(50)
124.7
(275)
167.8
(370)
117.9
(260)
167.8
(370)
Cargo
Weight
kg
(lb)
3175.2
(7000)
1587.6
(3500)
907.2
(2000)
181.4
(400)
226.8
(500)
1159.0
(2555)
1406.2
(3100)
4445.3
(9800)
2993.8
(6600)
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The second method of preventing the cube-out problem is to increase cube
utilization. In the same 1968-69 survey previously mentioned, Douglas found
that average cube utilization was about 54%. There were two prime reasons for
this result. First, there is a lack of cargo in some cases to sufficiently
load pallets and/or containers. This problem can only be solved by a better
marketing and sales program. The second reason is the use of pallets which
tend to be packed inefficiently in the vertical dimension. The use of con-
tainers can solve this problem. It has been demonstrated that containers can
achieve cube utilizations between 88 and 93% (ref. 13).
Even though there is substantial use of containers in the air freight
industry, most of them are contoured instead of rectangular containers. The
contoured containers are specifically designed to conform to the inside shape
of the airplane, thereby more fully utilizing the available volume of the
airplane. However, there are three distinct disadvantages of using contoured
versus rectangular containers. They are:
(1) Contoured containers cost more per cubic meter of volume than do
rectangular containers (ref. 12).
(2) A contoured container is less efficient (based on cube utilization)
than a rectangular container. For example, for a rectangular
and contoured container each of 12.74m3 (450ft3) volume, the contoured
container is about 2.5% less efficient (ref. 12).
(3) Contoured containers are sometimes designed and built for a specific
airplane which restricts the intramodal use of these containers.
2.1.8. Rectangular Container Capability of Current Aircraft
The introduction of the widebody airplane in the early 1970's was the
start of a new era in the air freight industry. These aircraft were capable
of carrying much more freight than the narrowbody airplane. For example, the
four engine narrowbody airplane can carry 33 294-46 448kg (36.7-51.2tons) of
cargo (9 435kg if carrying a full complement of passengers) while the four
engine widebody airplane is capable of 113 036-119 023kg (124.6-131.2tons; 26
339kg with passengers (ref. 7)).
There are four widebody aircraft on the commercial market today. They
are the B-747, the DC-10, the L-1011, and the A-300. At present there is only
one widebody freighter, the B-747-F. Each of the widebody passenger aircraft
is capable of carrying considerable freight. In general, this freight is con-
tainerized in the LD type containers. The cargo for these aircraft is side
door loaded. The passenger aircraft, in general, do not have the capability
to carry 2.44m x 2.44m (8ft x 8ft) containers.
The nose loading B-747-F is capable of handling the M-l and M-2 containers
and also the 2.44m x 2.44m x 12.19m (8ft x 8ft x 40ft) containers. The only
other commercial aircraft with this capability is the L-100.
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The B-747-F is the largest commercial freighter available today. It is
capable of carrying up to 117 936kg (260 OOOlb) of cargo (ref. 7). In terms
of rectangular containers, the B-747-F can handle the following maindeck
configurations (ref. 14):
(1) Thirteen 2.44m x 2.44m x 6.1m (8ft x 8ft x 20ft) and four 2.44m x .
2.44m x 3.05m (8ft x 8ft x 10ft) containers.
(2) Five 2.44m x 2.44m x 12.19m (8ft x 8ft x 40ft) and ten 2.44m x 2.44m
x 3.05m (8ft x 8ft x 10ft) containers.
This airplane is limited to carrying containers with heights of not more
than 2.44m (8ft). At present, approximately 97% of the domestic inventory of
intermodal 12.19m (40ft) long containers are over 2.44m (8ft) in height. For
the 6.1m (20ft) containers, there are approximately 47% over 2.44m (8ft) and
this percentage is increasing at a rapid rate (ref. 10). These trends could
hinder the intermodal capability of the air freight industry in the future
unless new aircraft are designed to handle the taller containers.
A recent industry/government effort was made to demonstrate that air
transportation could be completely compatible with surface transportation.
The effort was led by the Lockheed-Georgia Company and was named Intermodal
Air Cargo Test or Project Intact (ref. 2). The Air Force's C-5 Transport was
used in the demonstration. Rectangular containers conforming to ISO/ANSI
standards were used. The-containers were 2.44m (8ft) wide, ranged in height
from 2.44m to 4.12m (8ft to 13.5ft) and were either 12.19m or 13.72m (40ft or
45ft) long. On one demonstration flight, the airplane carried six 2.44m x
2.59m x 12.19m (8ft x 8ft x 40ft) containers. It should be noted that the
airplane weighed-out instead of the usual cube-out situation.
There are presently four air carriers who offer the M-2 container to
their customers. They are Seaboard World, Lufthansa, American, and Air France.
There are some 400 of the M-2 containers in use today (ref. 10). There is
still not a substantial volume of air cargo moving by the M-2 container,
however, during the period October 20, 1976 to December 23, 1976, Seaboard
World moved 963 M-2 containers between the United States and Europe (ref. 10).
2.1.9. Summary
Approximately 80% of the air freight being hauled today is either emer-
gency shipments or physically or economically perishable commodities (refs. 7,
15). Air Cargo is primarily small packages and has a high dollar value (ref.
2). In 1976, of the approximately 24.9 billion revenue-tonne-kilometers (17.1
billion revenue-ton-miles) flown, about half went as belly cargo in passenger
aircraft (ref. 14). The remaining half went to all freight aircraft. This
volume is insufficient to justify many of the intermodal container concepts.
The present air cargo markets are already well developed and offer little hope
of substantial volume increase. New markets must be obtained. This can be
done by becoming more cost competitive. One of the ways to become more cost
competitive is for the air freight industry to develop intermodal capabilities.
This will lead to a more integrated transportation system which will use
standardized containers. The use of the standardized containers could well be
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a driving force in obtaining realization of regulations imposed by world
government which presently hinder good door-to-door service (ref. 3).
The bottom line is that through the use of intermodal containers, the air
freight industry can become a high volume business which is economically
viable, and still provide the customer with a fast, reliable, door-to-door
service.
118
2.2 INTERMODAL ACCESS
Currently cargo arrives at freight terminals in packages or air containers.
Intermodal containers of the 6.1m variety will be an addition to this mix.
The access routes to and staging areas of terminals must be modified to handle
the new array of vehicles which will carry cargo to the airport. The essential
difference between existing terminals and those of 1990 will be the capacity
to handle intermodal containers. Other problems are similar in type to those
handled at present facilities; they are likely to grow as the amount of air
cargo grows. Currently the only direct access provided is to trucks, the
trucks often sharing major routes with automobiles. In general, the research
on terminal accessibility has been limited to passenger traffic (refs. 16, 17,
18, 19, 20).
This section has four major purposes: 1) to consider the types of access
required by surface modes in ACIS; 2) to consider the concepts by which this
access might be provided; 3) to consider the effects of terminal configuration
on access; and 4) to consider the effects of joint military/civilian use of
cargo terminals on access alternatives.
2.2.1. Contemporary and Advanced Surface Modes
The four surface modes are trucking, rail, water, and pipeline. They are
compatible with air transport in varying degrees. Part of the degree of
compatibility pertains to the type of cargo for which each mode has inherent
advantages. The greater the emphasis on bulk cargo, the less the compatibility
with air carriage. Thus, rail, water, and pipeline have often been summarily
dismissed as not needing air terminal access. While this is justified under
current operations, some innovations may change this condition; in addition,
there are some proposed intermodal hauls using air which require a better
physical interface. Thus trucking will be considered on the near horizon and
throughout our planning period of 1990-2015, while other modes are considered
to have possible effects on the far one.
2.2.1.1. Trucking Access
Trucking access is and will be provided by highways. The major question
here is how exclusive it should be. At most local (feeder) airports, the air
cargo facility, if there is even a separate structure, is reached by the same
roads as the passenger terminal. In some instances, a truck whose destination
is the cargo terminal must pass through the entire passenger area before it
arrives at the cargo gate.
Minor hub airports which, as in the feeders, have fairly simple on-
facility highway networks, generally use these networks for moving both people
and freight. There may be a specific turnoff to the air terminal and some
staging area for trucks, however even then the primary emphasis is convenience
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for personal vehicles and parking. In some instances, separate exits and
access roads are provided from interstates for those with cargo terminal
business. Major hub airports have separate cargo areas, hence connecting
roads on the site are to some degree exclusive. Many have air exclusive cargo
terminal exits from interstates or other limited-access highways leading to
the facility.
The quick movement of cargo is enhanced with the exclusiveness of the
cargo access routes. Trucks do not add to, nor are they caught in, congestion
generated from passenger-related traffic. Clearly the greatest contributor to
congestion is passenger and passenger related traffic. Access for thousands
and tens-of-thousands of automobiles is a common requirement at hub airports.
On the other hand, a cargo terminal with 180 tonnes per day capacity --the
volume of traffic at a minor hub -- may expect to receive only 65 trucks per
day (ref. 21). While some peak-hour congestion around hubs may develop even
with exclusive access roads, the problem is less severe.
2,2.1.2. Rail Access
With contemporary systems, rail access is not usually required for domes-
tic movements. In general, commodities which can tolerate the low speed of
rail transport do not need the special time advantages of air freight. The
added cost is, therefore, not acceptable.
There are some international movements involving rail that, at present,
do not incorporate a direct rail-air interface but could. For example, if a
company in Kansas has six 6.1m (20ft) containers of their product to be exported
to Japan, it is likely to travel Container On Flatcar (COFC) to a West Coast
port and there be shifted to a containership, with short truck movements to
connecting end point terminals. If this cargo is air eligible, a spur to the
air terminal with direct transfer to a plane would facilitate the movement and
increase the probability of air freight being selected for the transoceanic
leg of the trip.
Currently such a movement would require trucking the containers from the
railyard to the airport, stripping them, restuffing cargo into air containers,
and loading the containers on a plane. This handling would probably make the
air option both inconvenient and expensive. Simple transfer from a rail spur
would make air transportation more competitive. However, a regular and relatively
high volume of traffic would be needed to support the tracks. They would be
located only at the largest hubs, probably with a coastal location.
At least one future rail concept might efficiently use access to air
cargo terminals, the TRAILS system (ref. 22). TRAILS is designed to carry
high value, low density cargo in small loads (39 tonnes or less) at average
speed of 5.374m/s (120mi/h). It would obviously be competitive with domestic
airlines for cargo, however, it may be complementary with major international
hubs for single waybill movements of overseas cargos. Currently, the TRAILS
system is conceived to use standard gauge track, with rationalized vehicles,
and be routed in the medians of interstate highways.
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Though it is questionable that such a system will ever be constructed,
there will undoubtedly be some renovation and changes in operating procedures
which will allow for faster and/or express COFC service between points with
rail terminals. Some provision for rail access to international airports may
be appropriate for both cargo and passenger traffic, if rail service is im-
proved and highway transportation becomes more costly.
2.2.1.3. Water Access
There is no need for interface between inland waterway and air cargo
facilities. The types of cargo moved in the two modes are not compatible. If
an "air bridge" concept (ref. 23) is put into operation, there may be some
consideration given to ocean-going container docks on the airport site for
direct transfer of containers. An intermediate truck link, however, is more
feasible. The container docks could not be justified even accepting stupen-
dously high estimates of air bridge traffic. It remains that no direct access
is needed for waterborne commerce.
2.2.1.4. Pipeline Access
Again, the types of cargo which traditionally move in pipeline are not
compatible with the air mode. As long as liquid bulks and gases remain the
major cargos, this condition is not likely to change. Some have suggested
either pneumatic or hydraulic tubes for the surface transport of modules with
air eligible cargo.(ref. 22) The implementation of either of these innova-
tions would be at the end of the planning time period at the earliest, hence
it is not envisioned that pipeline access to air cargo terminals should be
provided, with one exception. If a terminal configuration which involves
breakdown and assembly of local traffic at a remote site is selected, some
sort of tube connecting the on- and off-site facilities may be feasible.
This, however, is not an access problem. It is one of the terminal design.
2.2.1.5. Summary
It remains that the major ground mode of transportation needing access to
air cargo terminals over the period 1990-2015 is trucking. The nature of rigs
is expected to change from semi-trailers to two and three trailer types in
interstate trucking by 1990 (ref. 22). This will call for some access road
and staging area design modification, but the predominant interface with
trucking persists.
Some interface with rails for COFC or TRAILS cargo may be needed for
direct international movement at major hubs. This still is likely to consti-
tute a small proportion of air traffic and a small space dedication in the
total terminal.
2.2.2. Access Design Concepts
There are two basic access design concepts: 1) on-port access only, and
2) on-port and subsidiary terminal access. The subsidiary terminal config-
uration alternative pertains only to local trucking traffic. Clearly the
121
container transfer among planes would not be facilitated by an off-site sub-
sidiary station.
2.2.2.1. Concept Alternatives for Trucking
Terminals can take two basic configurations on port: 1) a single build-
ing, or 2) gate arrival terminals (ref. 24). The primary advantage in gate
arrivals, assuming they are assigned by region of destination, is a forced
sorting of cargo before it arrives at the terminal. This saves at least a
general destination classification on the premises. In physical structure and
operation, these gate terminals do not vary widely from a normal terminal.
They are, however, scaled down in size to the smaller proportion of cargo
which will pass through each facility with the associated diseconomies of
scale.
Access objectives are similar in each case. First, the staging area and
bays must allow for manuvering vehicles, dropping trailers, and transferring
containers. Second, there must be adequate space for queuing of vehicles.
Their arrival is a random process, hence queuing space must be geared to peak
possibilities to avoid periodic congestion of access routes. Third, there
must be an adequate number of bays to minimize queuing in staging area.
Fourth, delays due to congestion in access routes should be minimized.
2.2.2.2. Staging and Bay Design Requirements
The nature and size of staging areas required for the types of cargo
moved in an advanced system would vary by airport classification, i.e., hub,
minor hub, or local airport. A hub is viewed to be a major origin and destin-
ation for domestic and international cargos as well as an important trans-
shipment point. A minor hub is a substantial traffic generator with some
transshipment, primarily in package cargo. A. local airport is a generator,
usually minor, of traffic. It does limited sorting and no consolidation.
2.2.2.3. Major Hubs
Considerably greater truck staging area than exists in current designs
will probably be necessary for hub terminals in the 1990 advanced system.
Maintaining the assumptions that substantial line-haul trucking will be done
in double- and triple-rigs and recognizing that major hubs will generate
foreign and domestic traffic from fairly large catchment areas, it follows the
direct, terminal access for the doubles and triples is desirable. Because the
trailers must be dropped and brought to bays or other cargo handling areas one
at a time, both larger and differently aligned staging areas are required
compared to those for semi-trailers.
The triple-rigs would be the largest access vehicles expected. Most
vehicles going to the cargo bays in the package terminal would remain local
delivery trucks. The current estimate of 558kg (12301b) payload per truck
entering or leaving cargo terminals would probably apply to these vehicles.
Double- and triple-rigs would carry substantially higher payloads. A 180
tonne terminal, one large enough to handle the full volume of a domestic hub
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or each of several carriers in a hub with international traffic, could handle
624 vehicles in the bays in a 24-hour period.
This assumes 13 bays in the covered package area and an average of one-
half hour in a bay for each vehicle. Assuming a 2300 to 700 hour curfew on
aircraft take-offs and landings at the airport, hence a 600 to 2400 hour oper-
ation of the terminal, 468 trucks carrying traditional package cargo could be
handled at the terminal building. Current designs for terminals of this 180
tonne average capacity include 13-16 cargo bays (ref. 21), hence would need no
modification to conform to this projection. Holding area, however, may be
limited to as few as three additional parking places for 12.2m (40ft) semi-
trailers. This holding area is approximately 166m2 and is inadequate for the
size and operation of double- and triple-rigs.
Because the multi-trailer rigs must drop all but one of their elements to
maneuver into bays, there is at least one trailer in holding for every one
being stripped or stuffed. Thus it is conceivable that a holding space will
be required for each bay in addition to those spaces for rigs which have no
elements in the bay. Each of these spaces will occupy a greater area than
those designed for semi-trailers. In addition, queuing space will be needed
for the local delivery trucks.
The holding area needed for trucks alone should be 540m2.. This amount
of space would allow for holding 48 triple-rigs, or more vehicles of smaller
sizes. This is approximately three times the area of the bay space plus three
overflow parking places. It would be possible to have 13 triple-rigs being
loaded or unloaded and 13 full plus 13 empty ones in queue.
Space for a 6.1m intermodal container operation must also be provided.
Current maritime container facilities have about 81 000m2 reserved for each
container berth. This, again, follows the rule of holding three times the
capacity load of associated container ships and provides working space and
full plus empty container holding areas. Nowhere near this allocation will be
required on an air terminal, because the capacity of an air freighter is so
much lower than that of a containership. Allowing for a possible load of 18
of the 6.1m (20ft) boxes in a Boeing 747-llF/lllF,(ref. 23, 25) the largest
proposed incremental improvement in craft size over current wide-bodies,
8100m2 would be a generous allowance of staging area for such cargo needs.
This would include the storage for equipment, space for the bay, and a truck
holding area. It is approximately five times the space needed for the load
from a single craft.
Gross staging area, not counting terminal structure bays, can then be
expected to be on the order of 8600m2 to accomodate the interstate truck of
the 1990's. This is a spectacular increase in open storage and holding area.
There is also some inherent overcapacity. The payload of a single 747-11F/111F
would be on the order of 110 tonnes, 77 in the main deck containers, and 33 in
the belly. This assumes an average cargo density of 107.3kg/m3, and is posited
on a trans-United States or East Coast U.S. flight to Europe with a craft
whose capacity is 130.5 tonnes at that stage length. All cargo is container-
ized with 9 standard intermodal 6.1m boxes, 9 M-2 intermodal containers, 4 of
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the 3.05m boxes, and 40 LD-1 type belly pods. The payload of two dedicated
flights would exceed the average daily volume of the covered facility. Such a
terminal would probably be minimal to allow maneuvering and avoid the queuing
problems associated with access, however, it would be capable of handling
substantially greater volumes if containerized service was highly successful.
Eight such flights daily would allow the processing of approximately 880
tonnes of containerized freight, 265 of which would be in the belly.
The belly containers could derive from package cargo which has been
consolidated on- or off-site. These would be processed through the regular
terminal structure, hence holding space for cargo or trucks accessing it would
not be needed at the intermodal container berth. Most of the 6.1m containers
would arrive two at a time on flatbed trucks; an average of two per vehicle
can be assumed. A 24-hour operation with two hour turnaround for the aircraft,
i.e., two hours to strip, stuff, and fuel the craft, would generate 216 trucks.
Holding area for vehicles would be provided for within the 8100m2. In a major
hub port, several carriers may require this sort of minimal holding and staging
area. Considerable construction cost and ground area might be saved if a
number of terminals used common staging areas. This would also mitigate the
extensive overcapacity.
Finally, some provision for parking for those sending and receiving
freight is necessary. Forwarders, brokers, and other principals will need to
be on site for customs and to receive cargo in major hubs. Small package
pick-ups and drops may be done by personal vehicles. The amount of space
needed for parking depends greatly on the local infrastructure and volume of
traffic hence will not be detailed here. The space required will increase as
the number of shippers and intermediaries grows.
Some special consideration may be needed in terminal design for increased
volumes of cargo which has been consolidated into belly containers off the
port by forwarders. As was noted earlier, freighters which are designed to
move the 6.1m intermodal container also,have considerable belly hold capacity.
Both increases in large dedicated freight and in passenger fleets result in
increases in belly cargo capacity; hence the total space available for cargo
in the belly holds will almost certainly increase at greater rates than that
for cargo above decks.
Forwarders who handle small lots are likely to take advantage of this
condition. The LD-1 containers, used in the earlier, computations, can carry
approximately 540kg (12001b) of cargo at 107.3kg/m3. Using these containers
for small lots would avoid waiting to fill a full 6.1m box, and hence expedite
service. Assuming 40 percent of the traffic continues to derive from for-
warders, increased handling of full belly containers can be anticipated.
Special bays for the receipt and delivery of them will facilitate access and
operations.
2.2.2.4. Other Mode Access for Major Hubs
Trucking and rail are the only two modes which would require direct
access to terminals in the 1990 period. Accepting the premise that double-and
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triple-trailers will be handled directly from interstate highways, the need
for the earliest possible separation of trucks from passenger terminal traffic
is emphasized in hub ports. The traffic capacity of these freight access
roadways would vary according to the total airport traffic, the exact terminal
configuration, and the mix of intermodal containers compared to other types of
cargo. Using the figures calculated for the earlier analysis, a 24-hour
capacity operation would generate 840 trucks, 216 of which would be at least
semi-trailers. This is an average of 35 vehicles per hour (this rate is the
same for the curfew-limited example). Personal automobiles with business at
the terminal would also add to the load. A two-lane, two-way highway would be
adequate to handle this sort of load with terminal staging of the type outlined
above. At a major hub, where ten or twenty such terminals might exist, a
four-lane road would be necessary.
For rail, a single track with three spurs should be adequate to handle
any anticipated needs. Each spur should hold 4 to 6 COFC, the approximate
payload of a large dedicated freighter. This configuration follows the marine
berth storage capacity of three times the containers in a single vessel.
Insofar as airports are located some distance from switchyards or mainlines,
there may be problems encountered in acquiring the right-of-way for a rail
spur.
2.2.2.5. Minor Hubs and Local (Feeder) Airports
No substantial changes in access links and staging areas are needed to
install the 1990 advanced system where most minor hubs and local airports are
concerned. Localized assembly and distribution will still be by truck, and
the trucks involved will not be the double- and triple-trailer interstate
rigs. While some volume increases, hence terminal expansion, can be antic-
ipated, the basic access rights-of-way and staging areas can remain as they
are in higher volume cargo ports of today. The single exception would be a
terminal which originates a regular container traffic. Here container handling
equipment and holding would have to be provided. Few of the minor hubs or
locals would have this traffic.
2.2.2.6. Off-Site Assembly and Distribution
The development of satellite terminals for local assembly and distribution
of goods must be considered in the light of scale economics of terminal size.
The off-site terminals do not eliminate the need for on-site facilities, they
merely modify the latter to container processing terminals with regard to
localized traffic. The on-site terminal at hubs must still consolidate and
breakdown cargo for transshipments. With hubs, then, both the on- and off-
site facilities do assembly and breakdown of cargo; in addition, the on-site
terminal processes full containers.
Only in local terminals could the port and satellite stations have distinct
operational characteristics. In this instance, however, it is unlikely that
the volume of traffic would justify specialization of function and ground
crews. In hub ports, since the on-site crews will have to perform all the
functions of off-site ones plus more, the feasibility of a satellite is based
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on the volume of local traffic as a proportion of total traffic. If the
transshipment far exceeds the local traffic, all cargo should probably be
handled on-site, otherwise there are strong possibilities of overcapacity,
i.e., inefficiently used labor, at the port.
Before a remote assembly point should be considered, the volume of local
traffic needs to be high enough in itself to justify a terminal, and the ratio
of local to transshipped traffic should be high. There is also an additional
transfer cost from the satellite to the main terminal which must be integrated
into the costs of such an operation. Finally the location of the remote ter-
minal must be selected.
Algorithms have been proposed for this location problem (ref. 26), and
there are a variety of general location-allocation techniques which pertain.
Terminals could be located to minimize total surface transportation costs or
time to trucks, to equalize surface transport costs or time to consumers, to
minimize the cost or time to the most remote consumer, or to satisfy other
criteria. Some algorithms incorporate established networks; others assume
direct point-to-point travel. All allow that any location within the space
delimited is eligible for terminal placement.
In reality, there are considerably fewer possible sites for a remote
terminal. The possible locations are limited by zoning. Such a terminal
could be in only those classifications in which industrial activities are
permitted. In all likelihood, old interior manufacturing districts would have
considerable access and internal circulation problems, hence would be unsuited
to a freight terminal. Planned manufacturing/distribution parks tend to be
located on the fringes of the urban area with convenient access to interstate
highways. Thus an assembly point on the airport itself would be as attractive
for cost minimization as one in a new industrial park. It is highly unlikely
that satellite terminals will be a practical feasibility for any single air-
line.
2.2.2.7. Gate Arrival Terminals
The primary problem with gate arrival terminals is the abrogation of
scale economies in operations. They could be feasible only at high volume
major hubs even with an expanded 1990 traffic. Further, if it is assumed
airlines that will maintain separate terminals, even the major carriers do not
have, and are not likely to have by 1990, the volume of traffic to justify
gate arrival terminals. Gate arrival terminals would have to be used commonly
by all lines to be feasible. While gate arrivals pose no particular problems
for access to other modes, they are an alternative which is highly unlikely
due to institutional constraints.
2.2.2.8. Access at Joint Civilian/Military Ports
The same modes would require access by the same means to airports handling
joint civilian/military and civilian cargos. In some sense, the problem is
minimized if military ports are used for dedicated air cargo movements. There
would be no overlap with commercial passenger access. On the other hand, many
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of the possible military bases for such joint use do not have the interstate
and rail links needed for hub traffic. The role of such places would be to
facilitate large local movements, possibly from a limited number of firms.
Using civilian airports for the loading of most routine military shipments
in the United States implies no unusual access problems. However, the shipment
of outsized military cargos would call for special load capacities in holding
areas and on access roads. Civilian air shipment of such cargo cannot be
expected to justify these additional requirements. Hence there are some
access limitations on both the civilian use of military airports and the
military cargos which might move through civilian airports.
Using military airports as all freight operations creates a considerable
problem of interface between the cargo system and small package and belly pod
traffic which originates from passenger flights. This same problem exists if
any dedicated freightports are established.
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2.3 TERMINAL OPERATION
A very important element in the proposed air cargo system is the airport
terminal. Most of the transit time for the majority of door-to-door air cargo
shipments is used on the ground and hence the weak link in improving overall
service is the ground support system. The main objective of the terminal
operations, then, is to achieve time savings and incidently lower the packaging
costs, better the protection of the goods, and better intermodal exchange.
This requires the introduction of automation and mechanization particularly in
those elements of the terminal where cargo is loaded, unloaded, and moves on
the ground. It also requires streamlining the consolidaton and break down
operations and moving them to the ends of the distribution system, preferably
to the locations of the consignor and consignee.
The terminal receives small loads, consolidates these into large unit
loads which are then loaded onto the transport aircraft. On off-loading the
aircraft, the terminal also receives large unit loads which are then broken
down into individual parcels for delivery to the customers. Planning for the
air cargo terminal then is like planning for any freight processing facility
except that the large tracts of land required come from usually expensive
airport land. As air cargo continues to grow in importance, the surface
vehicular traffic accompanying a large volume of air cargo will require careful
planning as already mentioned.
Air cargo facilities are influenced by many other factors such as surface
access, the split between full freight and belly cargo, aircraft types, the
split between domestic and international cargo, types of cargo, cargo handling
and storage, volume of cargo, intermodal containers, the information and doc-
umentation process, airport capacity, and existing passenger traffic. This
section considers four major questions for terminals of the integrated cargo
system proposed:
1) Where should the cargo terminal be located?
2) What size should it have?
3) What should the design look like?
4) What loading facilities and equipment are required?
2.3.1. Locations of the Terminal
Where should the cargo terminal be? Again, many factors influence this
decision, such as an existing airport versus a new airport, surface access,
runway access, location of the passenger terminal, zoning criteria. The
limited capacity of existing airports can be increased if certified freight
forwarders handle a larger share of the small package traffic and move their
assembly/disassembly areas away from the airport. The problems of the vehicular
traffic associated with the forecasted growth in cargo volume will tend to
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reinforce this trend to off-airport consolidation. Direct access from the
runways to the cargo terminal for the aircraft and transit ways from the
passenger terminal(s) to the cargo terminal(s) must be provided. Belly cargo
will account for 50% of total cargo making the transferability from the
passenger terminal to the freight terminal of considerable importance.
2.3.2. Size of the Terminal
How large should the cargo terminal be? That depends on many factors,
such as cargo tonnage projection, airport capacity restrictions, containerized
cargo storage requirements, livestock, mail, staging area, consolidation
space, express service, security, and automation of cargo handling systems.
The prime objective of air carriers is to fill their aircraft and this objec-
tive would be advanced by offering favorable bulk rates to forwarders, hence
diminishing their own small package business. Rather than develop off-
airport cargo handling facilities, they should make it clear that shipping
small packages via forwarders saves time and money. A containerized system
would require a proportionately smaller cargo terminal although this may be
offset by the penetration into less time sensitive products requiring greater
storage on the terminal. One LCA requires 10 000m2 of floor space, hence a
two dock operation would require at least double that area. Storage time
must be cut to a minimum to maintain these space estimates, thus the interface
with the trucking at the terminal will be critical. High rise storage seems
the only other alternative to devoting massive proportions of the total
airport to freight terminals, if transfer cannot be effected with speed.
2.3.3. Design of the Terminal
The design of future cargo terminals depends on factors such as aircraft
design, the degree of mechanization and automation in cargo handling, the
degree of computer control over information and documentation, and the degree
of containerization. The greatest impact on the design of the interface
between the cargo terminal and the aircraft is due to the introduction of the
large nose loader specifically designed to carry freight. Currently civilian
freighters are almost all modified passenger aircraft. The terminal must be
completely mechanized to bring the containers from the truck to the loading
device of the aircraft, and computers, real time teleprocessing ones, must
eliminate the paper work and decisions which tend to staff a smooth flow.
Momentary storage by destination in between arrivals and departures of aircraft
can be handled by the same computer.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the layout of the terminal. As was pointed out
in the section on rail access, there is at present no true intermodality between
rail container and aircraft. This makes the air option both inconvenient
and expensive. For efficiency with large volumes of air cargo, the container
used therein must eventually become intermodal. In the mean time, for true
intermodality, an "auxiliary" tray system is suggested in which the ISO/ANSI
container with its ribbed bottom and protruding corner posts is set in a tray
at the cargo terminal and automatically locked in place. The system would
incorporate fixed overhead cranes to move containers from flatbeds onto ter-
minal conveyers. At the conveyer interface, there would be a guide structure
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for containers and a feeding mechanism for trays. The container and tray then
move through the system in the same way as aircraft containers.
2.3.4. Loading Facilities and Equipment
The loading facilities include fixed and mobile aircraft handling units.
In the fixed handling unit, the loading facilities are fully integrated with
the terminal building and the aircraft taxies directly to the loading dock
where a telescoping bridge raises and tilts to mate with the aircraft doors
and the loading platform. From there on, the terminal handling equipment must
be able to operate at the speed with which the aircarft unloads its pallets
and containers, that is, at a speed of roughly 0.3m/sec, so as to take full
advantage of modern methods of dealing with freight on the ground. These
include standard size loading units, mechanical handling and locking, good
coordination of flow inside the aircraft and on the ground with the aim of
minimizing the combined loading and unloading times to something of the order
of one or two hours total. A design feature of the fixed docking facility is
a staging area that can move cargo to the aircraft either directly from a
truck or from the cargo unitizing area. Cargos consolidated off-port need not
pass through the freight classification facility. The truck offloading crane
must place any ribbed bottom container on a tray. Automatic attachment between
tray and container takes place before convey or transport through the terminal.
The reverse process takes place when containers are removed from temporary
automated high rise or horizontal storage and put on a truck.
Mobile handling equipment takes the cargo load to the aircraft at some
arbitrary point on the apron, and can be used in periods of extremely high
freight traffic or to handle loads from craft imcompatible with the fixed
docks.
2.3.5. Summary
As shown in Figure 2.3, the air cargo terminal consists of the following
systems and facilities.
2.3.5.1. Aircraft Loading Area
Here a loading dock and moveable bridge are connected to a double tier
staging area providing temporary separate incoming and outgoing cargo storage.
The fixed dockbridge system is capable of loading and unloading aircraft
through the nose or side doors while the mobile handling aspect would be
served by K-loader equipment.
2.3.5.2. Passenger Terminal Transit Way
This links the passenger terminal(s) to the freight terminal with access
to main storage area to containerization area as well as the staging area.
This could be part of a central distribution system forming the heart of the
cargo terminal as it transported cargo in all its configurations to.storage
areas, containerization areas, loading and unloading zones.
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2.3.5.3. Containerization Area
This covered area is used for cargo buildup and break down including
storage for mixed general cargo arriving from the truck docks or awaiting pick
up by small package delivery trucks. This area will diminish in importance
with respect to the overall terminal as the airport rises in the terminal
hierarchy toward hub status.
2.3.5.4. Storage Area
Intermodal containers as well as large packages offloaded from trucks are
stored here. High rise storage racks capable of handling all containers could
be used to minimize the floor area. A large part will be occupied by the
belly cargo containers of the passenger aircraft.
2.3.5.5. Special Purpose Area
This area can be used for special purposes such as oversize cargo, live-
stock, and cold storage.
2.3.5.6. Administrative Area
The offices for the airlines, customs, and other services are housed here
with separate parking facilities so as not to interfer with the delivery truck
flow.
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2.4 CUSTOMER COMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
No matter how effective a terminal operation is, it does not directly in-
crease traffic moving on the air cargo system. It can lower the costs of
transport, but customers must receive this information from somewhere if they
are to respond by increasing their use of air cargo. The institutions, laws,
and techniques by which information about freight movements is obtained,
stored, and reported are, thus, integral parts of the total ground support
system. This section will review these elements, particularly the marketing
of air freight, the role of the forwarder in attracting and handling cargos,
and the advantages of one-carrier waybills to ground support.
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2.4.1. Customer Communication Service
Customer Communication Service (CCS) is the term we will use to describe
the flow of information between the air cargo carrier and the customer (con-
signor). Its major goal is to maintain and increase the volume of cargo
shipped by the carrier. Subsidiary goals which support this are:
1) Expediting customer shipments to satisfy the customer and to meet
service standards
2} Maintaining satisfactory relationships between the customer and the
air cargo carrier
3) Keeping air cargo carrier management information on matters affecting
customer relationships.
The following activities are part of CCS:
1) Providing the customer accurate, timely information on tariffs,
schedules, classifications, and packaging
2) Answering queries from the customer and consignee on location, status
and expected time of arrival (ETA) of specific shipments
3) Persuading shippers to increase their use of air cargo
4) Receiving and arranging action on customer requests, complaints, and
directions
5) Advising management on matters arising from CCS activities
6) Handling advertising public relations and media relationships.
Any procedures or equipment used to support these activites contribute to
CCS.
2.4.2. Marketing Air Cargo
The type of marketing which increases volume generally revolves around
activities 1, 3, and 6. There are several steps in this marketing process.
The first step is identification of air eligible products which are
produced and shipped in large quantities in the area. The next step is to
determine which shippers have the biggest volume of the air eligible products
previously identified. The third is to contact those shippers identified as
good prospects to convince them that air cargo will be more profitable than
their present mode. The fourth step is to get the shipper to sign an agree-
ment for air cargo service. The last step is the follow up to solve any
problems which may have arisen and to verify that the shipper received the
service he was sold. Airlines have not been successful in effectively executing
all these steps.
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While air eligible products have been identified by a number of NASA
contractors and, presumably, within the market research sections of airlines,
the air freight industry has had uneven success in establishing and communi-
cating attractive tariffs.
Salespersons have even closed agreements with major shipping firms using
outdated tariffs which were lower than contemporary ones. For example, the
CAB denied WITS Air Freight, a Seattle-based air forwarder, an exemption for
mistakenly charging a Miami shipper rates based upon a canceled tariff. The
Board cited an exemption in the matter would encourage other carriers to
request for exemption in similar action (ref. 27). Errors of this sort haVe
hurt the public posture of the air freight business.
Activities 2 and 4, answering queries and handling consumer requests,
can be facilitated by computer technology. The data systems of Air Canada
(ACCESS) (ref. 28), or Emery's Air Freight are capable of tracing the status
of freight on any mode of transportation within the system within 10 seconds.
In tracing cargo shipped through Emery Air Freight, both the location and
status of the cargo can be obtained with the airbill number or the name of
the shipper and consignee. Both the Emery and ACCESS systems are capable of .
printing notices to the destination port, where governments honor them to
speed the cargo through customs. Very little time, if any, is lost on docu-
mentation and the tracing and monitoring are reliable.
The fifth activity, informing management on CCS matters, is, of course,
an in-house activity.
2.4.3. Marketing and Personnel
Almost every employee of an air cargo carrier communicates with customers
as part of his or her duties; however, this section concerns the employees
who spend all or most of their worktime dealing directly with the customer.
Normally, there will be at least two categories of customer service repre-
sentatives (CSR) — inside and outside representatives. The functions of the
inside CSR are:
1) To answer customer requests for information on tariffs, schedules,
service, packaging, and similar matters
2) To answer their requests for information on specific shipments and
relay their requests for action on a specific shipment to the proper
individual
3) To encourage increased use of the carrier's air cargo service
4) To inform his supervisor as directed of any pertinent information
obtained
5) To have a CSR available to the customer during working hours.
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The functions of the outside CSR are:
1) To call on present and potential customers to persuade them to
increase their use of the air cargo carrier's services. This
requires sales ability and a thorough knowledge of air cargo
advantages, services, tariffs, and packaging.
2) To respond in person to customer complaints and requests when a
personal call is justified.
3) To represent the air cargo carrier at meetings, service clubs,
and public groups.
4) If the carrier has no one specifically assigned to dealing with
advertising media, act as the carrier's advertising manager.
Either the inside or outside representative can be the first contact
that a potential customer has with the air cargo industry. It is extremely
important that they be effective in this capacity.
There are several critical areas in the large air freight forwarding
business that require expertise on the part of the salesperson. One such
area is knowledge of containers types, capacity, ownership, shipping modes
(i.e., Al freighters, LD-3 widebodies, and QD standard bodies), allowable
tare weight and handling features for shippers. Knowledge of what cargo can
be priority one (First Freight of United) is required of all forwarders.
Priority shipment carries a guaranteed boarding on-line transfer and a refund
if commitments are not fulfilled.
Unfortunately, especially within the air freight divisions of large
airlines, the development and quality of the salespersons holds a low priority
in company goals. This low priority stems from the "by-product philosophy"
of air cargo transportation. The by-product philosophy regards passenger
traffic as the main business of the air line. It assumes that the air carrier
would not operate to carry cargo unless the carrier also transported passengers.
In air carrier accounting, all or almost all indirect costs can be charged
against passenger traffic; only the direct operating costs of cargo service
are charged against air cargo. Little or no indirect or general overhead
expense is allocated to air cargo.
In essence, the entire function of the air freight department is to fill
empty holds on passenger planes. While any additional revenues which can be
gleaned this way are welcome, the suggestion of investments to maximize them
is met indifferently.
There are at least four areas in which marketing for air cargo can be
persuasive. These include:
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2.4.3.1. Market Dominance
Market dominance may be defined as a market position which brings the
holder the leadership position in pricing, product characteristics, marketing
channels, customer financing, and other areas. For example, an independent
phone company must make its equipment and accounting compatible with that of
the Bell System, the market leader. Bell dominance extends to the color of
the yellow pages and of the blue public telephone signs. The market dominant
firm is usually the one with the largest share of the market for the product
within the marketing area. Market dominance also has a time factor. The
first firm in a market has the lead in the race for dominance and in the
struggle to keep ahead. Air cargo can be instrumental in attaining early
market penetration and in holding the lead.
2.4.3.2. Customer Service
Another strong motivation for using air cargo is improved service (shorter
delivery time) to the customer. It has the advantage of easy measurement of
the elapsed time from the consignor's shipping dock to the consignee's receiving
area.
2.4.3.3. Budget
Many transportation decisions are made on the basis of a transportation
expense budget set by management. The traffic or shipping manager must keep
his transportation expenditures within his budget regardless of service, de-
livery time, profitability, or other factor.
The procedure separates the transportation mode decision from the decision-
maker concerned with profit, overall cost, sales, or customer service. It
also tends to encourage cheaper modes such as trucks over air cargo.
If transportation manager is limited in his modal choice by a strict bud-
get, the customer service representative .should try to reach the decision-
maker who can authorize use of air cargo.
2.4.3.4. Deadlines
Much use of air cargo is to meet deadlines. It doesn't matter who sets
the deadline or whether the deadline is necessary or rational. If the shipping
manager is told to meet a deadline, he will ship by air if this will meet the
deadline and if he can rely on the air cargo carriers ability to meet its
schedule. This movitation will apply to non-profit and government organizations
as well as to private business. A company may advertise its use of air cargo
in the hope of increasing its clientele.
There are some modeling techniques which airfreight salespersons can
employ in dealing with prospective customers, e.g., the Air Freight Decision
Tool (AFDT)(ref. 29). The AFDT is used to help the shipper analyze his air
transportation cost. The cost of shipping by air is compared to that for
other modes through a modeling procedure. The variables used are value of the
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product, density of product, start-up cost, and warehouse cost. A curve
showing the break even point for transporting by air is among the products.
A problem in using these total inventory approaches is that the trans-
portation manager of a company, the individual most likely to be contacted by
an airfreight salesperson, may not have control over the inventory procedures
of a company. His decision to use airfreight is based totally on his budget
which covers only the transfer of goods and does not include costs of ware-
housing, etc. Thus, an appeal to a high level of management may be necessary
to sell the use of air service, no matter how evident its advantages are.
The area of advertising is also one in which approaching the proper
audience is critical. Most companies find that using an advertising agency
is more satisfactory than doing the whole advertising job in-house. The
agency's fee normally comes from a commission, according to which media are
used. Thus the air cargo company would save little or nothing by not using
the agency. In addition, a good advertising agency will have skills and
contacts difficult for the air cargo company to acquire and maintain.
In what media should the air cargo carrier advertise? Some suggestions
are:
1) Trade journals of industries producing air eligible cargo. Regional
journals in the carrier's area are preferred if available. National
journals are more expensive and have many subscribers in regions not
served by the air cargo carrier.
2) Trade or professional journals directed at transportation managers.
The following are not usually successful because of the high cost per prospect:
1) TV, radio, and general circulation newspapers
2) Financial, commercial, and business general papers and journals
3) Trade journals of industries producing non-air eligible goods
4) General business periodicals
There is clear room for improvement in the manner in which airlines,
especially airlines whose major business is passengers, organize and execute
their customer communications services. Many of these improvements lie in
giving more attention to freight operations. Others may derive from delegating
certain of the CCS to other parties, i.e., the air freight forwarder.
2.4.4. Air Forwarders
If an advanced large air cargo (LAC) system is to become a viable enter-
prise, the freight forwarder/broker must assume the role .of.^he^central
nervous system for the network. The justification given freight 'forwarders
in 1955 by the CAB is just as appropriate today as it was then, ". . . . It
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is in the public interest and need for, the service of air freight forwarders
has been sufficiently established to justify the authorization of air freight
forwarder."(ref. 30) The importance of the forwarder is supported by the CAB
Files (Forms 244, schedule T-l) which listed freight forwarders as being
responsible for tendering approximately one-half of the total freight to
domestic trunk, all cargo and local service (ref. 31).
The objective of freight forwarders for the large air cargo industry of
the 1990's will be to establish a one-carrier responsibility that will move
cargo from dock-to-dock in a minimal amount of time, at a minimal cost to the
consumer, with dependable and consistent service. The shipper would simply
call the freight forwarder with a description of cargo, the time of shipment,
and the destination of the shipment in question. The forwarder would be
responsible for the cargo until it reached its destination. The achievement
of this objective would mean that freight forwarders would offer shippers of
large air cargo the same service that travel agencies offer air passengers
and present freight forwarders offer for small packages service.
In designing a large air cargo system with dock to dock service for the
1990's, we must review the present state of the art. The new system may be a
closed enterprise like Federal Express or it may be a forwarder with ground
transportation who buys lift from commercial airlines.
There are several advantages that operations like Federal Express have:
1) Since 1972 the Civil Aeronautics Board ruled that operators flying
aircraft with payloads of 1500 pounds or less could be classified as
"air-taxi" operators. This classification allows them to fly to any
city in the United States without having to file for a certificate of
public convenience or need (ref. 32).
2) Federal Express owns its own ground carriers which allows it to do
its own pick-up and delivery. This feature allows them to offer
next day, door-to-door service to any city in which they have a branch
office. Since only Federal Express personnel handle the parcel, they
are able to account for it at any point.
3) Federal Express or any other small freight airline can plan their
schedule for next day service, which prevents what Art Bass describes
as, "Packages from being slaves to when and where the commercial
carriers wanted to move people, which just may happen not to be where
the parcel is going."(ref.33)
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Federal Express has several other innovations that enable them to offer
next day service. One is the STAR System (Systemwide Tracking and Recording).
The STAR System has three major benefits to the company:
1) It allows Federal Express officials to know where a package is at any
given time.
2) It minimizes billing and handling cost.
3) It provides an accurate and timely data base.
The STAR is aided by a computer with terminals at each of its branches.
The package is scanned four times to insure accurate and reliable service.
The four scanning points are listed below.
1) Origin City Station. The shipper calls the branch office in his city
with a request for service. If he is a regular subscriber, he already
has an addressograph data recorder. This allows the shipper to prepare
the airbill (consignee address cards, return address, etc.) for FEC.
The airbill contains four copies, one of which is used as a label for
the package. The scanning is done when the carrier returns to his
branch office in the shipper's city.
2) The second scan takes place in the Memphis Hub, where all packages
are unloaded from the feeder aircraft and placed on a conveyor with
a divert chute that utilizes zip codes. Once the divert chute has
directed the package to the proper sender plane, it is scanned.
3) The package is scanned a third time when it reaches its destination
city.
4) The fourth and last time the package is scanned is when the courier
delivers the parcel to the consignee. The consignee's signature
which indicated that he received the package is scanned when the
courier returns to his branch office.
.The air freight forwarders who buy lift from commercial airlines also
have several advantages. The first advantage is that they usually employ
indirect air carrier service, thus relying heavily on an aircraft owned and
run by another organization. They know the exact flight schedule and route.
The freight forwarders are free of the burden of making flight plans. Another
advantage is that they avoid the high cost of operating an aircraft when their
payload does not justify the flight.
There are several disadvantages for the air freight forwarders who employ
commercial airlines to lift their cargo. First shipment carried by another
carrier and across several modes makes tracing limited, if not impossible. In
this event, the air freight forwarder is at the mercy of the passenger carrier
with their scheduled and unscheduled delays. If a priority decision has to be
made between passenger and cargo, the airline will usually go with 87% of its
total income, the passengers.
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2.4.5. Documentation
In order for the freight forwarding industry to achieve the objective,
"of moving large air cargo from dock to dock in minimal time", improved tech-
nology in documentation procedures must parallel improvements in aircraft
technology, intermodality, and ground support system. The air freight for-
warding industry's biggest asset is time. It can't compete with other modes
of transportation in terms of cost per shipment or volume per shipment. Time
consumption is the airlines only superior quality. International trade by
waterway between many nations is roughly 45 days, whereas by air it is less
than one week (ref. 34).
In order for the air freight industry to reach its full potential, the
delivery time of 6 days for international cargo must be reduced by one-half.
The IATA reported the following graphic description for international cargo
travel (ref. 34).
Export
Function Handling Export Export Transfer Import Import Import Import
Agent Custom Carrier Carrier Carrier Broker Custom Trucker
percent
days
15%
1/2
1%
1/4
15%
1/2
12%
1/2
15%
1/2
25%
1
2%
1/2
15%
1/2
The documentation procedure required for international air freight is to
a large degree the cause of much of the delay.
Eric Rath reported that there are as many as 125 different types of docu-
ments in either regular or special use for international shipments (ref. 3).
The 125 documents represents more than 100 separate forms. The forms include
the bill of lading, through bill of lading, custom declaration, counselor
documents, dock receipts, certificates of inspection and measurement, certifi-
cates and binders for insurance, banking documents, forwarders receipts,
invoices, billing forms, and manifests. In addition to the forms in regular
or special use, as many as 28 different governmental agencies may participate
in a single export shipment.
New documentation procedures are needed that will cut down on' the paper
work and speed the cargo from the shippers' dock to the consignee's dock. Air
Canada has made a step toward eliminating the greater portion of the paper
work involved in the air cargo business (ref. 28). ACCESS (Air Canada Cargo
Enquiring and Service System) is a data information system that prints out
documentation paper as well as monitors the cargo at any point enroute. In
1976, the ACCESS System had 150 input terminals and 50 air waybill printers
available for cargo business in 28 of Air Canada's offices, six in the United
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States and four in Europe. The informational system is coded in the air
waybill format. The computer is capable of performing the following operations
with the coded data:
1) Work out the exact cargo costs
2) Note any instruction from the recipient (Example: Keep temperature,
above freezing)
3) Check the credit rating of the shipper
4) Print out waybill, if required
5) Pass on to the accounting department all data needed for billing
6) Prepare the weight and balance charts for the aircraft.
The system is sophisticated enough so that no papers have to accompany cargo
inside of Canada and the number of papers accompanying international cargo has
been drastically reduced. The waybill is printed and matched with the cargo
at the destination in all of the airports within Canada.
Non-technical issues involved in documentation are Customs Clearance and
apportionment of liability. The FMC, CAB, ICC, and IATA must solve these
before international one-day dock to dock air freight will become a reality.
2.4.6. Single Waybill
To be effective, one carrier responsibility must include shipping under a
single waybill. The single waybill covers inter-carrier agreements with all
interline transportation agencies (air, rail, land, and sea) covering both
tariffs and services for both domestic and international shipments. The
advantages of shipping under a single document are: a) a reduction in billing
and collections costs, b) the knowledge that the shipper or consignee knows
exactly the total cost of the intermodal movement, c) the knowledge that one
forwarder can monitor his shipment at any point and on any mode, and d) the
knowledge that a single forwarder/carrier has liability for the shipment.
Shippers moving cargo using several modes of transportation where joint
rates are not established often pay a higher cost than they -would under a
combination rate. In the case where an air freight forwarder tenders cargo
from dock to dock where intermodal service is involved, only the forwarder
initiates and processes the through bill of lading applicable to the trip
(ref. 35). Since the down line carriers have lower terminal costs, their rate
for service should be less; this would result in a lower cost to the shipper.
Rates charged for door-to-door interline service by Emergy are more economical
than if modes for each link charge to make an individual profit. Emery Air
Freight owns its own ground support service and buys air service. With this
arrangement, each segment of the haul doesn't have to show a profit as long as
the overall operation does.
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If each mode of cargo transportation service would publish joint rates,
one of the problems of shipping under a single waybill would be eliminated.
If intermodal shipment under a single waybill is to become a reality,
recommendation 17 of Problems of Through Responsibility and Liability must be
accepted:
"The ICC, the FMC, and the CAB in co-operation with the Department
of Transportation should develop and publish one or more approved
standard forms for inter-carrier agreements or apportionment of
liability for intermodal shipment."(ref. 36)
The acceptance of this recommendation would solve a major problem pre-
venting shipping intermodal cargo under a single waybill. In order for shipping
under a single waybill to become a reality, domestic and foreign governmental
agencies must co-operate with each other.
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2.5 IMPACTS
Introduction
This section deals with the impacts the ground support system of an ad-
vanced air cargo system has on the environment around it. These impacts will
be divided into three major areas: (1) Environmental, (2) Economic, and (3)
Urbanization. The magnitude of any of these depends on several factors. The
first factor is whether a new airport is being built or an existing airport is
being expanded. A new airport would have far greater impacts than would an
expansion program. The second factor which determines the magnitude of the
impacts is the size of the airport. Again, a large hub-type airport has more
significant impacts on the surrounding environ than a smaller spoke-type
airport. In the discussion of the three areas of impacts, consideration will
be given to both the new airport and the expanded airport. In addition, the
significance of airport size will be discussed.
Even though this section deals with the impacts of the air cargo ground
support system, there will be times when it will be difficult to separate this
system from the passenger operation. Often it is the composite of these two
airport operations that causes the impact.
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2.5.1. Environmental Impacts
The construction of a new airport for air cargo or the expansion of an
existing airport to handle increased air cargo will cause a number of environ-
mental impacts. These impacts can be controlled to some extent by a good
advanced planning program which gives high priority to the ecology of the
surrounding environ. The environmental impacts may include the following:
(a) noise (f) sewage disposal demand
(b) air pollution (g) soil erosion
(c) water pollution (h) wildlife displacement
(d) drainage pattern alternation (i) congestion of airport access roads
(e) water supply demand (j) fuel consumption
"The contribution of aircraft and airports to the deterioration of the
natural environment are, at present, minor in comparison to the overall effects
of urban and industrial development, the chief agents of environmental degrada-
tion, "(ref. 37) However, as the air industry grows, so will its contribution
to the degradation of the environment unless steps are taken to prevent it
from happening.
What follows is a brief discussion of some of the environmental impacts
mentioned above.
2.5.1.1. Noise
"Aircraft noise is presently the most urgent of all social-impact factors
in civil aviation .... "(ref. 37) This opinion is one that is shared by
many people, especially those living close to airports. The increase of air
cargo traffic will certainly compound this problem in two ways. First, there
will be an increased number of large, noisy airplanes and second, there will
be the noise of the surface transportation carrying the cargo to and from the
airport.
Noise is measured in CNR (Composite Noise Rating) or NEF (Noise Exposure
Forecast). Noise levels below 30 NEF (100 CNR) are considered to be low
enough so as not to produce complaints from those subjected to the noise.
Noise between 30 and 40 NEF (100 and 115 CNR) will produce complaints and
noise above 40 NEF (115 CNR) will probably initiate group action, such as a
legal suit (ref. 37).
At present, there are a number of efforts being undertaken by the govern-
ment and the aircraft industry to reduce noise around airports. These efforts
are centered on three areas:
1) the source (aircraft)
2} the receiver (homeowner)
3) urban planning
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There are several ways to reduce the noise from the source. First, the
airplane engines can be designed to be less noisy. The L1011, a wide-body
jet, is achieving noise levels below FAR Part 36 for takeoff, sideline, and
approach (ref. 38). In addition to improved engine technology, airports can
modify takeoff and landing procedures and times to further reduce noise impacts.
Once a homeowner has located near an airport, there is little that can be
done by him, short of moving, to reduce noise levels. There have been attempts
to sound proof the homes with limited success.
The final method of controlling noise is through the proper planning of
urban development. This is such an important step that in order to receive
federal money for new airports, the builder must show compliance with the Air-
port and Airway Development Act of 1970, as amended. This act requires
"appropriate action, including the adoption of zoning laws, have
been or will be taken, to the extent reasonable, to restrict the
use of land adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity of the air-
port to activities and purposes compatible with normal airport
operations, including landing and takeoff of aircraft."
There are some land uses that are not sensitive to noise, such as farm land,
manufacturing centers, warehouses, and other transportation modes. These
could be located close to airports. On the other hand, homes, schools,
churches, and hospitals are very sensitive to noise and should be located at
some distance from the airport (ref. 39).
Proper urban planning is the answer to the noise impact for a new freight
airport. However, for existing airports, it is too late to plan. The answer
for the existing airport is the purchase of land surrounding the airport and
have it rezoned for noise insensitive uses. This is an extremely expensive
solution, with land surrounding some airports being worth $300 000 or more per
acre (ref. 40). On the other hand, law suits, lawyers, and other associated
legal costs are also expensive.
Noise pollution is a problem shared by both passenger and freight opera-
tions. However, in promoting increased air freight operations, we must realize
that the noise pollution problem is the single most important item constraining
the growth of airports and airport operations.
2.5.1.2. Air, Water, and Land Impacts
In comparison with other sectors of the economy, airports and aircraft do
not contribute much to the pollution of the air. However, the aircraft do
produce combustion type emissions. There have been advances in engine design
such as the turbine engine instead of the piston engine and other advances in
combustor design (ref. 38). In addition, there is now the smokeless engine
which eliminates visibility problems caused by the smoke generating engines.
A large air freight operation also produces air pollution from the surface
vehicles used to transport freight to and from the freight terminal. The
impact of this pollution problem can be reduced by routing the airport access
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roads through less densely populated areas. However, the control of air
pollution is mainly a problem for new technologies.
"Although aircraft themselves do not contribute significantly to water
pollution, terminal activities can exert significant effects on both surface
and ground water through demands imposed on local water supplies, waste water
discharge, or changes in drainage patterns. "(ref. 37) In addition, the con-
struction of terminals and runways destroys vegetation which can lead to soil
erosion, further harming water supplies. It is estimated that, in order for
air freight operations to derive the same revenue as passenger service now
derives, it will require ten times as much terminal space (ref. 40). Thus air
freight systems could use a significant amount of water as well as diminish
the natural replenishment of water supplies unless careful resource planning
takes place prior to construction.
2.5.1.3. Fuel Consumption
Currently the air transportation industry consumes approximately eight
percent of the domestic fuel requirements (ref. 38). With the introduction of
the widebody aircraft and improved engine efficiency, the trend of the fuel
cost per tonne per kilometer is downward. However, much of this savings comes
from the enormous payload capacity of the widebody airplane.
As petroleum based fuels become more expensive and scarce, technical
advances will be required to support the aircraft and surface vehicles of the
air freight industry. These advances may include the development of more
efficient engines and/or the use of new fuels, such as hydrogen.
2.5.1.4. Airport Access Road Congestion
In general, airports are built convenient to major highways which provide
good access, or the highways are promised. Approximately 90% of the ground
access to airports, domestically, is by highway (ref. 37). Since air freight
will require a significant amount of truck traffic to and from the airport, an
additional strain will be placed on already overloaded road networks. For
some of the large hub airports, ground access has become a major growth limiting
factor (ref. 37, 40, 41). For these airports, land acquisition is also a
problem which limits their ability to build additional highways.
There are three possible solutions to the access problem:
1) Use other modes to get freight and passengers to and from airports
2) Construct off-airport cargo facilities
3) Construct all cargo airports
use of mass transit in the form of busses, subways, railroads, and
helicopters between urban centers and the airport could reduce the congestion
access network and reduce air pollution and fuel consumption as well.
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The construction of off-airport freight terminals would reduce the truck
traffic into and out of the airport. They also eliminate the problem of
finding building sites on already land-scarce airports. These off-airport
terminals would be used for consolidation of freight and could be shared with
other freight transportation modes.
The final solution is an all cargo airport. This solution seems to be
the least viable. In order to justify such an airport, there would have to
be very large volumes of cargo such as might be found at a hub city. However,
land is in general not available in these areas. Since belly cargo will
still be carried on passenger flights, freight personnel, equipment, and
buildings will be duplicated, which represents large sums of money and will
necessarily increase the cost to ship by air. This would then reduce the air
freight industry's ability to compete with the surface modes.
2.5.2. Economic Impacts
The economic impact of a new airport is much more dramatic than the ex-
pansion of an existing airport. In addition, the size and capabilities of
the airport determine the economic impact, with the larger airports having
greater impacts. Examples of economic impacts are:
(a) employment
(b) payroll
(c) commercial and industrial development
(d) increased land values
A hub-type airport can be a major employment center (ref. 41). For
example, in 1970 Los Angeles International Airport employed 37 000 and was the
second largest employer in the county (ref. 42). This represents direct
employment such as airline, air traffic control, traffic, security, and main-
tenance personnel. In addition, airports create indirect jobs for people in
freight forwarding, warehousing, and trucking as well as hotels, restaurants,
construction, and car rental agencies. . The total employment impact associated
with an airport can be as many as 100 000 jobs (ref. 43).
If one were to assume an average annual wage of $7 400 for each airport-
created job and assuming 50 000 such jobs, an annual payroll of $370 million
would impact on the region. Further assuming an economic multiplier of 2.5
for the region, the airport would have a total regional economic impact of
$925 million (ref. 44). This impact would normally be considered very positive.
However, the creation of jobs and income in one region can drain the labor
force and financial base of another region. Thus one region could grow
economically at the expense of another.
There is also some controversy as to the proper employment and monetary
multipliers to apply to airports. Transportation in general has a derived
demand rather than an intrinsic worth; in that respect, it is a non-basic
economic activity in a city or region. It does not generate income from out-
side the area, but re-circulates that derived from the basic industries which
do bring in dollars. Thus, it is part of another industry's multiplier.
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Alternatively, the transshipment traffic at an airport does not derive from
the region, hence could pass through other airports. The income from and
employment related to it can be considered basic to the city. Thus, hub
airports have a large segment of their activity which is basic, while feeder
ai.rports are totally non-basic in their orientation. Thus, a uniform multiple
is misleading and many local facilities have only the very limited multipliers
related to the goods and services purchased locally by their employees.
The magnitudes of the above mentioned numbers are for new airports. The
expansion of an existing airport to handle more freight will not have such
large impacts. However,'it will necessitate the building of new terminals and
possibly runways on the airport, and warehouses and other facilities off the
airport. The construction and operation of these facilities will impact on
both employment and payroll (ref. 45).
2.5.3. Urbanization Impact
Historically transportation modes have created population centers. First
it was the ship creating seaports and then the train creating railroad centers
(ref. 46). In much the same way, airports have a nucleating effect on land
development (ref. 37). As was stated in the preceding section, the airport is
an employer. Since people prefer being close to their work, housing is built
close to the airport starting the population movement. At the same time, air
related business and industry, such as airline companies, freight forwarders,
car-hire agencies, etc. locate near the airport. This creates more jobs and
more housing. Next comes industry which uses air for shipment of its product.
These companies normally manufacture a high value product. There are also
businesses which move in to serve the air passengers such as motels, hotels,
convention centers, and taxi services. Finally there is the business and
industry that locate near the airport because of the good highway network
(ref. 47).
In all, there are large numbers of jobs created which in turn leads to
the creation of housing for the employees and their families. With this
population center must come such services as fire and police departments,
public utilities, hospitals, shopping centers, schools, etc.
This type of urban development can lead to good or bad impacts. Without
proper land use planning, the entire urbanization process can be a total dis-
aster. The result of poor planning is homes, schools, hospitals, and other
noise sensitive land users being close to runways. However, through long
range planning, the land around the airport can be zoned to achieve proper
land use.
Another factor should be included in the planning for an airport. Where
are the people, business, and industry coming from? Often times they come
from surrounding towns and communities. If the exodus is large, the impact on
thesetowns and communities can be devastating. Such impacts are often over-
looked by planners.
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The urbanization impact discussed above is for a new airport. The magni-
tude of the impact is dependent on the size of the airport and its geographic
location. The expansion of an airport would not have a large scale urbaniza-
tion impact. It would, however, create new jobs and draw additional business
and industry to the area.
2.5.4. Summary
The creation of ground support facilities for an expanded air freight
industry will generate a number of impacts on the surrounding environ. The
size of the facilities and their geographic location will determine the magni-
tude of these impacts. The impacts can be divided into three categories: (1)
Environmental, (2) Economic, and (3) Urbanization. The environmental impacts
discussed are detrimental to the environ, but the magnitude of these impacts
can be minimized through advanced planning. Both the economic and urbaniza-
tion impacts can be good or bad. Again, proper planning is needed in order to
make them have a positive impact on the environment.
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2.6 ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
Several issues need resolution before the ground support element of an
ACIS will fill its prescribed role. Some of these can be resolved for the
total system by high level policy decisions, the attendant legislation, and
the appropriate administrative procedures. The correct alternative on others
is related to operating costs, thus will vary with local conditions. Issues
can be broadly associated with two categories: 1) airport and terminal design,
and 2) institutional/legal.
The design issues include:
1. What modes require access to ACIS terminals?
2. What networks and technology should be used to provide access?
3. Should gate arrival terminals be instituted?
4. Should off-port assembly and distribution centers for small package
cargo be built?
5. Should dedicated freightports be built?
6. Are "union" cargo terminals appropriate to ACIS?
7. Should intermodal container storage be open or covered, or some mix of
these modes?
8. Can the ISO/ANSI marine type intermodal container be made to be com-
patible with ACIS?
9. What are the appropriate dimensions of containers for air transit?
10. Is the use of intermodal containers essential to significantly increas-
ing the volume?
11. Does extensive use of containers imply cube- or weight-out problems
for interface with aircraft?
12. What bay dimensions and loading capabilities should aircraft have to
ease the surface/air interface?
13. What degree of automation should be used in cargo sorting, handling,
and storage?
14. What sort of interface should be provided between the terminal and
aircraft, e.g., fixed conveyor or mobile devices?
The institutional/legal issues include:
1. How can documentation on cargo movements be simplified?
2. What can be done to improve the processing of documents?
3. Is one carrier responsibility and a one carrier waybill necessary to
ACIS?
4. How might marketing procedures be improved to help capture more cargo,
particularly air eligible shipments which have here-to-fore traveled by
other modes?
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5. How can air freight forwarders be better incorporated into the move-
ment of small package cargo?
6. Can night flights for air cargo be maintained given environmental con-
cerns in many communities?
7. What local and national land use planning requirements will be necessary
to insure that airports with airfreight operations enhance the economic
conditions locally while not detracting from intracity circulation,
service delivery, and residential functions?
The evidence assembled in this section points towards certain rational
courses of action with regard to these issues. First, it was shown that even
through the 1990 period, trucking will be the major mode requiring access;
COFC or possibly TRAILS rail access will also be useful at "air bridge" ports.
The access technology need not be different from existing roadbuilding, but
roads should be separated from passenger related traffic as soon as possible
on entering the port authority property. Secondly, no alternative which
abrogates economices of scale or divides belly freight in passenger planes from
freighter cargo should be entertained. Thus, design alternatives like gate
arrivals, off-site satellite terminals, and all freight airports, including
military strips, are not considered feasible for ACIS. Union terminals, in
that they enhance scale economies, are preferred. Third, it was evident that
the ACIS should be designed around the 6.1m ISO/ANSI box in its various heights.
This is appropriate to the lots of large package air eligible commodities likely
to be transported in the projection period. Both the high tare weight of the
containers and the higher density of this new type of traffic imply a reversal
of the current loading problem in air cargo, i.e., in 1990 the planes will
weight out before they cube out. All new craft can be expected to load the
6.1m boxes, hence should have nose or tail bays which can accomodate them.
Fourth, it is evident that fixed docks are more efficient for moving container-
ized freight than mobile equipment. Such automation as supports these docks is
beneficial. Alternatively, the degree to which automation is effective in
small package handling is open to question. Many operations may not require
it.
Finally, many of the service deficiencies of current operations could be
eliminated by single-carrier responsibility, the single waybill that supports
it, and computerization of the waybill and such additional documents as
accompany given shipments. This would expedite transfer of cargos, allow
direct contacts with the responsible transportation company by the customer,
and facilitate accurate tracing of shipments through the system. Night service
is also needed to attract an expanding business. Any aircraft or land use
planning efforts which support night operation are beneficial.
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CHAPTER 3
REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY AGENCIES
Introduction
1978 has been a year of rapid change in the air freight industry. The
extensive deregulation passed by Congress in late 1977 was beginning to be
felt in the marketplace, although some statutory provisions would not phase
in until after this report went to press, and the CAB was actively considering
regulatory revisions that would become effective even later.
In this context, an attempt to "predict" the regulatory climate as far
ahead as the 1990-2015 period would be doomed to failure. At the same time,
a strictly short-term approach would not provide the guidance which is the
purpose of this report. Finally, the extent and complexity of federal regu-
lation of both air carriers and other forms of common carriers made a complete
survey of the details of regulatory practices unfeasible.
Accordingly, this chapter is directed to the following principal goals:
First, a brief history of aviation regulation and mention of the principal
agencies regulating aviation and some of those regulating the carriers with
which air carriers must interact. Second, a discussion of the present eco-
nomic deregulation, some of its implications for the industry, and prospects
for the near future. Third, a discussion of the prospects for intermodal
transportation of freight and the various legal and regulatory impediments.
Fourth, a discussion of the problems presented to the industry by aircraft
noise regulation and some possible approaches to these problems. The intent
has been to provide both concrete guidance for the near term and an image of
the sort of regulatory structure needed to optimize the contribution of air
freight to the nation's economy in the 1990's and later.
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. 3,1 REGULATORY AGENCIES
Government regulation of transportation in the U.S. reflects the evolution
of the various modes of transportation. Each mode developed separately and in
different time periods. Regulation of the different modes occurred for one
or more of the following reasons: (1) Users of a transportation mode com-
plained of unfair pricing practices by the owners of the mode. (2) Carriers
within an industry complained of unstable market conditions and predatory
competition by other carriers. (3) Promotion of stable and efficient trans-
portation was considered to be in the national interest.
The airline industry, although a private enterprise, has seldom been very
far removed from government regulatory influence. The Post Office Department
began air mail transportation in 1918 but relinquished this to commercial
aviation by 1927 in an effort to encourage the development of the commercial
sector. Subsequent legislation continued this trend culminating in the 1938
Civil Areonautics Act which established as government policy the' promotion;,
protection, and development of the American airline industry. But after four
decades of a highly regulated system the opposing tendency of less regulation
has arisen. The 1977 all-cargo air service deregulation enactment had this
basic intent as does pending Congressional legislation to deregulate passenger
air service.
3.1.1. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
The condition of the airline industry in 1938 was quite unlike it is
today. The official rationale for the 1938 Act was to promote and protect
the industry from "unrestrained competition" which wasi felti (to! fce; detriiimerital
to the government and the industry (ref 1). The Act created a single regu-
latory agency, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, now known as the Civil
Aeronautics Board, charged with the responsibility of economic regulation and
control of the air transportation industry.
By regulating entry and exit in the industry, as well as routes and
rates of interstate air travel, the CAB both promoted and protected the exist-
ing companies. Competition among the major carriers was effectively limited
to the scheduling of service and on-board amenities on fixed routes and with
fixed rates.
In 1958 the U.S. Congress passed the second major piece of legislation
affecting the airline industry - the Federal Aviation Act. This amended and
replaced the 1938 Act and, although not altering the economic regulatory
authority of the CAB, created a separate entity - the Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) - with authority to "control all aspects of airspace management."
(ref 2) This includes pilot certification, traffic rules and all safety
matters.
160
Since 1958 there have been several amendments to the Act but no major
revisions until 1977. After a series of hearings focusing on airline deregu-
lation, the Congress, unable to agree on a comprehensive proposal, reached a
compromise agreement on cargo deregulation alone and passed that as a part
of an insurance risks amendment to the 1958 Federal Aviation Act. The
deregulation segment of the amendment (Public Law 95-163) is hereafter referred
to as the 1977 air cargo deregulation enactment.
While "ruinous" economic competition led to the 1938 Act and concern for
airline safety resulted in the 1958 Act, a strong undercurrent supporting
government deregulation appears to have been the moving force behind the 1977
enactment and pending passenger deregulation proposals.
Some of the major airlines have opposed deregulation, arguing that it
would be detrimental to the public in general and the industry in particular.
Despite this opposition there has been sufficient support in Congress, the
Executive branch, and various public and private interest groups, as well as
from some of the airline companies, such as United and Pan American, to
ensure passage of the cargo deregulation enactment and probably ensure
future passage of a passenger deregulation bill as well.
In addition to being more efficient and more economical, supporters of
deregulation argue that it would be a move away from big government and
toward a free-enterprise system. Thus deregulation is in the interest of
both the general public and the airline industry. Opponents of deregulation,
such as Eastern Airlines, argue that a move toward deregulation would be
detrimental to the industry since it would result in "an overcompetitive
situation" and could lead to "stagnation and nationalization." (ref 3. p.809)
But in 1977 naysayers were in the minority and the first major piece of
deregulatory legislation became law.
It is too early to accurately foresee how extensively the enactment will
alter the cargo industry. However, with the CAB's subsequent further liberal-
ization of the law by utilizing its authority to exempt all cargo carriers
from specific requirements of the 1958 Act, the cargo side of the airline
industry has the potential to be radically altered.
A major change resulting from the 1977 legislation is that the policy of
the CAB now includes the provision to encourage the "development of an
expedited all-cargo air service, provided by private enterprise" that would
be responsive to the needs of shippers, American commerce and national defense.
The service should also rely "upon competitive market forces t.n riptprmine the
extent, variety, quality and price of such services." This was the first
time that tne uongress explicitly mandated the CAB to concern itself with
air-cargo service.
Other significant alternations to the 1958 Act include ordering the
Board to issue'newly created "all-cargo air service" certificates to applicants
who are "fit, willing and able" to provide service. No longer does the
applicant have to demonstrate the necessity of such service. The 1977 law
also withdrew the Board's power to control routes and substantially reduced
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its control over rates. In addition, the CAB has itself contributed to the
deregulation movement by exempting the all-cargo carriers from certain regu-
latory requirements, such as reporting and accounting procedures. A final
important change is that, although air carriers will be exempted from restric-
tions placed on consolidations, mergers, and interlocking relationships, they
will no longer be immune from antitrust laws, as had been the case since the
1938 Act.
At the present time, the Board is considering several proposed rules
which would further deregulate the air cargo industry and promote free
market interplay.
3.1.2. International Aspects of Regulations
Although most of this study concentrates on the domestic aspect of air
cargo service, the international market for such service is substantial and
has experienced significant growth in recent years. From 1965-1975 combination
carriers providing international air cargo service doubled their freight
volume while all-cargo carriers freight volume increased 600% in the same
period (ref 4, pp. 125-126). In 1975 world freight moved by air consisted of
22.3 billion RTKs (15.3 billion RTMs) with 23% of that occurring in the United
States alone and nearly 60% involving shipments either within, into, or
from the United States (ref 5). Yet the regulatory aspects of international
air freight are quite different from domestic air freight.
There is no authoritative international agency regulating air trans-
portation and the international system is much more complex than a national
system and subject to sharp and sudden perturbations. In order to deal with
this phenomenon the International Air Transport Association (IATA) was created
in 1945. This followed the 1944 American sponsored Chicago Convention called
"to formulate universal international air transport policy for international
travel and commerce."(ref 6) Not surprisingly, the participants, representing
over 50 nations, were unable to agree on a universal policy and retained the
practice of negotiating routes on a bilateral basis.
A primary function of IATA is to set rates and fares on international
routes, subject to approval by member nations. This has provided the airline
companies with a certain degree of stability and uniformity. Yet recent re-
ports of dissatisfaction with IATA has led the CAB to propose reconsidering
American membership, raising the possibility of American withdrawl from the
organization (ref 7). This inclination is the result of both dissatisfaction
with the rate-fixing mechanism of IATA as well as the deregulatory mood with-
in the CAB.
Two important issues of concern to international airlines are route
locations and frequency of flights. Such arrangements have been made by
bilateral agreements many of which have been modeled on the 1946 Bermuda
Agreement signed by the United States and Great Britian. In recent years,
nations have placed increased restrictions on flight frequencies and authority
to transport cargo or passengers from or through one of the signatories to
another foreign country. Such restrictions clearly hinder the development
of an efficient and integrated transportation system.
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One potential problem faced by American international airline companies
is that many foreign airlines are government owned or subsidized, thus placing
American private enterprise at a disadvantage when negotiating such agreements.
According to William T. Seawell, Chairman Pan American Airways:
U.S. flag carriers face increasing competition from foreign
carriers, old-ones better managed and more strongly financed
than they have been in the past, new ones spring up for reasons
of national interest and all supported with a new nationalistic
aggressiveness by their parent governments, (ref 3, p.453).
Yet this has hardly been the case. Foreign airlines have at least as great
a desire for routes to the United States as American airlines have an interest
in routes to any single foreign nation. In addition, the enormous influence
of the United States in international commerce has resulted in American air-
lines faring quite well in most bilateral arrangements. The United States
Department of Transportation recently announced a proposal that outlined a
much more assertive American position in negotiating international air
transport agreements. It stated that one aspect of its negotiating policy
would be to "agressively pursue our interests in expanded air transportation
and reduced prices." (ref 8) This policy coupled with the CAB's inclination
to withdraw support from IATA makes it appear highly unlikely that the
American airline industry will, in any way, be at a disadvantage in negotia-
ting international service agreements.
3.1.3. Related Regulatory Agencies - The ICC and FMC
The other agencies regulating common carriage transportation, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC),
impact air cargo service through controls over their carriers who provide
carriage prior or subsequent to transportation by air. Of the two, the ICC
regulatory impact is substantial. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC
has jurisdiction over motor carriers, railroads, (inland) water carriers, and
freight fowarders. However, the Act exempts from ICC regulation motor carriage
of property which is "incidental" to air carriage. As would be expected, the
CAB and ICC have had a historical and ongoing dispute over the boundary between
their respective jurisdiction, focusing on the meaning of the word "incidental"
in the exemption clause. What resulted was CAB control over pick-up and
delivery services within a 25 mile radius of the airport or city limits served by
the motor carrier. All motor carriage moving outside of this 25 mile barrier
is regulated by the ICC with a few exceptions. This so-called 25 mile "rule
of thumb" continues to be a substantial barrier to the expansion of air cargo
service to new outlying markets. However, on recommendation from: several parties,
the ICC in 1977 proposed an extension of the limit out to 100 miles, the fate
of which is still under consideration at the present time.
Regulatory authority over common carriers operating United States and
foreign, flag vessels in transoceanic and coastal commerce is vested in the
Federal Maritime Commission. There has been insignificant CAB-FMC juris-
dictional friction in the past as the air and sea modes operated virtually
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independent of each other. But with the advent of air/sea service using con-
tainerization in recent years, the FMC will naturally influence air cargo
service through its authority over the sea connection.
3.1.4. Institutional Constraints and the CAB
In the theory, the CAB, as an independent government agency, merely carries
out its regulatory functions as mandated by the United States Congress. But
this mandate is seldom clear, and is in some instances contradictory. Accord-
ing to the amended 1958 Federal Aviation Act the policy of the Board shall be
to:
1. encourage the development of an air transportation system
suited to the needs of American defense, commerce and the
postal service;
2. regulate air transportation so as to foster safety and
sound economic conditions-;
3. promote adequate, economical and efficient service;
4. have competition "to the extent necessary to assure
sound development" of such a system;
5. encourage the development of "an expedited all-cargo air
service system, provided by private enterprise."
To develop a safe, efficient, competitive system that provides adequate
passenger, cargo, and mail service and meets the needs of national defense is
clearly difficult if not impossible. In addition, there is substantial dis-
agreement regarding the meaning of such terms as adequate, competitive, and
efficient.
But upon close examination it is evident that the activities of the CAB,
like the other regulatory agencies, are sharply circumscribed by institutional
and political forces. Members of the Board are nominated by the President for
a fixed six-year term subject to Congressional approval. The President also
appoints the Board Chairman for a one-year term, thus assuring that the Chair-
man, if not also the Board, would be supportive of relevant policies of the
Executive branch. Other considerations limiting the actions of the Board are:
the interests and policies of the Department of Transportation may overlap
with those of the CAB; the President must approve any regulatory changes per-
taining to foreign air travel; the power of the Board to issue a particular
order under the Federal Aviation Act is subject to judicial review in Federal
Court.
Institutional tendencies also limit the Board's independence as well as
its effectiveness. Delays in arriving at decisions, overresponsiveness to
the interests of the regulated industries, failure to coordiante policies and
activities with other agencies and departments are some of the major limiting
factors.
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Studies seem to indicate that the CAB is afflicted by the same in-
fluences and tendencies of most bureaucratic agencies: it tends to assume
that its immediate interests and the interests of its clientele are synonymous
with the public interest; it is subject to the political influences and
pressures of special interest groups, particularly those it regulates; its
policies are narrow and inconsistent since they are usually formulated on a worst
case basis (ref 9,10,11). These factors combined with the broad array of
policy objectives mandated by Congress and the inclination to tailor its
policies to the concerns of the Executive branch often result in complex and
even contradictory policies. The current support for deregulation could dis-
appear or be significantly altered following the election of a new Administra-
tion and/or the appointment of new board members or chairmen. It is unlikely
that these broader tendencies will be significantly altered in the near future
or that the Board will radically change its policies, current deregulation
trends not withstanding.
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3.2 CAB Requirements
3.2.1 Recent Changes Resulting from Deregulation
The regulatory situation in the air cargo industry is now in a state of
rapid change. Therefore, this section will discuss some of the specific as-
pects of the changes resulting from the 1977 law. The deregulation enactment
added a new section to the Federal Aviation Act, Section 418, creating a new
certification process specifically for domestic all-cargo service. It pro-
vided that all certified carriers, supplementals, and air taxis which had
furnished all-cargo services before the enactment would be "grandfathered,"
thus automatically receiving the new operating certificate upon application.
Any citizen wishing to become a new entrant to the all-cargo market is re-
quired to wait for one year after the November 9, 1977 enactment date before
applying for section 418 operating authority. By eliminating the showing of
"public convenience and necessity" required of applicants under section 401 of
the Act, and specifying that an applicant must be granted a 418 certificate
unless found not "fit, willing, and able," virtual free entry was established
for new entrant hopefuls.
Since section 418 was hastily enacted, its language is often unclear, re-
sulting in problems of interpretation. In several respects, the enactment
poses more questions than it answers. Subsection (b) (1) (B) states that
unless an applicant is not fit, willing, and able, "the Board shall issue a
certificate . . . authorizing the whole or any part of the all-cargo air ser-
vice covered by the application." What do the words "whole or any part" mean
in terms of the Board's authority? Since the definition of "all-cargo air
service" includes the carriage of property, mail or both, does application to
carry only one of these constitute a request for partial service, which the
Board must grant? The service is defined the same whether either or both
types of cargo are carried; thus, the definition itself offers no division.
In addition, this "whole or any part" provision was omitted from the grand-
father certificate requirements. It is possible that Congress intended that
the Board have some discretion as to the type of service a new entrant would
be allowed to perform. Under this latter interpretation, it appears that the
Board has a potential entry control beyond the "fit, willing, and able" criter-
ion. .
A similar problem exists where the section permits the Board to revoke a
certificate for a carrier's failure to provide "minimum service." Presently,
no one seems to know what is meant by "minimum service." The magnitude or
form of service that must be maintained is unknown and may be determined in
the future. The phrase remains, however, as a potential for Board control.
Because air cargo deregulation was split from its parent bill and hurriedly
passed, the CAB was caught somewhat by surprise. The agency was not really
prepared to implement deregulation on such short notice. However, the Board
was philosophically committed to free market competition; thus, it issued in-
terim regulations granting carriers a series of exemptions from Board control.
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The Board's present policy is to promote free market competition in air cargo,
thus permitting the deregulation experiment to proceed with minimal regulatory
interference. The success or failure of deregulation in the air cargo industry
will determine whether the Board reinstates controls in the future.
Congress has mandated that free market competition be the cornerstone of
the all-cargo industry. However, a couple of provisions in the enactment dem-
onstrate a Congressional intent to preserve a degree of regulation. The law
created new tariff filing and new tariff review requirements under sections
403 and 1002 respectively, designed especially for the carriage of property
as distinguished from passenger regulations. If Congress has intended total
deregulation, they would have omitted such requirements altogether, instead
of creating new, special ones. The intent of Congress was for the Board to
effectively preserve its limited right to review cargo tariffs under section
1002. This intent should be measured, however, in terms of the present air
cargo market. Congress may have intended for the Board to actively maintain
its review authority during the transition to free market competition, after
which the Board, at its discretion, could grant exemptions from review where
the market was protecting fair trade. In large measure, it will be for the
Board to define the Congressional intent, but ultimately the Courts may have
to decide the issue.
Potentially the most significant aspect of the new section 418 is the
Congressional grant of authority to the Board allowing it to exempt all-cargo
carriers from any section of the Federal Aviation Act which the Board by rule
or regulation deems appropriate. The Board has already issued exemptions from
several sections of the Act in recent months. It is conceivable under this
provision for the Board to completely exempt all-cargo carriers from the Act.
By the same token, the Board may revoke such exemptions by subsequent rules or
regulations. In order for the CAB to define itsnew role as a regulatory agency,
a balance must be struck between its Congressional mandate to deregulate on one
hand, and an awareness by Congress and others of the need for some continuing
regulation. It is the establishment of this equilibrium defining the Board's
role which will determine the future of the system.
3.2.1.1 Tariffs
Tariffs are written statements of the rates, rules and practices under
effect in or proposed for an air carrier's or an air freight forwarder's ser-
vice. Tariffs must be filed with the Board and constitute public notice of
their contents. By statute, air carriers must file any changes in their
tariffs 60 days before the effective date of the change. Air freight forwarders
must file only 45 days in advance. The rates, rules, and practices filed in a
tariff may be reviewed by the Board under section 1002 of the Act, which gives
the Board a limited authority to alter them when found to be in violation of
that section.
The Board has decided not to exempt all-cargo carriers from filing tariffs,
at least for the near future (ref. 12). In its decision, the Board noted that
filing was necessary to monitor the economics of the industry during the trans-
ition to free market competition. The Board mentioned, however, that
maintaining the tariff filing requirement was arguably inconsistent with effec-
tive competitive ratemaking, and hinted at dropping the requirement after free
entry takes effect in Fall 1978.
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If free market forces are to effectively govern the industry, it is neces-
sary to reduce as much as possible artificial economic conditions created by
remaining requisite regulation. Yet, the system will be best served if the
tariff filing requirement is retained in an altered form. Filing is needed
to enable the Board to monitor the industry so as to effectively fulfill the
Board's duty under section 1002 to guard against prohibited tariff practices.
At the same time, advance filing should be eliminated to erase the economic
imbalance created by the lag time between filing and effective date. By re-
quiring filing of tariffs on the date of effect, rates will immediately and
accurately reflect the market, but simultaneously giving the Board a sufficient
"picture" of the industry to intelligently enforce against prohibited tariff
practices.
3.2.1.2 Routes
Section 418 of the Act prohibits the Board from restricting the points
to be served by domestic all-cargo carriers. These carriers may freely choose
the points they will serve as well as the routing between those points. The
geographic scope of section 418 operating authority is air carraige in commerce
among the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands. Also included are flights between points in the same state except
within Alaska and Hawaii, which pass outside the airspace of that state, and
flights between points within any U.S. possession or territory (excluding
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands), or the District of Columbia.
The routing of cargo carried in the bellies of combination aircraft oper-
ating under section 401 certification remains regulated as a consequence of
continuing passenger regulation. Since passenger routes are regulated, the
cargo in the bellies of passenger aircraft is subordinated to the passenger
routing. Of course, air transportation of some cargo may include both all-
cargo and belly movement, and that part which in all-cargo carries is unre-
stricted.
Presently, passenger aircraft may not deviate from their authorized passen-
ger routes in order to provide cargo service to other points. This restriction
limits the potential flow of belly cargo. Deregulation in the passenger field
may give the airlines more routing flexibility which would result in greater
compatability between the cargo and passenger services of combination carriage.
However, even with passenger deregulation, the carriage of belly cargo will
remain subordinated to the particular needs and scheduling sensitivities of
passenger carriage.
3.2.1.3. Rates
The 1977 deregulation enactment substantially reduced the authority of the
CAB to regulate the rates charged for the carriage of property by aircraft.
Under section 418, the Board may not impose conditions or limitations on "all-
cargo air service" certificates restricting rates. This action marks the first
time Congress has specified such regulatory relief for a class of carriers.
Heretofore, Congress had delegated all such decisions to the Board under the
Act. Now all-cargo carriers have Congressional permission to freely set their
rates.
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Another significant change with potentially greater impact on deregulation
was a reduction in the Board's authority to review air cargo rates under sec-
tion 1002. Congress amended the section to create a new and separate standard
for the review of cargo rates as opposed to review of passenger rates. The
amendment eliminated the power of the Board to find rates in violation of
the Act because they are "unjust or unreasonable." In addition, the Board may
no longer suspend rates under review. The Board was granted the more limited
authority to "alter" rates which are found to be unjustly discriminatory, unduly
prejudicial or predatory. This new review standard applies to the carriage of
property in interstate commerce whether as an all-cargo service or as belly
cargo.
The importance of the new review standard is that it has eliminated the
"unjust or unreasonable" standard which has been the foundation of cargo rate
review since the Board was established. The terms "unjust or unreasonable,"
because they are capable of broad meaning, have given the Board great latitude
in examining rates. These terms have been the standard against which all rates
ere measured, and provided the core of the seven year long Domestic Air Freight
Rate Investigation (DAFRI) which was the most extensive review of air cargo
ratemaking ever undertaken. The Board recently decided to vacate nearly all
of its orders under DAFRI because they were made obsolete by the elimination of
the old standard (ref. 13). Only a few orders were left in effect, because
they did not rely on the "unjust or unreasonable" rationale.
The meaning of the new limited standard is yet unclear in practice. The
words "unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential, or unduly prejudicial"
were included in the old standard. The amendment has added the "predatory"
criterion. While the first three terms constituted part of the old standard,
they were usually defined in terms of rate levels set by the "unjust or unrea-
sonable" rationale. In actuality, the Board often involked neither of these
three terms because the broader "unjust or unreasonable" standard could cover
many situations. The Board in vacating DAFRI stated that whatever these terms
meant under the old standard is not necessarily applicable today, and that
once "reasonable" practices might now "present questions of unjust discrimin-
ation or undue preference or prejudice" (ref. 13, p. 5).
The Board has currently adopted a policy stating that issues involving
the new standard must be determined in light of the facts and circumstances
of each case. Generally, though, discrimination is defined as charging dif-
ferent rates for a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of
like traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. Undue
preference and prejudice are similar to discrimination, but involve services
to different points which are merely related and not alike. Predation is es-
sentially pricing below cost with the intent of driving out competition.
It should be said that the Board currently intends to apply these standards
sparingly in order to promote free market flexibility. The Board has stated
that these standards will only be defined in terms of rates established by
market forces. If the Board acts too soon in enforcement of these standards,
their interference in the market would influence the very ratemaking process
from which the standards are to be defined. Time is needed to allow the air
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cargo market to develop into a mature state before the standards are too
strictly imposed. Only time will allow the standards to effectively reflect
the market conditions which will define the standards in practice.
While the Board no longer has the power to suspend or prescribe rates,
it may "alter" a rate after finding the rate in violation of one of the
standards discussed above. What exactly is meant by the Board's power to
"alter" rates is unknown at present. In light of the standards of unjust
discrimination, undue preference or prejudice, which basically define inequit-
able practices, it is reasonable to conclude that the Board has the power to
alter the violative rate by making it equate to the rates to which it was com-
pared. It might also allow the Board to average rates if market forces show
that the alteration of the violative rate will change the comparative rate.
In other words, the Board may alter individual rates, establish equal treatment,
but it cannot prescribe what the overall rate level will be. As for predation,
the Board will have more control and discretion because it must first determine
what the costs are before deciding if rates are below costs, and then decide if
there is an anti-competitive intent involved. It would then have to set what
it considered a competitive rate. In any event, these are merely suggested
interpretations of the Act from a careful reading thereof and are presented
as a guideline for understanding. The Board will have to act to give a more
definite meaning, and the interpretation by the Board will, in all likelihood,
be contested in court.
3.2.1.4. Rules
Rules, as opposed to rates, are the statutory common carrier obligations of
an air carrier. Such obligations include the requirement to be liable for
loss or damage and to generally carry the goods of anyone upon a reasonable
request. Rules are filed in tariffs in the same manner as rates. They are
also subject to the same basic review as rates under the amended section 1002.
The comments above on the Board's current authority to review rates should gen-
erally apply to rules as well.
Of the various rules filed, those establishing the liability of air
carriers for loss or damage of goods carried are of great significance. The
liability obligation is a traditionally important duty of the common carrier.
Under common law, with a few exceptions, common carriers are absolute insurers
of the goods they carry. They are held liable up to the value of the goods
carried.
Statutory laws, including the Federal Aviation Act, have replaced common
law in establishing liability requirements for common carriers. Either ex-
pressly by statute or by regulations promulgated under statutory authority,
common carrier liability has been limited and/or expanded in numerous ways.
Before 1977 deregulation, the Board limited air cargo liability to $9.07 per
pound. At the same time air carrier liability was expanded by the Board to in-
clude special or consequential damage liability not required under common law.
The Board may no longer prescribe liability rules under the amended
section 1002, and its power to alter rules may be exercised only in limited
circumstances. The courts on the other hand, with one exception, have held
that they have no authority to review rule or rate tariffs lawfully filed with
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the CAB. These court decisions rest on the theory of "primary jurisdiction"
which states that the courts have no power to review regulatory matters where
Congress has delegated such authority to a regulatory agency. As a result of
this regulatory and judicial impotence, air carriers are free to set their
own liability rules with virtual immunity from review. Several air cargo car-
riers have recently reduced their liability limit to $.50 per pound and have
exempted themselves from special or consequential damages. The Board allowed
these changes pending a determination of its post-deregulation authority, but
hinted that its authority is probably very limited.
The adverse effect of these changes on shippers is obvious. Air carriers
cannot be allowed to all but absolve themselves from liability. Recommenda-
tions on this matter are proposed later in a discussion of bills of lading.
The duty of an air carrier to furnish air transportation upon a reasonable
request is found in section 404 of the Act. Usually rules filed in this regard
are attempts by carriers to exempt themselves from this duty with respect to
certain requests for service. A notable example of this process is the long-
standing attempt by air carriers to exclude themselves from having to carry
live animals as small packages. Only recently, the Board decided that
section 418 certified carriers must continue to provide this service because
it is a "reasonable request" (ref. 13 pp. 7-9). However, this decision was
made pending a final determination by the Board at a later date of the overall
common carrier duties of section 418 certified carriers. If a long-term
unified transportation policy is developed, it is possible that special
cargo such as live animals and hazardous substances might be carried only
by particular modes or over particular routes. Pending such policy, however,
it would be unwise to allow the air carriers to substantially eliminate this
service.
One final note on the duties of air common carriers. Section 404 requires
that air carriers provide service with reasonable rules, while section 1002
limits the Board's authority to alter rules. Unless the Board should exempt
418 certified carriers from section 404, that section provides the Board a
method to require at least a minimum level of carrier responsibility even
where it cannot alter the rules under section 1002.
3.2.1.5 Current Trends
It is still too early to reach solid conclusions as to .the effect of de-
regulation on the air cargo industry. Most commentators agree that no major
trends will appear until after free entry takes effect in Fall 1978. However,
current trends do give some hint of industry response to free market competi-
tion.
Service has expanded generally. All-cargo carriers have added service
to new points which they could not acquire approval to serve before deregu-
lation. Carriers have expanded their fleets in number and size of aircraft,
enabling them to offer more service to more points. The result was a notable
increase in domestic ton-miles for the first quarter of 1978. This rapid in-
crease in service reflects an adjustment of the all-cargo industry to market
demand.
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Ratemaking also appears to have been affected by market conditions.
There has been a general increase in commodity rates contrary to the expec-
tations of many proponents of deregulation. However, the rise can be attri-
buted to existing carriers taking advantage of the current situation in which
there are only a limited number of competitors in the market. After November
1978, the entry of new competitors should drive rates downward. Assembly
and distribution charges and rates for specialized services, like the carriage
of live animals, have substantially increased, an apparent reflection of the
additional and special costs of these services in light of the limited demand
for them.
Yet there have been rate reductions as well. Several carriers have in-
troduced discounts for space-available daylight service or guaranteed regular
shipments over a minimum weight in bulk loads or in containers. The overall
rate reduction for daylight service is consistent with the low market demand
for daylight cargo service. Accompanying rate differentials allowing greater
discounts for larger bulk or container shipments is also consistent with
market pricing since cost per unit decreases as shipment size increases. More-
over, carriers have engaged in discount-offer competition, each attempting to
give the best discount.
Besides recent changes in liability rules, carriers have altered the
unrouted traffic rules. Carriers no longer, as previously required, charge the
lowest line-haul rate between two points, regardless of the actual routing.
Instead, carriers are now determining the routing when not specified by the
shipper, and are assessing freight charges on the actual routing of the ship-
ment. The result is that charges more closely reflect costs. With the entry
of new carriers, routing under this scheme should become more rational, as
carriers compete to offer the shortest routing.
3.2.2 Impacts on Management
With the present rapid changes in the regulatory situation, it is difficult
to project even two or three years into the future, and impossible to make
projections into the 1990-2015 period with any confidence. Nevertheless, it
may be in order to suggest some possible ways in which management may react to
deregulation over time, and to mention some possible structural changes for
the industry.
3.2.2.1 Rates and Load Factors
An air carrier serving a given route and seeking to maximize profit may
control several variables. The most important are price and capacity. Capa-
city includes not only the size of aircraft but also the number (frequency)
and scheduling of flights. Insofar as frequency and scheduling are the.most
important determinants of shipping delay (elapsed time from when a package
is ready to leave the shipper until its arrival at the consignee's loading dock),
capacity is the most useful measurable proxy for "quality of service." To the
potential customer for air freight, time has a value; he will use air cargo
services to an extent determined by both the cost of the service to him and the
quality (primarily speed) of the service he receives.
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In the past carriers had extremely limited freedom (if any) to set rates;
thus, adjustments in capacity offered were a principal management tool. This
phenomenon has been closely studied in the case of passenger traffic (ref. 14,
15). These passenger market studies found that under CAB regulation, carriers
tried to adjust their profit levels in a given market by adjusting capacity
offered. If they .enjoyed high load factors, they would tend to expand capacity,
increasing quality of service (decreasing the average delay experienced by
passengers) so as to attract more passengers. This increased traffic, but it
also tended to decrease the average load factor, and thus increase cost per
passenger carried. Each carrier, of course, sought to maximize total profit.
Similarly, in a market with low load factors, the carrier would try to de-
crease capacity, decreasing traffic but increasing the load factor and thus
decreasing cost-per-passenger. All this was done in the context of fixed
price per passenger.
The studies argued that the prices actually fixed were not maximally
efficient. In view of the costs of passenger time and availability of competing
modes, passenger load factors should be greater in long-distance than in
short-distance markets, and greater in dense markets than in sparse markets.
In the early 1970's, the opposite was true in practice. Thus they urged that
prices be cut in the longer and denser markets. If this did not adequately in-
crease demand, it would lead to pressure on carriers to decrease supply, but
in either case, it would increase load factors.
Shortly after these studies were published, the CAB did in fact move to
increase load factors in these markets, but in a very different fashion.
Under the banner of fuel conservation, it encouraged competing carriers to
agree to limit capacity in selected markets without cutting prices.
In 1977-78, while passenger rates were not deregulated by statute, the
CAB allowed carriers consiberable flexibility in reducing rates (via promo-
tional fares), and the carriers were quick to take advantage of this. This
would seem to demonstrate a serious interest on the part of the carriers in
(a) determining price elasticity of demand more accurately than was possible
under strict regulation, and (b) determining feasibility of carrying out in
practice several price separations long advocated by the theoretical economists,
e.g., charging more for certainty of scheduling (a reserved seat as opposed to
a reduced standby fare), preferred hours (reduced off-hour and weekend fares),
and schedule flexibility (reduced rates for 7-day or 30-day advance reservations.
The attempt to separate passenger markets by special fare programs is
consistent with past evidence in the cargo category. The small-package services
of the major airlines is an attempt to price separately for a distinct market
segment, as are the lower ("daylight") rates for cargo carried in passenger air-
craft bellies. The success of Federal Express shows that an entire network can
operate on a single one of these markets in some cases.
Typical load factors for cargo in 1976 differed drastically between all-
cargo and combination service. All-cargo planes had an average 53 per cent load
factor, while cargo space in passenger plane bellies was typically on 26 per
cent utilized. Passenger load factors increased fairly rapidly in 1977 and early
1978 as the CAB permitted carriers to introduce the special fare programs;
this is evidence that carrier managements agreed with the economists that
increasingly differentiated fares and higher load factors were desirable.
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3.2.2.2 Future Rates and Load Factors
Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the carriers will continue
the process of differentiating markets, introducing special fares to fill
available capacity, and regarding fares as being a competitive tool, at least
as important as capacity offered. This may be expected to lead to increasingly
segmented markets; to a fare taper (with distance) more extreme than before
deregulation; and to higher costs for users requiring special services
(e.g., shippers of live animals and hazardous materials). It is probable
that even if the United States returns before 1990 to a more regulated en-
vironment, some of these changes will persist: that is, that the fare
structure will be somewhat closer to a competitive-optimum rate structure
than it was before 1977.
As demand for all-cargo service grows, it will become increasingly
feasible for the air carriers to assign larger aircraft or multiple aircraft
to particular markets, thus giving them more leeway in capacity offered than
is now possible except in the very largest markets. These changes, as well
as fare adjustments, will continue to drive load factors up. On the other hand,
load factors in scheduled service tend to be limited since there must be re-
serve capacity for busy days or seasons. It seems most likely that load
factors in common carrier service in the 1990's will be about 65 per cent on
the average, somewhat lower in sparse markets and short-range markets (where
frequent service is necessary to compete with trucks) and somewhat higher in
dense markets and long-range markets. Charter operators and special market
segment operators (e.g., Federal Express) who are more able to adjust levels
of service to actual demand, on a single-flight or day-to-day basis, should
also enjoy somewhat higher load factors than average.
A problem is presented by certain relatively small and high-cost operations
where active competition is unlikely. For instance, it appears that the CAB
is presently unwilling to see live-animal carriage dropped. Can it allow
prices to rise without eventually causing the service to essentially cease
due to lack of demand at the high prices? What about regular service between a
small outlying city and the appropriate hub? Where there is a single carrier in
such a market, will fear of competition keep the price at a reasonable level,
or might the market be so small that this is unlikely? It appears probable
that a mechanism will be found to continue regulation in these areas: for
instance, by asserting that in some circumstances carrying live animals or
hazardous materials is necessary to providing a "minimum level" of service,
or by declaring excessively high rates to be "predatory." Competition and the
increased efficiency of higher load factors will in all probability keep the
overall level of air freight rates from rising faster than inflation. It may
be reasonable to conjecture (based on the reasoning in the Domestic Air Freight
Rates Investigation, even though as a formal precedent it is obsolete) that
rates in smaller markets will be kept in about 130 per cent of the rate in a
similar competitive market.
In an air cargo industy with unregulated rates, certain problems arise
that are not present in a regulated market. On the one hand, rates for a given
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commodity on a given route may in fact become fixed by competition: several
carriers charging essentially identical rates with a change in rate by one
typically met by the others. There will then be various arguments either
that this violates the anti-trust laws, or that it should be formalized
and exempted from the antitrust laws (for instance, in order to "stabilize"
the industry, or to make fare changes more predictable for shippers, or to
increase load factors and reduce fuel consumption). Alternatively, there may
be a large variety of rates and terms of shipment offered by various carriers
(a situation not unlike that prevailing with cut-rate air passenger fares in
mid-1978). The next few sections discuss some possible changes in the market
structure in these circumstances.
3.2.2.3 Rate Bureaus
Several of the transportation modes in the U.S. engage in collective rate-
making practices through organizations known as rate bureaus. Rate bureaus
are not permitted in the U.S. domestic airline industry; however, IATA func-
tions as a rate bureau. Given a significant increase in air cargo transporta-
tion under an advanced air cargo system, the establishment of rate bureaus in
the air transportation industry might be considered. The following paragraphs
discuss the history and functions of rate bureaus in surface transportation and
the implications for rate bureaus in air cargo transportation.
History and Functions of Rate Bureaus
Rate bureaus are nonprofit, carrier-maintained organizations that are
legally permitted to initiate joint carrier pricing action (ref. 4, p. 171).
In rate bureaus, rate proposals may be filed by shippers, consignees, bureau
members, other carriers or by the bureau's standing rate committee. After a
proposal has been filed, a public hearing may be held at which all interested
parties have the opportunity to make their views known. In addition to their
collective rate-making function, rate bureaus also perform the following
functions: disseminate information on regulatory changes, publish rates, and
provide carriers a forum for discussing problems of mutual concern. Rate
bureaus are found in the railroad, the trucking, and the domestic water carrier
industriess and membership in a particular bureau is restricted to carriers of
a single mode.
In the past, rate bureaus were generally regarded by carriers and shippers
as desirable mechanisms for maintaining stability and fairness' in rate-making
practices. However, as part of the current movement toward transportation de-
regulation in the U.S., rate bureaus have increasingly come under attack
by shippers (ref. 16). The main complaint.of many shippers is that rate
bureaus provide too little consultation with shippers in rate-making procedures.
In addition, some shippers, particularly smaller ones, would prefer to have more
individual bargaining rights with carriers. In fact, the effect of a provision
in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1973 will allow
individual bargaining between shippers and some railroads.
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Implications for Rate Bureaus in the Air Transportation Industry
Rate bureaus might be considered in air cargo transportation on two
levels: (1) domestic air cargo transportation, and (2) international air
cargo transportation.
In the domestic case, rate bureaus were established during the early days
of rail and motor carrier transportation and it is tempting to suggest that
rate bureaus might also be established in a developing air cargo industry. How-
ever, given the airline deregulation movement and the wishes of many shippers
for more individual bargaining rights with carriers, it is unlikely that rate
bureaus will be established. Only if deregulation should result in very un-
favorable conditions for shippers and carriers over an extended period of time
would the establishment of rate bureaus become a serious possibility.
Internationally, IATA is a global rate bureau which represents more
than 100 airlines. IATA divides the world into traffic conferences, and airlines
operating within or between these conferences periodically meet and agree on
rates. The rates are then filed with the governments involved for approval.
Conference meetings are not open to the public or users of airline services.
IATA has not been particularly effective in its rate-making functions, but
it does serve as a forum for the international airline industry and has provided
a certain degree of stability in the industry. Thus, it is likely that IATA
will continue its past functions, although the relationship of its members may
vary from time to time (see the discussion of the changing role of U.S. airlines
in IATA in section 3.1.2).
3.2.2.4 The Travel Agent Function
There are two types of middlemen in today's airline industry. In the
cargo sector, the air freight forwarder serves as a middleman between ship-
per and air carrier. On the passenger side, there is the travel agent who
makes arrangements for the passenger with an air carrier. The two func-
tions are basically different in nature. The forwarder accepts packages from the
customer-shipper, and then as a shipper purchases air carriage for the shipment,
making a profit by charging one rate to the customer and then paying a lower
rate to the air carrier (for instance, by obtaining a quantity rate or using
charter services). Travel agents, on the other hand, sell air transportation
to passengers, but in an agent capacity to the air carrier. The agents are
remunerated by a commission on tickets sold. This section explores the possi-
bility of the travel agent function applied to air cargo.
The growth of air passenger traffic has been considerably assisted by the
relationship between the airlines and travel agents. The travel agent
provides the public with services including consultations about available rates,
routes, and schedules as well as the actual writing of tickets, performing func-
tions which if they had to be performed directly by the airlines would require
substantial additional personnel costs. The agent attracts the public not only
by offering services that could be offered by an air carrier in the usual
course of business, but by offering other services, by his ability to appear
neutral as between carriers, and by promoting demand for service not supplied
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by one single carrier (e.g., trips which require that different portions be
flown on different carriers).
The creation of travel agents, or commission sales agents, for the transpor-
tation of cargo might have extremely beneficial results. One reason that
the growth of air cargo has not kept pace with some expectations is probably the
lack of effective selling. While salesmen employed by air carriers and air
freight forwarders have been able to call on the largest potential customers in
cities where there is significant traffic, they have not been able to call on
relatively small customers, or even on mid-size customers located away from
carrier/forwarder offices or whose transportation needs will require a larger
mix of suppliers. The commission agent able to represent a large variety of com-
panies will have substantial incentive to make such calls. Further, since a
great many shipping decisions are in practice made by blue-collar employees--
shipping clerks or shipping managers who are not motivated to devote time to
comparative studies of competing modes or carriers—such salesmen might find a
ready audience.
There is one other strong argument for the creation of a freight equivalent
of travel agents. If such commission agents could function, and if arrangements
could be made for them to represent not only various air carriers (and possibly
forwarders) but also companies providing other modes of transportation,
they could be a significant force in establishing an intermodal transportation
industry. They could provide a customer with a single source of information
about several ways of getting a shipment to its destination, and even provide
the waybill(s) for a trip involving several modes and carriers.
It should be noted, that many in the industry argue that the role of
travel agents is dependent not only on the existence of regulations permitting
air carriers to pay commissions to non-employees who sell tickets, but also on
a specific antitrust exemption which permits the air carriers and agents to
agree on a uniform fixed commission system. It has been argued that in the
absence of the uniform system, one carrier could try to induce agents to direct
passengers to it by raising commission rates, leading to a competitive
spiral and eventual increase in fares. While it seems very probably that
the CAB will eventually permit the paying of commissions, it seems highly
unlikely in the present climate that the antitrust exemption will be forth-
coming.
The argument that an antitrust exemption and fixed uniform commissions are
necessary is not wholly convincing. While much of the stock brokerage in-
dustry developed on a fixed commission rate system, competitive commissions
have been allowed more recently (of course, here the commission is paid by
the retail customer). The real estate brokerage business has also functioned
without an antitrust exemption. Finally, there is some experience with compe-
tition even in the presently-constituted air passenger travel agent business;
an agent is paid a percentage commission which is reduced if the agent finds a
way to make travel cheaper for the passenger (e.g., a lower fare); the pressure
on the agent to do a good job for the retail customer is thus not in terms of
immediate reward but in terms of return business. Presumably, travel agents do
try to seek low fares for their customers when available, rather than trying to
maximize their commission per transaction.
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Even accepting the desirability of the freight travel agent function,
many questions remain. Should this function be performed by an air freight for-
warder? It has been argued that there is a significant conflict of interest
between the forwarding and travel agent functions. (Some of the issues were
touched on in a speech made by Chairman Kahn of the CAB to the Air Freight
Forwarders of America on July 2, 1978). A forwarder thrives by selling his own
service which uses those of others, while a travel agent exists by selling the
services of others for whom he is an agent. The tension between being, in
effect, a shipper in the former case and a carrier's agent in the latter
creates an essential conflict of interest. The best solution to this problem
may be separate the two functions, with competition between forwarders and
travel agents. Present forwarders might even choose to switch over to the
travel agent function, instead of continuing as forwarders. This question
may well be settled by the CAB during 1978, at least for the near future.
How effectively could or would the agent serve as a package tracer? Obvi-
ously it would be beneficial to give the shipper or consignee a single contact
point with problems about damage, delay in shipment, etc.; this is not a
traditional travel agent function, but there might be considerable benefit to
the carriers as well as the shipper in having at least the more routine
inquiries processed through an agent, who would be more likely to know who to
call and what to ask than a relatively small individual shipper (especially
on an intermodal shipment).
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3.3 Intermodal Relationships
3.3.1 The Current Regulatory Situation
Intermodal transportation involves the transfer of a shipment from one
mode to another as it moves from origin to destination. Although intermodal
transportation is not a new concept, technology is presently available which
greatly facilitates intermodal transportation and results in greater trans-
portation efficiency. Intermodal transportation will be a necessary part of ,-
an air cargo system, and the technical aspects of intermodal operations in the
ACIS are discussed in other sections of this report. There exists, however,
in the areas of transportation management and government policy toward trans-
portation, barriers which prevent the most efficient intermodal transportation
that is technically possible.
Intermodal cargo transportation utilizing air carriage as the primary or
secondary mode is an established fact. A series of regulatory compromises and
relaxations between the CAB on one hand, and the ICC or FMC on the other,
have promoted the growth of intermodal service involving air carriage.
While regulation remains a barrier in certain respects, the range of inter-
modal service possibilities is broad, and many exist in practice. This section
outlines the present situation in air cargo intermodality, the purpose being
to lay a foundation for discussion of needed changes.
3.3.1.1 Air Carrier Service
Air carriers provide intermodal service utilizing motor carriage under
a variety of arrangements. For many years, air carriers have provided pick-up
and delivery service by motor carriers within a limited area surrounding the
airport served. Some air carriers operate this service themselves while others
provide it through their jointly wholly owned subsidiary, Air Cargo, Inc. These
pick-up and delivery services must be performed within the "air terminal area,"
defined generally as a 25-mile radius around the airport served by the carrier.
Such motor carriage being "incidental" to air carriage is exempt from ICC reg-
ulation, and comes under CAB authority as a service "in connection" with air
carriage.
Another air/motor arrangement is "motor-substitute-for-air" carriage.
Under this arrangement, an air carrier substitutes truck transportation for
existing transportation by aircraft as a connecting service between two points
which it serves. The motor carriage stands in the place of an actual airline
flight between the airports at these points. The air carrier assumes full one
carrier responsibility for the movement which is performed by an underlying
ICC regulation motor carrier. All air carriers must obtain permission from
CAB for this service, and tariffs must be filed as with any air service route.
This includes all-cargo carriers operating under section 418 since there is
currently a question as to what degree that section deregulated ground carri-
age by all-cargo carriers. The major difficulty with the new section is that
because the Board cannot restrict the points to be served, all-cargo carriers,
unless regulated, could substitute motor for air carriage "at numerous new
points and, therefore, get heavily -involved in trucking operations.'.-,Such
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action would run contrary to the original purpose of this service which was to
relieve air carriers from the expense of flying aircraft for mere connecting ser-
vice. The Board is presently reviewing its authority in this matter.
Another air/motor service in widespread use is a contract arrangement
between an air carrier and an ICC regulated motor carrier for connecting
service. The ICC motor carrier provides line-haul and/or pick-up and delivery
services beyond the 25 mile radius of the air terminal area. A variety of
through service arangements are possible, but the trend is toward one carrier
responsibility utilizing a single bill of lading. It should be noted that
similar arrangements are possible between air carriers and ICC rail or water
carriers, although air/rail and air/water services are practically non-
existent.
Air carriers have offered an intermodal service in conjunction with FMC
regulated ocean-going carriers. An example of this is the Sea Tiger service
managed by Flying Tiger. The primary reason for this air/sea service is to
connect ocean cargo commerce between the Orient and Europe via air transpor-
tation across the continental United States. By using air cargo service between
western and eastern ports in the United States, the long ocean voyage through
the Panama Canal or around the tip of South America is eliminated, saving both
time and money. Air/sea service has also been expanded to include shipments
originating at or destined to points within the United States. The 1977
deregulation enactment accompanied by subsequent CAB action has given all-
cargo carriers a great deal of latitude in such arrangements. However, FMC
regulation over its carriers remains strong. Moreover, much of oceanic
shipping is governed directly by laws of Congress so that the FMC has little
discretion even when it wishes to institute change. The upshot is that ocean-
going carriers do not have the same flexibility to reach compromise arrangements
as do air carriers.
3.3.1.2 Air Freight Forwarders
Forwarding is not really a mode, but a service which uses modes. Air
freight forwarders are users of the air mode, although some of them also
offer pick-up and delivery service by truck incidental to the use of the air
model. Forwarders may conduct their own pick-up and delivery service within
a 25-mile radius of either the airport or the limits of the city served by
the airport, depending on the base of operation they use. Forwarders wishing to
provide pick-up and delivery service beyond this 25-mile radius must utilize
an ICC regulated carrier for that service. The Federal Aviation Act prohibits
air freight forwarders from establishing joint rates (including liability)
with ICC carriers, to separate carrier responsibility is required for such
service. However, the ICC recently granted some air freight forwarders a way
around this barrier to one carrier responsibility beyond the 25-mile limit.
These forwarders were licensed by the ICC as "subsequent or prior" carriers
to carriage by aircraft with a limitation that the carriage must be performed by
an underlying ICC motor carrier. This arrangement avoids the prohibition of
the Act because the forwarder is then both a CAB and ICC carrier, but contracts
with the underlying ICC carrier only in its ICC role.
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Air freight forwarders may use ICC carriers as a substitute for long-
haul carriage by aircraft, but only where an emergency exists beyond the
control of the air carrier used by the forwarder. The motor-for-air substitu-
tion must be at the forwarder's expense, and the shipment will travel under an
air bill of lading.
Under the Long-Haul Motor/Railroad Carrier Air Freight Forwarder Authority
Case, the CAB has granted ICC motor and rail carriers virtual free entry into
the air freight forwarding market (ref. l!7). The only significant stipulation
was that the CAB would only grant such authority for ten-year periods, with
renewal possible. This action should facilitate intermodal coordination
between air, motor, and rail modes.
3.3.1.3 Bill of Lading
The bill of lading is the receipt for possession and the contract of car-
raige of goods in shipment. It is a document necessary to all common carriage.
Existing intermodal through services use either single or multiple bills of
lading. The deciding factor as to the documentation procedure used in a given
intermodal through service is the liability contract arrangement within that
service. Liability may be stated in terms of one carrier responsibility,
joint carrier responsibility, or multiple-but-separate carrier responsibility.
Under the first of these liability arrangements, one carrier contracts with the
shipper to be responsible for the entire movement which utilizes at lease one
connecting carrier acting as an agent for the principle carrier. Joint liability
occurs when two or more carriers contract together with the shipper such that
each of them is responsible for the entire through movememt. Both of these
liability arrangements permit the use of a single bill of lading because a
single liability is common to the entire through movement. However, where
multiple carriers cannot establish such a single liability, separate bills
of lading are required to establish each carrier's responsibility for its part
of the entire movement. In this situation multiple bills of lading are
necessary, multiplying documentation and often resulting in confusion and
delay. Regulatory changes are needed to facilitate the use of the single
bill of lading as a simplified documentation procedure.
The major regulatory barrier is the existence of differing liability re-
quirements among the transportation agencies for the carriage of the same
type of goods. Differing liability among carriers in an intermodal through
movement necessitates multiple bills of lading. The authority of the agen-
cies to regulate liability is enumerated in various acts, with great variations
of authority existing between each agency. CAB all-cargo carriers now have a
great degree of flexibility in setting their liability, but ICC and FMC carriers
are still strictly regulated in this regard. The difference in liability valua-
tion by granting a reduction in carriage rate. These limitations vary with the
value of the commodity involved. FMC ocean carriers in international commerce
between U.S. and foreign points, or vice versa, may limit their liability
valuation under COGSA (ref. 18), but not below $500 per unit, and only after
meeting certain conditions. Problems have resulted as to exactly what consti-
tutes a "unit" in any given ocean shipment. A "unit" may be based on the
commodity or how that commodity is packaged.
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In addition to the valuation of liability, the cause of liability is
significant. While carriers cannot exempt themselves from liability for
their own negligence, they may exempt themselves from other causes beyond
their control. However, the hazards and perils peculiar to each mode often
differ, creating differences in the scope of their liability, as formulated
by acts of Congress and regulatory or judicial decisions.
Closely related to this jungle of liability standards are differing
insurance requirements among the agencies. The insurance requirements are
usually based on assumed liability and, therefore, present as many problems as
the liability differences.
Another problem related to liability results from differing commodity
codes among the agencies. Since liability is usually calculated in terms
of these commodity codes, if a particular commodity is classified differently
by each agency, the liability will usually differ as well.
Up to now, the single bill of lading for intermodal through service using
carriers regulated by different agencies has only been possible through uni-
lateral and multilateral agency actions permitting a common liability. Either
one agency will exempt its carrier from that agency's requirement, or two
agencies will take compatible actions so that a common liability can be
achieved among carriers. This is a cumbersome and inefficient process which
needs replacement.
Congressional action is necessary to clear the way for increased use of
the single bill of lading in intermodal through service. The present regula-
tory agencies can compromise only so far on liability before reaching their
statutory limit of authority in this regard. As suggested later in this report,
a single intermodal regulatory agency is needed. In creating this new agency,
Congress should consolidate and rework present liability statutes and regula-
tions to meet the concerns of shippers and carriers alike. This radical action
will involve changing traditional concepts of liability which are deeply rooted.
Congress should pass legislation letting out the basic requirements for common
liability including a common unit for valuation of liability, a common list
of exemptions from liability and common insurance requirements. The legisla-
tion should delegate to the new agency the authority to set the minimum value
of liability based on the common unit. If this authority is delegated, the
minimum value can be adjusted to meet particular needs, unlike a fixed limit
set by Congress. At the same time, this delegation will put the minimum
value decision out of the judicial branch, where the enforcement of minimum
levels under the common law had been ineffective in the past. However, the
courts will maintain an active role in enforcing carrier and agency compliance
with the basic concepts of the new act.
While reasons exist for liability differentials between modes, much of the
present division is a result of separate development of the modes with each at-
tempting to establish the best liability for its own mode. It is time for a
compromise that will allow the use of a single bill of lading in intermodal
through service and thereby benefit the entire carrier industry.
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3.3.2 Common Ownership
Intermodal common ownership is the ownership of two or more modes of common
carriage by the same legal entity. There are three basic types of intermodal
common ownership. One type is the multi-modal corporation in which the modes
are brought together in a single corporate entity operating under one manage-
ment. Multi-modal corporations can occur through the merger or consolidation
of corporations operating different modes, or when a single-modal corporation
initiates operations in another mode." A second type of intermodal common
ownership exists when a-corporation operating one mode purchases controlling
interest in the stock of a corporation operating another mode. This arrange-
ment is commonly called a "parent-subsidiary" relationship. The final type of
intermodal common ownership exists when a single person acquires a controlling
interest in the stock of different corporations operating different modes.
The corporations remain separate legal entities, but they share a common
owner.
Although not of itself constituting intermodal common ownership, a signi-
ficant method of intermodal common control exists where one person holds
directorships in two corporations operating different modes. Such an "inter-
locking relationship" also occurs when a controlling stockholder of a
corporation operating one mode (or his representative) holds a directorship
in a corporation operating another mode.
3.3.2.1 Anti-trust
A major issue of concern in examining common ownership is whether or not
it may violate anti-trust laws. In the United States, Anti-trust control is
exercised under two separate schemes. One method utilizes the so-called
"anti-trust laws" which are embodied primarily in the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
and are enforced by the Justice Department and the courts. The other method
grants anti-trust control into the regulatory agencies. Congress decided that
these agencies were better equipped and qualified than the courts to rule on
anti-trust matters concerning the regulated industries. Thus, by act of
Congress, the CAB, ICC, and FMC have been delegated anti-trust authority over
their respective carriers.
Under the Federal Aviation Act, the CAB has the duty to approve or disap-
prove mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions of control (section 408),
interlocking relationships (section 409), and pooling or other agreements
(section 412) by utilizing anti-trust concepts. The decisions of the Board
under those sections expressly immunize the carriers involved from the anti-
trust laws. This authority of the CAB not only extends to arrangements
between its own carriers, but also to arrangements between CAB carriers and
ICC or FMC regulated carriers. The ICC holds similar authority over its
carriers, but unlike the CAB, its authority only extends to arrangements
between the carriers it regulates. This same qualification applies to FMC
anti-trust regulation. The result of these gaps in ICC and FMC anti-trust
control is that any ICC-FMC carrier arrangements are subject to judicial
review under the anti-trust laws.
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3.3.2.2 All-cargo Carriers
Acting under its exemption power in section 418, the CAB recently exempted
all-cargo carriers from the anti-trust sections (408, 409, 412) of the Act.
The Board specified that its order was not an order under the anti-trust
immunity section, 414. Thus, all-cargo carriers are now subject to judicial
review under the anti-trust laws. Although the anti-trust laws will have
to be tested, in theory these carriers are now free to establish common owner-
ship or control arrangements with air freight forwarders, other air carriers,
and carriers of the other modes without CAB approval. They may purchase other
carriers and, thus, acquire the operating authority of those carriers. As the
ICC and FMC can only control common arrangements made among their own carriers,
respectively, all-cargo carriers do not need the approval of thos agencies to
establish common ownership or control with the carriers regulated by those
agencies.
3.3.2.3 Air Freight Forwarders
The CAB has proposed an extensive deregulation measure with respect to air
freight forwarders. Air freight forwarders will be relieved from CAB anti-trust
review but made subject to the anti-trust laws the same as all-cargo carriers.
Thus air freight forwarders will have the same freedom to establish common
ownership and control arrangements with air carriers or other common carriers.
A specific provision will allow any air carrier to acquire an air freight
forwarder free from CAB anti-trust review. Should these proposed rules
not be approved air freight forwarders may still apply to become all-cargo
carriers under section 418 and be entitled to all of the exemptions allowed
such carriers.
3.3.2.4 ICC and FMC Carriers as Air Carriers
Prior to the 1977 deregulation enactment, ICC and FMC carriers were
effectively, though not expressly, prohibited from owning air carriers.
Motivated by fears that "takeover" by other modes would destroy the airline
industry, the CAB has never found under section 408 that an ICC or FMC
carrier could "use aircraft to public advantage in its operations and (would)
not restrain competition." Thus, with the exception of a few railroads who
owned air carriers prior to the 1938 Act and were "grandfathered" thereunder,
the Board has not allowed carriers of other modes to own air carriers. More-
over, the CAB could prevent these carriers from starting their own air
operations because it could find under section 401 that such service was not of
"public convenience and necessity."
Now, because of section 418, as long as an ICC or FMC common carrier is
"fit, willing, and able," it may become an all-cargo carrier. Having achieved
all-cargo air service authority, these carriers may enter service either by
creating their own new air operations or by acquiring an existing air carrier
under the exemptions from CAB anti-trust review.
3.3.2.5 Barriers
Despite the removal of most CAB regulatory barriers to intermodal common
ownership, the anti-trust laws and the regulations of other agencies still
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create substantial barriers. Now that common ownership or control arrangements
involving all-cargo carriers are subject to the anti-trust laws, the courts have
the power of review over such arrangements. It is impossible to predict with
any certainty what type of arrangements the courts will permit as judicial
review under the anti-trust laws turns on the facts and circumstances of each
case. Whether judicial anti-trust review will be more or less strict than the
previous CAB review is unknown. Yet, the courts should take a more objective
approach than has the CAB because they do not share the Board's pro-air carrier
bias.
Even where the anti-trust laws, if tested in court, would permit common
ownership or control, the legal costs involved in researching the anti-trust
implications are often so high as to deter the owner of a mode from embarking
on such ventures. It is the fear of anti-trust and not the anti-trust laws
themselves which form the barrier.
Legal costs also come into play in an air carriers decision to seek ICC
authority to start a trucking service. Approval for trucking routes is granted
on a point-by-point, route-by-route, and case-by-case basis, causing the legal
costs to run high. Air carriers are, thus, indirectly deterred by ICC regulation
from seeking trucking authority.
Many other barriers to intermodal common ownership or control exist such
as separate traditions within each mode, lack of imagination, the overall cost
of such ventures. Yet it might be argued that the complexities and uncertain-
ties inherent in regulations pose more barriers than the substance of the
regulations themselves.
3.3,3 Managerial and Policy Implications
Transportation regulations were usually established in response to prob-
lems within a particular mode. Each mode became subject to a regulatory
mechanism which was responsible only for that mode and which was intended to
resolve specific problems. This ad hoc approach to transportation regulation,
though perhaps appropriate at times, has resulted in each mode's development
into a separate system within the total transportation system. The different
modes are often in competition with each other. Intermodel competition has
often been regarded as desirable on the grounds that more competition (inter-
as well as intra-modal) will ultimately benefit the consumer. Criticisms of
the current transportation arrangement are levied at the unnecessary duplica-
tion of service resulting from intermodal competition, the lack of coordina-
tion among the different modes, and the promotion and protection of each mode
by its regulators, which, the critics argue, hinders the attainment of an
efficient, integrated system.
From a regulatory standpoint there are various policy alternatives to ac-
complish efficient intermodal transportation: (1) voluntary agreements among
carriers in different modes to provide intermodal transfers, (2) government
enforcement of intermodal coordination, and (3) development of regulations
which would permit companies to operated in several modes (integrated or multi-
modal transportation companies). Each of these alternatives is discussed in
the following sections.
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3.3.3.1 Voluntary Cooperation Among Carriers in Differnt Modes
Under current national transportation policies voluntary cooperation is
the way in which much of the intermodal transportation takes place. These
agreements are subject to the approval of the regulatory agencies concerned.
There are limitations to the success of intermodal transportation through
voluntary cooperation of different modes. If one accepts the economic as-
sumption that each firm will maximize profits, it follows that when firms in
different modes must interact in transporting a shipment, each carrier will
handle the shipment such that the shipment produces the maximum benefit to
his own firm (e.g., will try to keep the shipment on his segment of the
journey as long as it is profitable for him to do so). This may not be in the
best interest of the shipper. Other problems in voluntary cooperation arise from
different managerial practices among firms and differences in regulations of the
various modes. Management practices such as pricing policies and accounting
procedures, as well as incompatible physical facilities at interfaces, may cause
impediments to smooth intermodal transfers. In the negotiation of mergers
which involve firms within the same industry, the integration of the manage-
ment structures of the merging firms poses many problems and often determines
the success or failure of the merger. Thus, attempting to coordinate these
factors among independent firms of different modes is even more difficult.
Government regulations which focus attention on separate modes of transporta-
tion also complicate intermodal transportation.
The form of intermodal transportation which is most important in an air
cargo transport system is the air/truck combination. It is also in the in-
teraction between these two modes that examples of inefficiencies resulting
from regulatory policies can be seen. Inefficiencies have resulted from the
different freight rate structures for air freight and motor carrier freight
as had been established by the CAB and ICC, respectively. (Under the newly
enacted air cargo deregulation legislation the CAB has far less authority in
regulating rates). Shippers and forwarders have argued that the 25-mile
rule prevents the forwarder from offering the best possible service to
shippers located outside the zone (ref. 19, p. 67).
Progress has been made recently in facilitating voluntary agreements
among carriers of different modes. This is largely due to the recognition
of the efficiency of properly executed intermodal transportation and its
importance in an energy conscious society. The precedent has been set for a
single waybill in air cargo (see section 3.3.1.3). The CAB recently granted
Trans World Airlines permission to truck air freight between Milwaukee and
Chicago at air freight rates (ref. 20). This decision opens up issues
concerning the role of motor trucks or other surface carriers in air cargo
service. Investigations are underway which examine the possibility of expanding
the 25-mile exempt zone. Changes in all of these areas will lead to improve-
ments in intermodal transportation.
Through cooperation of the regulatory agencies involved, more efficient
intermodal transportation through voluntary agreement among.modes can be
encouraged. It appears this is the current trend. It must be noted that even
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with fewer regulatory barriers to voluntary cooperation, the problems associated
with coordinating policies of different firms still exist.
3.3.3.2 Government Enforcement of Intermodal Coordination
Current trends in government policies indicate that regulatory agencies
are working toward facilitation of voluntary coordination among carriers of
different modes. Even under an extensive porgram of voluntary agreements some
problems would still exist in achieving intermodal transportation. The dif-
ferent modes would still remain competitors and in pursuing the best interests
of their firms might not necessarily act in the best interest of the shippers.
Problems would also result from different management policies of the firms
involved. A way of resolving these problems would be to implement government
regulations which would establish standards for uniform technical characteris-
tics and financial procedures. But changes in the governmental regulatory
structure would be required.
Although the functions of the Department of Transportation include the
formulation of a national transportation policy and the encouragement of
transportation coordination, the department exercises no regulatory powers
over the various transportation modes except in safety matters (ref. 20 p. 275).
The Secretary of Transportation cannot dictate policy to the various regu-
latory agencies which are responsible for carrying out the provisions and poli-
cies of the regulatory statutes which govern them. An important step in
reorganizing the regulatory structure would be the formulation of a national
transportation policy, emphasizing a coordinated transportation system. It
would still be necessary to have agencies which would provide some regulatory
control over certain areas of transportation. However, the agencies would
be divisions of a larger organization, would be subservient to the overall
policy of transportation coordination, and would be divided functionally
rather than according to mode.. Regulation of safety matters in the dif-
ferent modes would be one definite area of regulation. Other possibilities
might include agencies which monitor intermodal transfers and joint rates.
The advantage of such an organization is that there would be an overall
policy which would enhance coordination of the nation's transportation modes.
However, the organization would be subject to the problems inherent in any
bureaucracy. The extent to which the large agency would become involved in
regulation is subject to the arguments for and against government regulation.
Rigid regulations for some of the above-mentioned areas are not in line with
the current movement toward deregulation in transportation. The regulatory
agencies comprising the divisions of the larger organization should serve
the function of monitoring, rather than regulating, economic aspects.such as
rates and routes, providing guidelines for intermodal transfer, and enforcing
safety standards in the various modes.
Yet, regardless of whether a voluntary or government managed approach
urged greater intermodality, the major hinderance would still be an institu-
tional one, i.e., altering those established practices and procedures of the
different elements of the industry. The problem that arises is not as much
how to develop a common set of rates and documentation procedures or decid-
ing what regulations would have to be altered to achieve that end, but how
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the system could be made to accept it. The shippers and handlers would have
to be convinced that their existing procedures needed to be altered. This
could be accomplished by either government fiat or voluntarily.
A direct government mandate requiring a standarized method of handling
freight documentation would seem the most effective method of implementing
such a change but this is unlikely in the United States. The fractionalized
nature of the industry as well as the limited nature of government involve-
ment makes it unlikely that, other than for an extreme emergency or crisis
situation, the government would try to impose such a change. It would require
a coordinated effort of the Congress, the Executive and the regulatory agen-
cies, along with the tacit support of the industry.
It is more probable that a gradual and voluntary movement under the
direction and guidance of the regulatory agencies would be the most realistic
method of implementation. But even at that it would still require the coordin-
ation of the ICC, CAB, FMC and the Department of Transportation to first
develop the procedures that would result in a single way bill and standarized
documentation. Even though such a change would probably be the single most
significant contribution to the eventual development of an intermodal trans-
portation system, since it is not very urgent or critical there is not going
to be a great deal of interest in it. Most shippers, handlers, and regulatory
officials are concerned with more urgent and pressing needs and have little
time or interest in changes that would have long term payoffs. The inherent
tendency of organizations is to alter procedures only when it is required or
when it is viewed as directly beneficial. Although standardization of pro-
cedures would undoubtedly benefit the freight industry as a whole it would be
difficult to measure the immediate and direct benefits to any single mode of
transportation and even more difficult to measure any benefits to any single
element in a mode. Therefore, such institutional restraints are a very real
barrier to developing an intermodal freight service.
3.3.3.3 Multi-modal Transportation Companies
The two previous sections discussed means of attaining transportation
coordination through active government participation. There are those who
advocate the formation of multi-modal transportation companies as a way of
facilitating intermodal transportation without involving the government to
such a great extent in business operations. A multi-modal transportation
company is a single corporate entity which combines several forms of for-hire
transportation. The terms, "intermodal ownership," "integrated transportation
companies," and "vertical integration," are synonymous with multi-modal
companies.
Federal transportation policies tend to restrict the formation of multi-
modal companies. As usual, there are strong arguments for and against multi-
modal companies. Several references present potential advantages and
disadvantages of common ownership. The following arguments, pro and con, are
taken from Suelflow and Hille (ref. 22) and Lieb (ref. 23).
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Arguments in Favor of intermodal ownership
1. According to those who favor common ownership the greatest advantage
of multi-modal transportation companies would result from the ideas of a single
corporate entity. With one organization in charge of the administration of
several modes, intermodal transfer would be facilitated, a single pricing policy
could be implemented, and the best possible comination of services utilizing
different modes could be offered to the shipper. Competition could still be
assured, since there would be many multi-modal companies offering such services.
2. Common ownership of several modes would strengthen the nation's common
carrier system by making maximum use of each mode. Inequalities which now exist
among modes, including user charges and subsidies, would be removed.
3. The shipper would find it advantageous to have his transportation needs
filled by one company. The appropriate combination of modes could readily be
provided, and the same carrier would also be responsible for any loss and
damage claims.
4. Long-run economies of scale resulting from common ownership would
result in cost economics, lower and more stable rates, and more expeditious
handling of LCL shipments.
Arguments Against Intermodal Ownership
1. Some of the arguments opposing multi-modal companies are based
on the concern that railroads would eventually dominate the transportation
system. According to these arguments railroads would be most interested in pro-
moting rail service due to their heavy sunk investment and would phase other
modes out of existence.
2. Destructive competition between the transport companies and the small
independents of various modes would result in elimination of the independents.
3. The management of multi-modal companies would find it difficult to
operate all modes because of differences in economic structure. The conse-
quence would be that each mode would be organized as a separate operating entity
and there would be little opportunity to spread overhead costs.
4. Multi-modal ownership would stifle the development of the newer forms
of transportation.
5. While advocates of common ownership argue that common ownership
will improve competition, lower rates, and improve service, opponents of common
ownership maintain that multi-modal companies would result in a transportation
monopoly, higher rates, and a deterioration of service.
Most of the arguments against common ownership reflect the concern over
concentration of power by one mode. The most severe restrictions of common
ownership are placed on the railroads and originated during a time when rail-
roads dominated other modes of transportation. While common ownership among
the nonrail modes is not specifically restricted by law, policy interpretation
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by the regulatory agencies involved have nevertheless limited the degree to
which common ownership may occur. A restriction commonly applied to inter-
modal ownership operation is that services of one of the modes involved must be
auxiliary or supplemental (as opposed to parallel) to the operations of the
other modes. This has been the interpretation of the CAB in cases involving
control of air carriers by surface carriers. While the intent of the restriction
has been to prevent predatory competition by a single mode, the effect has been
to limit the use of the most appropriate mode for a particular service.
Present day conditions in the transportation industry outdate many of the
restrictions against intermodal ownership, particularly in the restrictions
directed mainly against railroad domination. A stronger economic balance
prevails among the various modes of transportation. Antitrust laws would pro-
vide an adequate mechanism for preventing anti-competitive practices.
Regulatory agencies would still be required to prevent abuses in the industry
from occurring. Therefore, restrictions pertaining to intermodal ownership
should be relaxed to permit more flexibility and managerial discretion in the
use of different transportation modes.
If intermodal ownership should result in the efficiencies its advocates
predict, it is possible that independent carriers and carriers in high-cost
modes may not be able to compete effectively with intermodal companies. The
alternatives for dealing with carriers who lose business to intermodal com-
panies would depend on the importance attached to maintaining the services
of these other carriers and this would be a government policy decision. Gov-
ernment subsidies might be provided for these carriers if it were deemed in
the public interest for these carriers to provide transportation services. On
the other hand, it might be held that the intermodal system was providing the
most efficient service and it would not be in the public interest to artifi-
cially sustain the operation of less efficient carriers. These carriers might
go out of business or assume different roles in the transportation system.
Intermodal ownership possibilities range from bi-modal operations to total
transportation companies which include virtually all modes of transportation.
Organizational structure can range from separate operating entities related
only through joint stock ownership to single management responsibility for all
modes. The various types of intermodal ownership which would be feasible in
an air cargo system are discussed in the following sections.
3.3.3.4 Common Ownership in an Air Cargo System
The 1977 air cargo deregulation legislation opens the way for common
ownership in the air cargo industry. According to Leister and Stram some
legal ambiguities remain, but "PL 95-163 permits, certainly within one year,
the option of single ownership of all the organizational entities that are
required to offer the shipper the complete dopr-to-door product with the
use of scheduled large aircraft" (ref. 24, p. 6).
The most likely changes in the organizational structure of the air cargo
system in the near future will involve motor carriers, freight forwarders, and
191
the airlines. Trucks provide the flexibility of service which aircraft cannot
attain. Trucks are widely used to provide supplemental service in air cargo
transport, although the effectiveness with which they are used is limited by
inefficient ICC common carrier rulings. The deregulation legislation along
with changes in ICC rulings (e.g., expansion of 25-mile exempt zone) would
permit inter-modal ownership combinations which would improve the efficiency
of air cargo transport. A single corporate entity would be able to provide
pickup and delivery service, freight consolidation, and line-haul air transport,
Because airlines serve a limited number of routes, a single intermodal company
would not be able to provide service to all points required by shippers. Since
ideally there will be many intermodal companies, interline agreements such as
occur in airline passenger transportation, could be arranged to provide service
to a wider range of cities. Another possibility would be a new type of
freight forwarder who would arrange the optimum routing for a shipment and re-
ceive a commission on the traffic generated for a transportation company. (The
functions of this agent are discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.2.4). Such
reorganization of the transportation industry would affect the trucking indus-
try and the freight forwarding industry. Some of the potential consequences in
these industries are discussed in Section 3.5. The truck/air combination is
the most probable next step toward intermodal ownership in air transportation.
Other intermodal combinations, such as rail/air and water/air will also un-
doubtedly be applicable in many cases.
This report deals specifically with the design of an air cargo transport
system, and, therefore, intermodality is discussed mainly with reference to
air transportation. Given the current sentiment in favor of a coordinated
transportation system it must be remembered that air transportation is only one
part of a transportation system. There are many who argue that in a coordinatec
transportation system, the best service can be provided by total transportation
companies which potentially could own and operate several modes, one of which
might be air. The transportation companies would assume the responsibility of
selecting the appropriate combination of modes and the optimum routing of ship-
ments. This would not necessarily result in the elimination of independent
carriers or single mode carriers. The services offered by these various carrier
would differ in the scope of the service provided and the degree of specilizatic
of service offered.
Thus, it is recommended that remaining regulatory and legal restrictions
which currently prohibit common ownership of transportation modes be removed.
If intermodal ownership is economically feasible and if the resulting service
is efficient, this form of transportation organization, possibly including the
total transportation company, will exist on its economic merits. Governmental
guidelines and anti-trust laws would provide protection against abuses.
3.3.4 International Intermodal Transportation
This report does not deal extensively with regulations concerning inter-
national intermodal transportation. The international scene is complicated by
varying degrees of political involvement in the transportation industries of
different countries. We feel that suggestions pertaining to changes in the
national policies of foreign countries are not appropriate in the context of
this report. Recommendations are offered for general areas in which changes am
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innovations would facilitate international transportation coordination.
International transportation agreements are usually reached through bi-
lateral negotiations or through international transportation organizations such
as IATA or ICAO. The international organizations consist of a large number of
countries and are usually too unwieldy to reach consensus or make desirable
changes in any reasonable length of time. Thus, it is most likely that changes
facilitating international intermodal transportation will be attained through
bilateral (or possible multilateral) negotiations among governments or among
carriers and governments. Emphasis in the following areas will facilitate co-
ordination: development of an international intermodal through bill of lading
interchange and pooling of containers, landing rights which would permit air-
craft to load or unload cargo on any leg of the flight, negotiations which
would permit door-to-door service (such as allowing carriers to operate their
own delivery service or use those available to local carriers).
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3.4 NOISE CONTROL AND LAND USE
As the use of commercial jet aircraft has grown, there have been increasing
efforts by citizens and local governments to restrict or control aircraft noise.
Although from the beginning of commercial aviation there has been conflict
between localities and the aviation industry over the noise produced by aircraft
operations, the present conflict dates from the late 1950's when private air
carriers first introduced pure-jet aircraft to the nation 's civil airports.
While the noise emitted from jet aircraft measured in decibels,is not
necessarily louder, it is of a higher frequency than that of propeller-aircraft.
Because of the higher pitch, jet aircraft noise has a disturbing impact at close
range. (For a more detailed study, see the 1970 NASA Summer Faculty Program in
Engineering Systems Design) (ref. 25). In addition, larger numbers of people
are affected by jet noise because of the growth of suburbs around formerly iso-
lated metropolitan airports. Searching for means to protect themselves, those
communities have attempted to legislate the abatement of aircraft noise and
alternatively have sought injunctive relief against the offending aircraft op-
erations. These local attempts to remedy the noise problem have largely failed
because of the current preeminence of federal aviation law.
In addition, the increasing numbers of people who find airports unaccept-
able as neighbors have made it extremely difficult to find acceptable land for
new airport expansion. This failure to find available land, in turn, threatens
to seriously hamper the future growth of commercial aviation.
3.4.1 The role of the airport operator
As a preliminary matter to any discussion of regulatory control of airport
noise, consideration must be given to the question of which authority is liable
for damages suffered by neighboring residents from excessive airport noise. Is
it the federal government, the owners of the airplane, or is it the airport
owner? In 1962, the question was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Allegheny County (ref. 26).
The court concluded that it was the airport proprietor that was liable to
nearby property owners for damages caused to their property by noise from
commercial flights when the flights were low enough to constitute the "taking"
of an air easement over the property. Essentially, the court reasoned that
since the proprietor as a land owner has the ultimate say as to who comes on
to the land, he should bear the ultimate burden.
Since Griggs, the real effort towards regulating and reducing airport
noise has gotten underway. There has been a sort of balancing out in which
the various levels of government have tried to do some regulating but not so
much regulating that they are found by the Supreme Court to have the ultimate
say, so that Griggs might be overruled and they might become the one saddled
with liability (ref. 27, p. 34). Some states have acted affirmatively to
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control exposure to aircraft noise through land use control and building design,
whereas the FAA, acting to maintain consistency with the Griggs rationale, has
avoided assuming responsibility for taking of local noise easements. This may
perhaps explain the relative inaction by the federal government in matters
connected with airport location and local noise control.
Through enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Congress has pre-
empted regulations of aviation; therefore, acts by a state or municipality which
are inconsistent with this congressional action are prohibited. The principle
of preemption in aviation regulation has been developed in a series of cases
primarily involving local governments, which dealt specifically with the ques-
tion of jurisdiction to regulate aircraft noise. The first two of these,
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst (ref. 28), and American Air-
liens v . Town of Hemps tead had arisen near what was initially Idlewild and is
now Kennedy Airport; a third case, American Airlines v. City of Audubon Park
(ref. 30), came up in Kentucky.
These cases held that the local governments which surround an airport and
which do not own that airport cannot by police power regulation, whether by
height restrictions, noise restrictions, or hour limitations, impose controls
which have the effect of regulating aircraft in flight.
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal ,
(ref. 31) upheld the preemption principle as against a locality which did not
own the airport. In subsequent cases, however, it was found that a local
government could play a role in cases where it was (in whole or part) the
airport proprietor. The combined result of these decisions has been that
while common sense requires that exclusive control of airspace allocation be con-
centrated at the national level, thus, communities are preempted from regulating
planes in flight, the task of protecting the local population from aircraft noise,
has fallen to the agency, usually the local government, that owns and operates
the airfield. Therefore, local proprietors have the power to select an airport
site, acquire land, assure compatible land use, and control airport design,
scheduling and operations — subject only to Constitutional prohibitions against
creation of an undue burden on interstate and foreign commerce, unjust discrim-
ination, and interference with exclusive federal regulatory responsibilities
over safety and airspace management.
The most recent case addressing the question of the role of the airport
proprietor held that local airport proprietors may impose noise requirements for
aircraft landing or taking off at their airports provided the regulations
are reasonable and nondiscriminatory (ref. 32).
The restriction that an airport proprietor may not unreasonably burden
interstate or foreign commerce has given federal agencies—principally the FAA
and its parent, the Department of Transportation—considerable leverage in
dealing with individual airport proprietors, even where this leverage is
exercised only in a "consulting" process. In its 1976 Aviation Noise Abatement
Policy, the FAA suggested a procedure modeled after efforts in Boston and Louis-
ville, whereby an airport proprietor in conjunction with local governments,
airport users, citizens, and the FAA would develop noise control plans (ref. 33).
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ihe following outline is an excellent list of most or all steps that can
presently be taken at the local level (ref. 33, pp. 55-57).
A. Actions that the airport proprietor can implement directly:
(1) location of engine run-up areas;
(2) time when engine run-up for maintenance can be done;
(3) establishment of landing fees based on aircraft noise
emission characteristics or time or day.
B. Actions that the airport proprietor can implement directly
if he has authority, or propose to other appropriate local
authorities:
(1) plan and control of land use adjacent to the airport
by zoning or other appropriate land use controls, such
as utility expenditures and the issuance of building
permits;
(2) enact building codes which require housing and public
building in the vicinity of airports to be appropriately
insulated; and
(3) require appropriate notice of airport noise to the pur-
chasers of real estate.
C. Actions that the airport proprietor can implement directly in
conjunction with other appropriate local authorities and with
financial assistance from the FAA, where appropriate: .
(1) acquire land to insure its use for purposes compatible
with airport operations;
(2) acquire interests in land, such as easements or air
rights, to insure its use for purposes compatible with
airport operations;
(3) acquire noise suppressing equipment, construction of
physical barriers, and landscape for the purpose of
reducing the impact of aircraft noise; and
(4) undertake airport development, such as new runways or
extended runways, that would shift noise away from
populated areas or reduce the noise impact overly
presently impacted areas.
D. Actions that the airport proprietor can propose to FAA for
implementation at a specific airport as operational noise
control procedures:
(1) a preferential runway use system;
(2) preferential approach and departure flight tracks;
(3) a priority runway use system;
(4) a rotational runway use system;
(5) flight operational procedures such as thrust reduction
or maximum climb on takeoff;
(6) higher glide slope angles and glide slope intercept
altitudes on approach; and
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(7) displaced runway threshold.
E. Actions an airport proprietor can establish, after providing
an opportunity to airport users, the general public and
to FAA to review and advise:
(1) restrictions on the use of or operations at the airport
in a particular time period or by aircraft type, such as:
(a) limiting the number of operations per day of year;
(b) prohibiting operations at certain hours--curfews;
(c) prohibiting operation by a particular type or class
of aircraft; and
(2) any combination of the above.
F. Actions an airport proprietor can propose to an airline:
(1) shifting operations to neighboring airports;
(2) rescheduling of operations by aircraft type or time
of day.
3.4.2 The federal role
As indicated in the preceeding pages, the FAA can play a significant role
in noise management by consulting with local airport proprietors. It also,
however, has a major role to play at another level. The FAA began instituting
noise abatement procedures in the early 1960's. The first explicit statutory
direction to deal with the problem came in 1968 when the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 was amended to enable the agency to institute noise emission standards as
an element of the aircraft certification procedure. This statute gave the
FAA broad authority to prescribe rules and regulations for the control
and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom, and required it, in formulating
noise abatement regulations, to consider a number of factors, including whether
a proposal requirement is consistent with safety and whether it is "economically
reasonable, technologically practicable and appropriate for the type of aircraft,
aircraft engine, appliance, or certification to which it will apply" (ref. 34).
In 1972, a second major piece of Federal legislation, the Noise Control Act,
strengthened the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act and brought the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into the regulation of aircraft noise
(ref. 35). This comprehensive enactment was the first venture of the Federal
Government into the field of noise pollution control. Under the Act, the EPA
is one of the agencies the FAA must consult before adopting noise rules, and
except in emergencies, requires consultation with EPA before any exemption is
granted under the rules. It contains a prohibition against FAA's granting a new
type certificate for any aircraft whose noise could be significantly reduced,
unless the FAA has adopted noise standards applicable to the aircraft. It also
created a new procedure for joint regulatory action by FAA and EPA, which has
led to the enactment of several significant regulations.
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As part of its overall aircraft noise and abatement program, the FAA
adopted Federal Aviation Regulation Part 36 (FAR 36) in 1969 (ref. 36). It
is a comprehensive rule containing highly technical appendixes whose purposes
are to require the maximum feasible use of noise control technology, to set '
standards for the acquisition of noise levels, and to obtain data useful for
predicting noise impact in airport neighborhood communities.
Specifically, FAR 36 has prohibited further escalation of aircraft noise
levels by establishing noise standards which must be met as a condition for air-
craft type certification for all new subsonic turbojet-powered aircraft and
subsonic transport category airplanes. As for older aircraft, the Secretary
of Transportation has decided that these will have to comply with the regu-
lation by January 1, 1985 either by means of aircraft replacement or retrofit-
ting the engine nacelles (housings) with accoustical material (ref. 37).
FAA regulations also require certain new production subsonic turbojets and
subsonic transport category airplanes to comply with noise standards of Part 36,
irrespective of the date of type certification as a condition for issurance of
airworthiness certificates (ref. 38). (Since the effective date of the regu-
lation, three transport-category turbojet aircraft have been certified--
Boeing 747, McDonnell-Douglass DC-10, and Lockheed L-1011 Tristar.)
The most recent FAA regulations for subsonic transport category large
airplanes (over 75,000 pounds) and subsonic turbojet powered airplanes provide
for three stages of noise reduction, require new applicants for type certifica-
tion to comply with noise limitations more stringent than previous regulations
and increase the strictness of the accoustical change requirements (ref. 39).
The FAA has also adopted noise standards for small propeller driven aircraft
(ref. 40, p. 1029).
Pursuant to 49 USCS 1431, the FAA has authority to control aircraft noise
by control of aircraft operations such as take off, approaches and flight paths.
In this vein, the FAA has proposed regulations to require airports, as a condition
of certification, to plan for noise abatement (ref. 37), and the EPA has pro-
posed noise abatement minimum altitudes for turbojet-powered airplanes in
terminal areas (ref. 40, p. 1072).
Lastly, the FAA has promulgated regulations which almost completely
prohibit the operation of any civil aircraft (the FAA has no authority over
military aircraft) over the lands and territorial-waters of the United States
at greater than supersonic speeds unless authorized by the FAA (for certain re-
search and test purposes) (ref. 41). This regulation virtually bans supersonic
flights over the United States with the exception of military aircraft.
To date, the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control Act of 1972 are
the two major pieces of Federal legislation aimed at aircraft noise. However,
more legislative action is likely to follow. While the FAA has recently ex-
perienced some success in reducing noise emission standards of aircraft, and
will continue to require future aircraft types to fully utilize noise suppres-
sion technology, Federal law still fails to deal effectively with the problem
of cumulative noise exposure near airports. FAA rules also contain many broad
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exceptions. They do not apply to military aircraft nor older types of aircraft,
and there has yet to be established effective rules limiting airport noise from
supersonic transports (SST 's ) and vertical and short take-off and landing
aircract (v /s to l 's ) . In view of the pervasive scheme to federal regulations
and promotion of air commerce, more comprehensive federal action addressed to
all areas of aviation seems inevitable.
3.4.3 International Controls
The FAA's rules have very limited application to the international
movement of air cargo. The noise standards in FAR 36, apply only to aircraft
registered in the United States, including foreign-made aircraft operated by
American carriers (ref. 42). In accord with international practice, foreign
air carriers need only have their aircraft certified in the country of origin,
meeting the noise standards in force there (ref. 43). The FAA's operating
rules, including any that it might adopt to control noise, govern the
flight within the United States of U.S.-registered aircraft and, in general, of
foreign-registered aircraft. When U.S.-registered aircraft are in another
country, they follow its flight rules and, except where inconsistent, American
rules as well (ref. 44).
The need for international cooperation on aviation rules is met by the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, formulated in Chicago in 1944 and
ratified by the U.S. in 1946. This multi-lateral convention established the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a consultative organ through
which contracting nations work out coordinated approaches to aviation
problems. Through the work of the ICAO, a number of annexes have been added
to the convention establishing "international standards and recommended
practices," which apply to more than one hundred and twenty contracting nations.
Annex 16 to the convention prescribes noise standards, similar to those in
FAR 36, which bind all ICAO members not filing an exception to them. Although
Annex 16 has differed slightly from FAR 36 in the past, recent amendments to FAR
36 have brought United States aircraft noise standards into greater conformity
with the international standards adopted by the ICAO. These amendments indi-
cate an awareness on the part of the United States of the need to promote
equal treatment for foreign and domestic aircraft operations through interna-
tional standards. Without this equal treatment, unwarranted economic
advantages or disadvantages among competitors could be created in a world air
transport environment characterized by diverse national noise requirements.
3.4.4 Impacts on the air cargo system
A number of local governments and airport authorities throughout the United
States have imposed or are considering imposing special restrictions, including
complete curfews, on nighttime airport operations. Such restrictions might have
an especially significant impact on air cargo operations. This disruption
would occur mainly because the movement of air freight is heaviest at night.
Many shippers (e.g. chemicals and allied products industry, agricultural pro-
duction, electrical equipment and related industries, and the apparel industry)
have come to regard "next-day delivery" as essential. Growth of the system
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visualized in this report depends heavily on the ability of the shipper to have
packages leave his dock at the close of the work day and reach the consignee
the following morning.
Despite recognition of the danger to the air cargo industry from restric-
tions on night operations, little effort has been put into determining the magni-
tude of the impacts which may result. To what extent would extensive nighttime
restrictions hamper the air cargo industry, the industries that ship their raw
materials and products by air, the regions housing these industries, or the
U.S. economy as a whole? A recent study by the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey may suggest some dimensions of the problem (ref. 45). While a
limited study, it still presents a glimpse of the air cargo industry as it is
structured today and how it is likely to be initially affected by airport night-
time restrictions. Further, it provides the basis for studying the flows of
aircraft between major national markets, the impacts of curfews on shippers and
consignees and, therefore, insight into the nature and magnitude of some of the
problems that may result.
Some of the early analysis work of the survey indicates the following
about the New York/New Jersey air freight picture.
1. About 35 percent of all Kennedy/Newark Airport freight moves
between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. (472,000 tons in 1977).
2. "All Cargo" aircraft haul about 94 percent of all nighttime
tonnage (444,000 tons in 1977). .
3. About 28 percent of all nighttime tonnage (132,000 tons in 1977)
was transfer freight, some final destination.
4. 61 percent of all New York/New Jersey regional all-cargo activity
occurs between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m.
5. Freighters move most of the cargo originating in the five major
originating cities. For example, freighters move about 67 per-
cent of Los Angeles' daily tonnage to New York, 86 percent of
San Francisco's, about 100 percent of Chicago's, about 100 percent
of Seattle's and about 95 percent of San Jose's.
6. Overseas air cargo movement would probably be less affected by
nighttime restrictions. Only 22 percent of the overseas tonnage
moves between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. But whatever moves at night
moves mostly on freighters (92 percent of total nighttime
tonnage moves on freighters).
From this data, one can see that nighttime use restrictions, such as cur-
fews, might have a major detrimental impact on air freight shipment. For this
reason, it is easy to understand why the FAA and other proponents of the
national air transportation system do not "promote" curfews, but in fact,
recommend that proprietor's first consider other approaches (i.e., zoning,
noise barrier, engine run-up areas) to abating the noise at their airports.
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3.4,5 Future prospects
It is obvious that government at.all levels is involved to some extent in
aviation noise control. State and local governments, as airport proprietors or
through guidance to proprietors, have taken the lead in measures to reduce the
impact of noise on people on whom it can have an effect in the near term. The
exclusion of noisy aircraft, limitation on number of flights, and con-
straints on times of flights are all tools used by innovative proprietors faced
with the difficult task of balancing the benefits of aircommerce with the
equally pressing need to diminish the effect of noise pollution on the
people who live and work near airports.
The federal government, on the other hand, while it has taken the
lead in regulating the manufacture of aircraft so as to insure greater quiet, is
in a paradoxical position. If it joins in the fight in a major way to reduce
aircraft noise pollution at airports, it runs the risk of occasioning a reversal
of Griggs and a federal assumption of billions of dollars of liability. If it
takes more modest steps in the area, it runs the risk of preempting the efforts
of state and local governments without substituting anything meaningful for
them (ref. 27, p. 36).
It seems inevitable that this split in responsibility will continue,
although it seems probably and desirable that there be increased coordination.
We expect that the "consultation" process between the FAA and individual air-
ports will be increasingly formalized and that this will promote a tendency to
more uniform local practices.
The local and state governments will continue to have the primary
responsibility for finding land to locate new airports and expanding existing
airports. These difficulties, like those of locating new power plants,
presently seem nearly insurmountable and will require substantial innovative
thinking. For instance, it has been suggested that some percentage of the tax
revenues generated by a new facility could be set aside to provide sub-
stantial benefits to residents of the area adversely affected by proximity
to the new facility: a town or county might be more willing to permit a new
airport to be located in or near it if it meant a substantially lower tax rate.
In regard to aircraft design and aircraft and airport operations, cooperation
between all parties (manufacturers, air carriers, airports, and governments
at all levels) will remain necessary. Advocates of an enlarged air cargo system
must not be blind to the effects of nighttime aircraft operations on surrounding
communities. They must use aircraft which utilize the most advanced.noise sup-
pression technology and try to schedule flights during hours which would be least
offensive to local residents. Local residents and other interested parties
must, however, realize that for the air cargo system to function economically,
it must be able to land and take off from airports at night. For maximum growth
of the air cargo industry, it is essential to maximize the number of cities
which can accommodate night flights by cargo planes. Two actions will contri-
bute to this. First, we urge that the FAA work to avoid absolute prohibitions
on night operations or restrictions that would effectively prevent night cargo
flights. Second, we urge that the developers of a new mid-range cargo aircraft
(of the general type described in Chapter 2) pay careful attention to the fact
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that it must fly into small airports at night and that it must satisfy noise re-
strictions appropriate to that circumstance. Further, the imposition of
nighttime restrictions, especially curfews, on a national basis would
result in a bunching of flights in those hours immediately preceeding the curfew.
This would have the two-fold effect of increasing an already serious congestion
problem and actually increasing, rather than relieving, the noise problem by in-
creasing the number of flights in the time prior to the curfew. Such a result
would be totally inconsistent with the objectives of the federal statutory and
regulatory scheme and would cause a serious loss of efficiency in the use of the
navigable air space.
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3.5 IMPACTS
3.5.1 Introduction
Conditions in the U.S. airline industry today are to a great extent the re-
sult of government regulation. Therefore, the recent deregulatory changes will
have both direct and indirect impacts on the airline industry, related transpor-
tation industries, and the overall transportation system. There is considerable
disagreement as well as a lack of historical precedent regarding the exact extent
and degree of impact these changes will have. This concluding section attempts
to describe what are considered to be some of the potential impacts of these
regulatory changes on various segments of society.
The major regulatory changes pertinent to this study are (1) economic de-
regulation of the airline industry, which includes legislative and regulatory
changes, (2) noise regulation, and (3) regulatory changes which have been recom-
mended by the design team, but which are not yet in progress. Since most of the
impacts are discussed in more detail in other parts of this report, in this
section a brief summary of each impact with the appropriate cross-reference is
given.
3.5.2 Impacts of Economic Deregulation
Organizational Impacts. Organizational impacts resulting from deregulation
will be most evident in the formation of multi-modal transportation companies.
In the short term the most probably intermodal combination in the air cargo in-
dustry will involve airlines, freight forwarders, and motor carriers. The long
term result, if dictated by economies of scale, will be totally integrated
transportation companies (Section 3.5.3.3). A new type of company in air cargo
transport which would provide services analogous to those provided by travel
agents in passenger service has been suggested (Section 3.2.2.4).
Impacts on Airline Route Systems. The major effect of deregulation on
airline route systems will be to allow increased managerial discretion in
selecting routes to be served. Airlines will be able to expand their route sys-
tems and make route changes necessary to improve operating efficiency. Freedom
to own and operate other modes of transportation will increase the number of
points served and in effect greatly expand the air cargo route system (Section
3.2.1.2).
Impacts on Service to the Shipper. The increased flexibility of routes and
rates permitted by deregulation will encourage carriers to be more responsive to
the demands of shippers. Free entry into the industry will provide the environ-
ment n'ecessary for price competition. Intermodal operations will increase the
number of points served. The combination of these factors should result in
overall improvements of service to shippers. Some negative impacts of deregula-
tion are an increase in rates for services which require special handling or for
which there is little demand (Section 3.2.2.2) and the reduced liability of car-
riers under deregulation (Section 5.2.1.4).
Impacts on Employment. There is some concern that deregulation will re-
sult in loss of jobs in the transportation industries. The reasons given for
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the potential unemployment are varied and include: Job losses resulting from
mergers and consolidations, jobs losses resulting from the financial diffi-
culties that some firms would experience after deregulation, and displacement of
motor carriers and independent carriers that might result from a restructuring
of the transportation industries. Others predict that deregulation will
result in increased air traffic which will result in additional jobs. The most
probably effect will be: Some unemployment will result for the reasons mentioned
above, but additional jobs will be created in the airline and aircraft indus-
tries, as well as in other areas of the transportation system. Thus, the over-
all impact of deregulation on employment will be favorable.
Ijnpacts on Capital Formation. The uncertainties associated with a dereg-
ulated environment will result in some initial reluctance on the part of
investors to provide capital. However, deregulation will encourage managerial
efficiency, which will increase profitability and improve the financial situa-
tion of the airline industry. The resulting higher proportion of internally
generated capital funds will increase the attractiveness of the airline industry
to investors. Thus, although in the short run deregulation is likely to have a
somewhat negative impact on capital formation, in the long run it will have a
positive impact (Section 4).
Impacts on Subsidies. Transportation subsidies are difficult to analyze.
There are problems in determining the amount of subsidies in the various modes
and the necessity for such subsidies. Subsidized service in the airline
industry is likely to continue under deregulation, since the airline deregula-
tion bill pending in Congress contains a provision which will guarantee "neces-
sary air service to communities" (ref. 46). Services for some types of air
cargo might also be deemed necessary (Section 3.2.2.2), and it might be deter-
mined in the public interest to provide subsidies for certain modes (Section
5.3.3.3). It has been argued that intermodal ownership would reduce the'needs
for some government subsidies (3.3.3.3). Thus, direct government subsidies
will continue after deregulation, but the extent will depend upon policy deci-
sions which meet the needs of the public interest.
3.5.3 Impacts of Noise Regulation
Ijpacts on Air Freight. One means of resolving the noise pollution issue
around airports has been the imposition of restriction on nighttime airport
operations. Since the optimum scheduling of air freight movements is for
night flights, curfews restricting nighttime operations will have a detrimental
effect on air freight shipments. The result of a preliminary analysis of the
impacts of curfews are discussed in Section 3.4.4.
Impacts on the Economic Obsolescence^ of Older Aircraft. The Secretary of
Transportation has decided that older aircraft will have to comply with new
noise regulations by January 1, 1985, either through aircraft replacement or
retrofit with quiet engines. It has been estimated that approximately 1200
aircraft operated by the domestic trunks and Pan Am will not meet federal
noise standards (ref. 47, p. 4). An estimated cost of retrofitting aircraft
in service in mid-1972 was given at $456 million (ref. 48, p. 302). Thus, the
impact of noise requirements is to increase the capital requirements of the
airline industry.
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3.5.4 Impacts Resulting from Recommended Changes
The following are positive impacts which we believe would be the result.of
our recommendations in the legislative and regulatory areas.
1. A restructuring of the regulatory organization into a single
agency with functional rather than modal divisions.
2. The attainment of a coordinated transportation system by .en-
couraging the use of a single bill of lading and relaxing
restrictions on pick-up and delivery zones.
3. A guaranteed level of service to the shipper by requiring
minimum insurance provisions, carrier liability provisions,
and preservation of the capability of the national transpor-
tation system to handle some classes of special cargo.
3.5.5 Summary
The impacts resulting from legislative and regulatory changes are complex
and there is considerable disagreement on what form these impacts will actually
take. Because of time limitations, only a brief discussion of these impacts is
given in this section, and the most probably impacts as suggested by this study
have been presented.
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3.6 CONCLUSIONS
In view of recent developments, including the extensive deregulation of
air cargo operations as well as changes in airport curfews and continuing noise
control efforts, long-term predictions about the impact of regulatory practices
on the air cargo industry are exceedingly difficult to make. There is signifi-
cant difference among analysts regarding the extent and duration of the deregu-
latory movement. On the other hand, there is general agreement that at
least some degree of regulation will continue well into the twenty-first century.
Certainly there will continue to be extensive regulation of such matters as
safety standards and noise. The major issue is whether or not the regulatory
climate will be a force for or against the development of a relatively unified,
efficient, and rational transportation system.
The air cargo system can make its most effective contribution if the
transportation network is seen as a unified system. It appears that this
can be best achieved by unifying national transportation standards and poli-
cies—most logically through a unified regulatory agency—and by sufficiently
relaxed regulation to allow the marketplace to develop new corporate structures
and merchandising methods appropriate to a unified system.
Even the complete elimination of all regulatory constraints would leave
substantial problems, resulting from present institutionalized practices, .the
fragmented nature of the transportation industry, and the contending pressures
of special interest groups. Still, appropriate easing and simplifying of regula-
tions will encourage—or at least remove present obstacles to—the evolution of
an integrated intermodal freight transportation system in which the air cargo
system described in this report can play its optimal role.
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CHAPTER 4
PUBLIC POLICY
Introduction
Public policy issues which relate to the air cargo integrated system are
basically issues of energy, economics, and politics. The energy picture must
be displayed; the economic considerations must be explicated; and the political
ambiance in which decisions occur must be defined if we are to comprehend the
global significance of the ACIS. These three concerns are not separate in
fact, and not easily separable in theory. Therefore, even though the separate
sections in Chapter 4 may focus on one of the three central aspects, the dis-
cussions are not "topic tight".
Section one of our chapter addresses American political culture as it re-
lates to the ACIS. Section two is most easily characterized as the economics
of materials and energy. Section three relates the concerns of the preceeding
section to policy issues. Capital formation is the primary focus of Section
four. Section five addresses military needs and foreign policy. Finally, in
Section six, we discuss futures and impacts of the ACIS.
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4.1 PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY
It appears that an integrated air cargo system cannot be put in place
without government playing a facilitating role. This facilitating role includes
the establishing of an appropriate set of regulations; institutions for imple-
menting those regulations; and the creation of an economic climate wherein
business can function in conformity to those regulations. In playing its
facilitating role, the government must see that the public interest is served
and thereby legitimate its involvement.
While there exists a wide range of opinion about what is and is not in
the public interest, consensus prevails among Amercians regarding the necessity
of provision for public goods. In explicating the notion of public good John
Rawls says "... the main idea is that a public good has two characteristic
features, indivisibility and publicness. That is, there are many individuals,
a public so to speak, who want more or less of this good, but if they are to
enjoy it at all, they must enjoy the same amount. The quantity produced
cannot be divided up as private goods can and purchased by individuals accord-
ing to their preferences for more and less. There are various kinds of public
goods depending upon their degree of indivisibility and the size of the relevant
public." (ref. 1) The consequence of indivisibility and publicness is that
public good must be provided for through the political process rather than the
market. Thus if it can be shown that the public good derived from an integrated
cargo system is worth the public portion of the money used to put such a
system in place then the government is justified, on these grounds alone, in
acting to implement the ACIS.
When we attempt to access the public good that will be derived from the
ACIS, we are immediately confronted with the difficulty of forecasting future
trends and guarding against undesirable outcomes. That is, we want to have a
system which will be politically and economically acceptable if things go as
planned, but we also want to avoid catastrophic consequences if things do not
go as planned. We ask ourselves, "What will happen if the economy grows much
faster, or much slower, than expected -- What are the disbenefits associated
with overcapacity and undercapacity?"
We do not view the system here proposed as a conservative one. We'have
already advocated major changes in the terminal system, in the structure of
regulatory agencies, and other facets, and have foreseen a major and important
industry, growing where only a few years ago there was only a minor business;
a poor relation of passenger carriage. On the other hand, we have not adopted
the views advocated by some that there should be, by the turn of the century,
huge distributed-load aircraft or other major technological changes involving
truly massive public and private investment. Is this being unduly conservative?
The answer to this question lies in viewing the consequences of misjudgement,
and forseeing corrective measures.
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Figure 4.1 introduces the concept of consumer's surplus (ref. 2). The
curve labeled D is the hypothetical demand curve. Following the curve from
right to left we see that as the price increases, the demand goes down. The
curve labeled C represents the cost of service. At some point, curve C crosses
curve D. In an unconstrained market, we would expect the quantity of services
available to be determined by the intersection of curves C and D.
If the capacity of the system exceeds market demand, then the quantity of
consumer surplus benefits is little affected and the disbenefits of the excess-
ively large system will be borne in part by the government. But, if capacity
is less than market demand then the mechanism utilized to bring demand into
line with supply is worthy of analysis in terms of public benefits.
If market demand exceeds capacity and users are accomodated on a first-
come, first-serve basis, then the overloading of the system will create a
population of randomly selected dissatisfied users. These users will be less
inclined to use the air transport system and therefore quantity of goods moved
will decline. The randomly distributed instances of poor service has the
effect of increasing the cost to the users. (See Figure 4.2)
If, instead of relying on customer dissatisfaction to limit demand, a tax
is placed upon the system which has an equivilant constraining effect, the
picture changes considerably. In Figure 4.3, the price to the user is shifted
With the addition of the tax. The result is that most of the consumer surplus
lost due to undercapacity is transferred to the government and is available
for investments to correct the situation or for other public uses.
Since the government will presumably be able to impose a tax at its
discretion, should market demand exceed capacity, it follows that in planning
air cargo futures, the federal government, in its role as guardian of the
public interest, should opt for the smallest practical system. The cost of
overcapacity cannot be recovered while the cost of undercapacity can be made
to translate into considerable public benefits.
In trying to fulfill the governments role, decision makers must work
within the framework of American political culture (ref. 3). It is therefore
appropriate to look at four specific features of American political culture
which define parameters for decision makers (ref. 4). The four features are:
1. Belief in a limited role for goverment in relation to economic
enterprise
2. Distrust of centralized decision making in government
3. Ethnocentric orientation toward institutions
4. Emphasis upon pluralistic public decision making
It is plausible to expect that the American public and public sensitive
decision makers will emphasize a limited role for government in relation to
the ACIS. Therefore, such options as creating a public corporation to
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manufacture advanced aircraft may be difficult to exercise. It can also be
expected that there will be considerable resistance to the formation of inter-
national companies for either aircraft manufacturing or freight movement.
Therefore, capitalization will be difficult arid the efficiencies achieved by
single waybill difficult to realize in the international sphere.
American political culture also operates to produce a diffuse decision
making process wherein each administrative agency jealously guards its pre-
rogatives (ref. 5). This factor tends to further augment the likelihood that
non-optimal decisions will be made concerning the ACIS unless a concerted
planning effort is made.
The diagram in Figure 4.4 attempts to identify the principal participants
in the policy making process.that involves a national decision on advanced air
cargo aircraft. As the figure indicates, input concerning policy initiative
comes primarily from aircraft manufacture, the military, and commercial group
lobbies. One can expect lesser involvement by government agencies such as
EPA, DOT, DOE, NASA, etc., and state and local government, (ref. 6) All such
interests may influence the introduction of legislation and the adoption of
regulations relating to the ACIS. Once the legislative process is underway,
congressional staff members, lobbies, and the GAO have considerable impact
(ref. 7).
The systematic implications of this diffuse and pluralistic process are
that a vast complex of goals and interests will have to be taken into account
when public policy is formulated with-respect to the ACIS. A reconciliation
of all interests may not be feasible and unhappy compromise decisions may be
made. Under these conditions, optimal solutions may be difficult. Therefore,
persons looking for the best decision with respect to the ACIS could be
somewhat disappointed.
The combined effects of the legitimating rationale which must be offered
for the development of the ACIS and the political ambiance, or culture,
wherein decisions about developing the system must be made are such that
undesired outcomes are likely unless concerted and clear planning is undertaken.
We must decide what we want to do in some comprehensive fashion, but the
current energy situation increases the risk of resource commitment. Therefore,
we now turn to a consideration of natural resources and the role of transport
in the U.S. economy.
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4.2 MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE AIR CARGO INTEGRATED SYSTEM
Introduction
The need to use many different natural resources (Table 4.1) in the
actual construction of the Air Cargo Integrated System (ACIS) is certain.
Therefore, while it is true that the actual percentage of most natural re-
sources to be used will be small, this small use must be determined so an
awareness of the possibility that any particular material will not be avail-
able due to depletion or administrative regulation is known.
During the OPEC embargo, the amount of petroleum available to the airlines
was drastically curtailed. When shortages of non-renewable resources (NRR)
occur, it is logical to assume that the use of these NRR will likely be cur-
tailed. By attempting to determine how much NRR are used by the airline
industry and the ACIS specifically, and trying to implement conservation
techniques now, it may be possible to avoid critical shortages during the
planning period.
The number of different natural resources are great. This study will
examine only those natural resources where shortage is likely to occur during
the time frame of the overall study. This narrows the natural resources to be
studied to certain mineral resources (Table 4.1).
This analysis separates the fuel and nonfuel mineral resources. Although
there are many similarities in the basic characteristics and policy implications
of fuel and nonfuel minerals, today's market, with its prospects of massive
transformation in the fuel sector, introduces important differences that
warrant special treatment.
4.2.1. Non-Fuel Mineral Resources
The five major metal minerals used by the U.S. Transportation sector in
1970 are shown in Table 4.2. Although these figures include general aviation
aircraft as well as the major airlines and military aircraft, it is evident
that the aircraft industry, especially the air cargo industry, uses a substan-
tial amount of mineral resources.
The different minerals used in aircraft are of a greater range than in
other transportation modes due to the unique operating conditions. Aluminum,
steel, and special alloys of titanium and magnesium constitute more than 70
percent of most aircraft by percent of the total weight (Table 4.3). In
addition, a variety of other minerals are present in smaller, but certainly
not less important quantities: beryllium, boron, cadmium, carbon, chromium,
cobalt, graphite, gold, lead, molybdenum, nickel, silver, tin, tungsten,
vanadium, zinc, and zirconium.
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Table 4.1
NATURAL RESOURCES
Air Aesthetics
Minerals* Product of Land
Fuels* Crops
Hydrocarbon Livestock
Non-hydrocarbon Space
Metal!ics* Timber
Non-metal lies* Water
* Those natural resources to be studied in this section of the ACIS study.
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The choice of materials is influenced more by the technical properties of
the materials than by price considerations. This is due to the small propor-
tion of the total cost of an aircraft that materials make up. Moore (ref. 8)
states that the cost of a 747 would only increase by 16 percent if the materials
used increased five fold.
4.2.1.1. Availability of the Non-Fuel Mineral Resources for the ACIS
The U.S. is nearing the end of the second of a three stage development in
mineral resources. From a past period when the U.S. was abundantly supplied
by itself and the world, to the present period when the U.S. must share the
world's supply more uniformly with the rest of the world, to the near-future
period where the world's mineral supplies are not adequate for the world and
some countries must do without depending on their military, resource, and/or
economic strength. "The outlook is for an acceleration of demand, increasing
difficulty of supply, and increasing challenge to technology, and an upward
pressure on prices." (ref. 9)
Table 4.4 illustrates the minerals, divided into metals and non-metals,
needed for the three parts of the ACIS system. Their importance to each part
of the system is indicated by a number sequence: 3 for important, 2 for
moderate importance, and 1 for low importance. A letter indicates those
minerals which may have supply problems in the 1990-2015 time period due to
possible cartel action (x), price difficulty (y), or depletion-world (z) and
U.S. depletion (w).
The three possible types of supply problems were investigated and deter-
mined by using the following seven characteristics as well as the author's
previous research:
1. The proportion of imports to domestic consumption
2. Vulnerability to coordinated producer action
3. The availability of alternative materials
4. Development of and the amount of domestic resources
5. Imposition of conservation measures
6. The balance of payments impact
7. The capital requirements for domestic and alternative foreign resource
development
In dollar value, the U.S. produces about 85 percent of its total mineral
needs; yet, despite this success, the U.S. has not been able to correct its
mineral deficiencies and has fallen steadily behind in its ability to supply
its needs. Of 40 primary minerals needed by the U.S., 20 of them are in
jeopardy of being depleted. Approximately 1/3 of the country's net supply of
primary metals and metallic ores are imported. The increasing problem of the
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Table 4.4
MINERAL RESOURCES NEEDED FOR THE ACIS
General Type
of Mineral
Specific Type
of Mineral
Aircraft Terminal and Ground Supply
Needs Support Needs Problem
Metals
Iron
Iron
Alloy
Base
Light
Precious
Rare
Iron Ore
Steel
Manganese
Chromium
Nickel
Molybdenum
Cobalt
Vanadium
Tungsten
Copper
Lead
Zinc
Tin
Aluminum
Magnesium
Titanium
Gold
Silver
Platinum
Uranium
Beryl1ium
Zirconium
Mercury
2
3
2
3/2
3/2
2
2
2
3/2
3
3
3
3/2
3
3
3
2
1
2
*i
2
3/2
2
3
3
1
1
3
2
2
1
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
x
xw
X
X
X
y
z
y
xzw
X
X
zw
zw
xzw
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Table !4.4 (continued)
MINERAL RESOURCES NEEDED FOR THE ACIS
General Type
of Mineral/s
Specific Type
of Commodity
Aircraft Terminal and Ground Supply
Needs Support Needs Problem
Non-metals
Ceramic
Insulant
Gas
Building
Chemical
Pigment and
Filler
Artificial
Clay
Asbestos
Mica
Helium
Hydrogen
Nitrogen
Oxygen
Sand and Gravel
Limestone
Cement materials
Sulfur
Salt
Clay
Diatomite
Barite
Plastics
Glasses
Composites
2
2
*3
*<*
1
1
1
1
3
2
*5
2
1
*3
*"*
1
1
3
3
3
1
2
2
1
1
3
3
z
*
Notes: 1.
3 &
If a nuclear aircraft is developed uranium will be 3 to 2
rating, otherwise uranium will not be a factor.
4. If hydrogen is used as a fuel in future airplanes hydrogen
will become a 3.
At the present it is 1 but as composites become used more
for aircraft construction it will develop into a 3.
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U.S.'s developing deficit of minerals is illustrated in Figure 4.5. Specifically
the reserve situation is somewhat tight or critical for several minerals.
Asbestos, chromium, mercury, and tungsten will be near depletion by 2015.
Price increases and difficulty of supply will occur with aluminum, copper,
gold, lead, manganese, nickel, and silver. There is a possibility of short
supply of barite, iron, mica, phosphate, thorium, titanium; vanadium, and
zinc; the extent of the shortage depends on technological supply.
Therefore, the U.S. will become increasingly dependent on foreign sources.
Assuming no political problems with obtaining necessary minerals, what is the
likelihood that the world's mineral supply will be able to meet the United
States needs? Except for asbestos and mercury, the possibility of the world
running out of necessary mineral resources from 1990 to 2015 is very unlikely.
However, there is a strong possibility of political controls being placed on
certain critical minerals. Therefore, it is not the problem of depletion but
one of political and in some cases economic controls that will cause the U.S.
and the ACIS problems in obtaining the necessary minerals for development.
4.2.1.2. Solutions to the Mineral Supply Problems
What can be done about the U.S. mineral supply problem?
Besides the advancement of technology to use lesser grades of minerals,
there are five other possible solutions to the U.S. mineral problem: (1) sub-
stitution of abundant for scarce minerals and in certain situations just the
reverse, (2) stockpiling of possible problem minerals, (3) recycling of the
mineral content of products, (4) changes in product design to increase the
useful life of a product, and (5) develop new techniques to find undiscovered
mineral deposits. For depletion, true depletion, where our technology cannot
make lower grade "ores" feasible to utilize, substitution is a possible solution.
Table 4.5 shows some of the more important materials and the possible substi-
tutes that will be used in the construction of the ACIS. Of course, where a
mineral has specialized technological applications in which a multiplicity of
properties is required as will be the case in the use of many of the minerals
for the ACIS, available substitute materials will be more limited than in many
other industries.
To reduce the risk of being cut'off from necessary mineral supplies,
stockpiles of many minerals should be maintained. They may be developed by
individual industries as well as the national government for the reality
of world trade dictates that industries dependent in significant measure on
imported minerals should try to carry substantial inventories of needed raw
and semiprocessed materials.
The efficiency of recycling to decrease the U.S.'s mineral supply problems
depends on the particular mineral; aluminum, steel, copper, and lead are the
leading minerals to be recycled. However, until transportation regulations
and federal economic controls are revised, it is unlikely that recycling of
minerals will increase for any of these minerals.
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There are many serious problems concerning the U.S.'s mineral resources.
Only a few have been addressed in this report; however, Table 4.6 attempts to
illustrate many of the problems, which due to space and time constraints,
were not addressed in the text.
In view of the geologic and geochemical constraints on the occurrence of
economic deposits of minerals and energy resources, and the advanced nature of
present exploitation techniques, we must conclude that such resources are
finite. On the other hand, the question "When will we run out?" indicates a
misunderstanding of geologic resource limits. The world will not run out of
many mineral resources, but they will become more expensive and difficult to
obtain.
4.2.2. Fuel Resources for the ACIS
There are many sources of fuel for the ACIS; however, at the present time
only natural hydrocarbons, specifically petroleum derived kerosenes, are used
as fuel in aircraft. Because of this situation, discussion of petroleum
resources is an appropriate starting point for this section.
4.2.2.1. World Petroleum
Energy is the lifeblood of an industrial society. It substitutes the
power of matter for the power of man. Industrial development and the growth
of revenues are linked to the use of various sources and forms of energy.
Much of the energy produced originates from fossilized hydrocarbons which are
completely consumed in their first using. The amount of available fossil
energy, its cost, and the mastery of technologies of extraction, treatment,
and dispatching to make it readily available are all factors of power and
wealth. Therefore, one of the most critical questions facing the world is:
how long will the production of oil continue to be the most important source
of energy?
It is hard to overdramatize the importance of oil as a world energy
source. If the supply of petroleum could continue to increase indefinitely,
the world would continue to use it as the major source of energy; however,
because petroleum is a non-renewable fuel it will be depleted in the future.
This situation is the principle reason for the "energy crisis". To understand
this crisis, it is necessary to understand some of the underlying facts and
data.
From the early 1940's to 1975 the estimated crude oil world resources
have grown from 400 x 109 barrels to 2000 x 109 barrels (ref. 10). However,
the 200 figure was first quoted in 1959 and it has not varied more than 20
percent since that time. The amount of reserves totaled between 600 and 700
billion barrels. Of this amount, 80 percent is in OPEC countries and 80
percent of this amount is in the Middle East (ref. 10). These estimates only
include those resources recoverable at current prices and with current tech-
nology and therefore include oil recoverable by primary production plus oil
recoverable by secondary or tertiary recovery where the potential has been
evaluated and facilities are planned.
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To increase the estimated total petroleum resources, it will be necessary
to find a completely new source region for petroleum. Two areas that have
been proposed are the deeper portions of the earth's crust and the ocean
bottoms. The first is very improbable as commercial quantities of crude oil
do not occur at depths"greater than 20,000 feet due to the temperatures and
pressures associated with such depths (ref. 11).
The second, the ocean bottoms (not including the ocean's shelfs and
slopes), is more likely because the seabed has yet to be adequately explored
geologically. However, there is the problem of developing the technology and
industrial means to exploit petroleum which is beneath an average of 15,000
feet of water.
If new deposits are found, the very long lead times required to develop
wholly new petroleum reserves requires that planning be done now (ref. 12,
13, and 14). Even longer lead times are needed to plan, finance, and conduct
research into new and improved methods of seeking the hard-to-find deposits of
hydrocarbons that will be needed by future generations.
It is also very unlikely that new deposits will increase our overall
petroleum resources greatly because a very large percentage of the total
petroleum found is a very small percentage of all known accumulations. More
than 85 percent of the world's hydrocarbon production plus reserves occur in
less than 5 percent (238 fields) of all producing accumulations. Even more
remarkable, 64 percent of the hydrocarbons (petroleum and gas) occurs in
slightly over 1 percent of all fields -- the 55 "supergiants" (a billion
barrels more)(ref. 15) (Table 4.7).
Approximately 60 percent of all petroleum found outside communist countries
is located in an area some 800 by 500 miles in the Middle East. The likelihood
that such a prolific oil-bearing region will be found again appears small.
Future additions to reserves are more likely to be obtained by improved recovery
techniques. The percentage of oil that can be recovered varies from field to
field (10 to 80 percent) but the general average is 30 to 50 percent. Recovery
rates will improve gradually, starting small but increasing over the next 25
years.
With limited supplies of petroleum being a reality, we must realize it is
essential that we determine when the change from a petroleum based economy
will occur. This necessitates an understanding of how to determine the
quantity to be used and how fast this use will occur. There are seven basic
factors that interrelate to answer this question:
1. World energy price 5. Production limits
2. World economic growth 6. World demand
3. National policy response 7. Type of replacement fuel
4. Petroleum discoveries
Using the above factors, several studies have tried to predict the future of
petroleum. Hafele and Sassin (ref. 16) compared a projected population growth
rate to world per capita energy use and determined that all oil and coal
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Table 4.7
APPROXIMATE SIZE OF WORLD OIL FIELDS
All fields
Fields greater than 0.5
billion bbl recoverable
reserves
Fields greater than 10.0
billion bbl recoverable
reserves
Four largest fields3
Number of
Fields Discovered
30,000
240
15
4
Estimated
of Non-
Communist
World 's
Reserves
100
73
34
21
aGhawar (Saudi Arabia), Greater Burgan (Kuwait), Bolivar Coastal (Venezuela),
and Safaniya-Khafji (Saudi Arabia/Neutral Zone). Source: Martin, 1977,
p. 40 (ref. 23).
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would be used up between 2030 and 2064 assuming these two energy sources were
all that were used and a 5KW/capita energy usage occurred. Allen (ref. 17)
assumed that there are 21)00 billion barrels of natural crude oil left. He
determined that (1) at present world consumption rates, oil will last until
2054, (2) continuing present day growth at 5 percent, oil will last until
2004, and (3) if growth declines to zero by 2000, oil could last until 2023.
Martin (ref. 23) determined that the end of the growth era in oil production
is probably no more than 15 years away. Potential oil demand in the year 2000
is unlikely to be satisfied by crude oil production from conventional sources
(Fig. 4.6).
It is imperative that the world prepare to adjust to a declining oil
supply in the near term (1990-1995). "There may be additional major oil
discoveries or much higher recovery factors than have been assumed, but such
favorable developments would only delay, not remove, the problem. Nations
that continue to increase their oil consumption in the hope that more optimistic
estimates will prove correct risk losing time to adjust their energy consumption
patterns if their optimistic expectations are not met." (ref. 10)
From the above data, one definite conclusion can be made: potential oil
demand in the year 2015 is unlikely to be satisfied by crude oil production
from conventional sources.
4.2.2.2. United States Petroleum
At present, the most serious problem confronting the U.S. is for the
American public to realize the seriousness of the energy crisis. Since the
energy address by President Carter in the spring of 1977, the public has been
made aware of the problem. However, the President has not been able to mobilize
public opinion quickly enough. The country has not reached a consensus on
energy policy. Perhaps this is due to the way Americans tend to deal with an
unexpected national problem (1) be skeptical of the problem's existence, (2)
search for scapegoats, and (3) settle down to dealing with the problem. The
previous section indicated that the world is rapidly approaching a petroleum
supply problem. Is the United States? The 6 percent of the world's population
that lives in the U.S. consumes 31 percent of the world energy production.
Energy consumption in the U.S. has more than doubled in the past 25 years,
from 34 quadrillion BTU's in 1950 to about 78 quadrillion BTU's in 1975. This
increase is equivalent to an average per annum growth rate of 4 percent.
Projections of the total energy demand (ref. 18) to 2000 vary considerably and
range from 124 quadrillion BTU to 192 quadrillion BTU.
Forty-five percent of the U.S. energy demand is supplied by petroleum.
Although Hendricks (ref. 19) has estimated that 400 billion barrels would be
ultimately recovered, all other estimates are near 150 billion barrels. In a
series of papers, Hubbert (refs. 20, 21, 22, and 36) "concluded that the
amount of ultimately recoverable petroleum in the United States is between 150
billion barrels for the contiguous states and about 200 billion barrels for
the entire continental United States (including Alaska and the outer continental
shelves). Hubbert's method is one of integral logistic curve fitting. It is
related only statistically to rocks and geologic parameters, and to those only
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100 -1
50 -
0
OPEC Production
OPEC Production
Limit at 40
MBD
OPEC Production
Limit at 33
MBD
Non-OPEC Production
1975
100 -i
2000
50 -J
0
2025
OPEC Production
Limit at 45
MBD
OPEC Production
Limit at 33
MBD
OPEC Production
Non-OPEC Production
1975 2000 2025
\---2 No OPEC Production Limit, assuming 20 BB/Yr. additions
to reserves to 2000, declining to 4BB/Yr. by 2025
3-4 No OPEC Production Limit, assuming lOBB/Yr. additions
to reserves to 2000, declining to 4BB/Yr. by 2025
3BB/Yr. by 2025
Figure 4.6 TWO OIL PRODUCTION PREDICTIONS (Source: Martin, 1977,
p. 15, (Ref. 23).
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through a variety of economic and technologic factors. Supposing that human
beings will be doing in the future as they have in the past, so far as petroleum
exploration is concerned both technologically and from an investment viewpoint,
Hubbert's approach is unassailable." (ref. 15)
At the present time, about 100 billion barrels have been produced in the
U.S. The U.S. has consumed between 25 and 40 percent of its own petroleum to
this date. By the year 2015 between 80 and 90 percent will be consumed.
This decrease in availability of U.S. produced petroleum will have several
effects: production will drop from 8 to 12 million barrels daily in 1985 to 6
to 10 million barrels daily in 2000 (ref. 10), the U.S. will become more and
more an energy-deficient country, the possibility of restrictions and threatened
restrictions on U.S. oil imports will increase, decrease the independence of
U.S. foreign policy, and bring havoc to the complex of both international and
domestic economic matters.
In 1960, the net rate of external dependence on foreign oil stood at 5
percent, in 1974 it was 16.3 percent, during the first half of 1978 it varied
from 40 to 50 percent. The possibility that it could reach 70 percent by 1990
is very real. This would be equivalent to an annual deficit of some $50
billion in 1974 dollars.
It is the last figure which is the most important. Although the vulnerable
nature of our energy dependence was made abundantly clear during the OPEC oil
embargo, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be cut off from imported oil in the
near future. But even if foreign imports are fairly assured for the near
future, the balance-of-trade deficit is leading us into serious economic
problems. 'We cannot long tolerate paying over $30 billion annually for imported
oil that cost only $3 billion a year as recently as 1972.
In the next several years, the United States must develop a sound energy
policy which includes the following parts: (1) rapidly increase the domestic
energy supplies, (2) reduce demand by conserving energy, (3) develop new tech-
nologies through a massive new research and development program, and (4) aim
for a lower energy future.
It would cost us little to direct the U.S. toward a low energy future and
there would be major gains as to the possibility of ahcieving such an energy
demand; a lowering of environmental and human damage, a lower risk of catas-
trophic accidents, and a strengthening of our economy.
4.2.2.3. Transportation -- Aviation
Primary energy consumption in the U.S. is almost evenly divided between
residential, industrial, electrical, and the transportation sectors. Within
the transportation sector, highway modes (bus, trucks, and autos) account for
most of the energy consumed (Fig. 4.7.).
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In the U.S., transportation accounts for about one-fourth of the total
energy used and about half of the petroleum consumption. The energy consumed
by aviation, which accounted for only a few percent of the transportation
energy consumption in 1960, amounts to about 13 percent of the transportation
energy usage (about 9 percent civil and 5 percent military) or less than 4
percent of the total U.S. energy consumption. Although air transportation
accounts for a small fraction of the U.S. petroleum used, aviation in all
forms (passenger, freight, general aviation, and military aviation) is 100
percent dependent on petroleum fuels and strongly influenced by the availability
and cost of these fuels.
Aviation is growing at a faster rate than all other transportation modes
with energy consumption having increased at a rate of about 11 percent per
year between 1963 and 1973. Although there was a decrease in fuel use from
1974 to 1976 (6 percent), a continuing increase of 4 percent (Fig.4.5) for the
air mode is very possible. If this growth rate continues to 2000, aviation
will change from its present relatively modest role into the dominant factor
in future transportation energy consumption. Projections of aviation growth
vary from 2 to 6 times. But, whatever that growth rate in aviation, it will
consume a much larger fraction of the transportation sector's fuel in the
future (Fig. 4.7).
The growth in the all air-cargo fuel consumption is also expected to
increase drastically in the future. At a 5.8 percent annual growth, it would
increase from 680.mill ion gallons in 1974 to between 6 and 7 billion gallons
by 2015.
4.2.2.3.1. Aviation Fuel Problems
As the aviation fuel need increases and the amount of crude oil decreases,
several problems will arise. One is the conflict which will occur between
transportation sectors because of differing fuel-requirements. If pressure
from either the motor gasoline, petrochemical or high quality gas/oil markets
reduces the volume of jet fuel below demand, Jet B could substitute. However,
increased demand for naphtha and motor gasolines could, as in the past, reduce
Jet B's availability. There is also the possibility that a new need for the
jet fuel fraction of crude oil could develop and cause aviation fuel shortages.
Another problem is the amount of direct operating cost (DOC) that is
caused by fuel acquisition. The ratio of fuel costs to the total cost of air
transportation has been relatively low for most of aviation's history. However,
since the Middle East War of 1973 and its related embargo and fuel price
increase, the price of fuel has become the single most important item in DOC.
It is this high fuel contribution to DOC that has brought about the
situation whereby, at the current level of U.S. airline fuel use of 10 x 109
gals/yr (CAB data), each cent/gal increase in the price of fuel costs the
airlines 100 x 106 dollars.
Of course, it is the increase in the price of fuel which is causing the
DOC fuel problem. Air Transportation Association data indicate that the cost
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of fuel climbed from $1.4 billion in 1973 to $2.3 billion in 1974 even though
consumption was cut from 10.7 billion gallons to 9.6 billion gallons. Fuel
prices will apparently continue to increase for the indeterminate future
because of the inflationary spiral that has been generated. Fuel price increases
join with other inflationary forces to drive up the prices of the things the
oil-producing countries buy. This leads to further increases in what they
charge for fuel. This increase will intensify as the necessity of exploiting
new, more capital and energy-intensive fossil-fuel and raw materials sources
increases.
This fuel cost problem will not be as serious for air cargo as for the
passenger portion of aviation for if a ticket of a passenger increases from
$300 to $400, there is certainly a chance of a decreased passenger demand.
However, if the air-cargo rate goes from 30 cents a pound to 40 cents, the
ten-cent increment can be readily passed on to the consumer as a 1 or 2 percent
increase in the retail price of the goods. In summary from the energy point
of view, aviation has to face in the short term much higher fuel costs with
supplies critically dependent on political stability and in the long term
steadily increasing fuel costs with no satisfactory alternative fuel yet in
prospect.
4.2.3.3.2. Ways to Improve Fuel Utilization
The air transportation system, both in operation and equipment, has never
been designed for minimum fuel utilization. Even so, the fuel efficiency of
aircraft has improved from 1920 to 1975 by a factor of four. Using the value
of 1920 as a constant base, this represents an average increase of about 5
percent per annum. From 1955 to 1975, the jet era, this rate of improvement
has corresponded to a rate of 10 percent per annum. Now fuel efficiency is
clearly the prime target for designers who, by technological advance, can
directly influence the economic effectiveness of much of the research and
development in the aerospace industry.
The rising energy consumption for all transportation, the increasing de-
pendence of transportation on petroleum, the growing level of petroleum imports,
the impending shortage of adequate oil supplies, and the rising price of fuel
make the need for significant increases in aircraft fuel efficiencies mandatory.
There must be no delay in developing advanced technologies to provide com-
pensating improvements in fuel consumption. Sufficient research must be done
to accommodate the use of alternative fuels should the need arise. While it
may be hoped that economies in other energy areas will leave sufficient
petroleum for the relatively small requirements of aviation, it is unacceptably
risky to rely on such hopes. The airlines were the first, not the last, to
have fuel allocations imposed in the fuel crisis of 1973-1974. A number of
studies (refs. 24, 25, 26, and 27) have recently been made in response to the
concern of the impact of the energy crisis on commercial aviation. These
studies indicate that although current transport aircraft are reasonably
energy-efficient, considerable improvements can be made in future aircraft
designs through incorporation of advanced technology.
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In addition to the technological advancements that can improve fuel effi-
ciency, other direct and indirect energy requirements must be investigated.
These other energy requirements include the energy expended in switching and
repositioning equipment; regular maintenance; storage; training; extra operations
because of adverse weather; equipment breakdowns; extraordinary traffic delays;
heating, cooling, and lighting of offices and terminals; advertising displays;
energy expended in producing, refining, and distributing the fuel; and the
indirect energy consumed in constructing and manufacturing the various facili-
ties, structures, and equipment associated with a particular transportation
system.
Fuel efficiency improvements in some of the above areas were responsible
for a 7.5 percent fuel consumption decrease during the 1973 to 1976 period
even though the overall passengers carried increased by 10.4 percent.
A listing of possible methods to increase fuel efficiency appears below.
It is divided into management and maintenance, aircraft technology, and
operational procedures (aircraft flight operations and aircraft ground handling).
Methods to Increase Fuel Efficiency
I. Management and Maintenance
Retirement of older inefficient airplanes
Drag reduction maintenance
Reduced training flights (use of simulators)
Increased seating and payloads
Rely on energy-economical concepts where possible (ex: 1ighter-than-air
heavy cargo lifting)
Higher density seating (increased capacity)
Higher load factors
Fleet mix and usage
Airport design
II. Aircraft Technology
Advanced airfoil design - new supercritical wing, improved aerodynamic
fairings
Increased aspect ratio - stretched fuselage
Lowered structural weight by less swept, thicker wing
Use of composite materials - fairings, wing and tail extensions, floor,
doors
Fuel conservative engines (optimum design parameters between engine
specific fuel consumption and aircraft design efficiency parameter)
Active controls to reduce size, weight, and drag of surfaces
Laminar flow by boundary layer control.
Re-introduction of turbofan where possible
Alternative fuels utilization and the engines that can use them (this would
act to decrease dependency on petroleum-derived fuels)
Wing tip vortex dissipation
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[II. Operational Procedures
A. Aircraft Flight Operations
Climb to cruise altitude as fast as possible
Select fuel efficient cruise altitude
Use fuel efficient speed enroute
Hold to cruise altitude as long as possible
Use fuel efficient descent profile and if possible idle some engines
Use minimum circuitry in departure and approach patterns
Reduced air traffic control delays
Routine monitoring of flight fuel consumptions and operating procedures
All weather operations
B. Aircraft Ground Handling
Reduce engine usage in taxiing in
Take delays at gate with engines off
Delay start up of engines until pushoff
Reduce engine operation in taxiing out
Increase use of towing
Manage better all the terminal operations
Better diagnostic procedures of engine problems and use of materials
that resist deterioration
Control of fuel reserves and dumping
The above information was compiled from sources in references 25, 27, 28, 29,
50 and 51.
Once the operational and management improvements are implemented, the
reduction of aircraft fuel consumption will occur by employing advanced tech-
nology to improve the efficiency of the vehicle and the propulsion systems.
Figure 4.8 illustrates some of these improvements interrelated to the percent
of fuel utilization improvement and the years of introduction. When advanced
engine and materials as well as the laminar flow control are available, the
possibility of a completely new fuel efficient plane will increase. This may
also be when alternative fuels will become the major source of aircraft fuels.
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4.3 PUBLIC POLICY, ACIS AND FUELS
There are three special areas where public policy makers should direct
their attention with respect to the ACIS. These areas are: (1) the design of
a fuel efficient intermediate size aircraft; (2) allocation of fuel to ACIS in
the event of a critical fuel shortage; and (3) the development of alternative
fuels.
4.3.1. Fuel Efficient Aircraft
A fuel efficient intermediate size aircraft is needed. This plane
should be designed to accept standard size containers, use composites wherever
possible, and have a fuel efficient engine; possibly a new type of turboprop
which is highly loaded, multibladed, and has advanced blade structure.
The above described aircraft is needed now, but because of the serious
economic problems of all segments of the U.S. including the airline and air-
craft industries, it is not presently being given the attention required for
implementation. In the very near future, 1980-1985, this attitude must 'change.
"... there should certainly be a heightened emphasis on research and develop-
ment work related to future potential aircraft systems, with emphasis on im-
proved efficiency at reduced cost. Whether derivatives or new systems prevail,
only through aggressive and dedicated research and development efforts can the
many potential improvements in fuel conservation, other operational cost
factors, and production costs be brought to fruition. All of the technological
potentials discussed earlier, and many more, need to be developed further. It
is through this entire mechanism, of course, that one should reasonably expect
to discover one or more "breakthroughs," which will be the means of a shift
from our current technology curve to another more beneficial level, thus
alleviating the adverse cost impact factors now faced by all new cargo systems.
When one reflects that it has been only a little over 20 years since the first
service of a British commercial jet-propelled passenger airplane and less than
17 years since the first commercial service of a U.S. jet, the supposition
that a few more years might have to pass before a significant breakthrough may
be made with new advanced cargo aircraft should cause no great disappointment."
(ref. 30)
4.3.2. Fuel Allocation in Case of Shortage
The OPEC oil embargo of 1973 drove home the dependence of the U.S. economy
on imported petroleum. As has been previously presented, this dependence has
increased since 1973. At the time of the embargo, the federal government
limited sales of automobile gasolines; however, the only public mode of
transportation to be allocated reduced fuel supplies was the commercial airlines.
Why was this done? The scheduled domestic airlines consumed less than 5
percent of refinery output and it is very likely that the traffic shifts from
automobiles increased the public demand for air service. If the same situation
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happened now would the same result occur? Very likely. Jet aircraft are very
visible consumers of energy and their "high" fuel consumption is the subject
of much discussion.
If the ACIS is allowed to come into being, policy planners must safeguard
against any shortsighted response which could be far more destructive for a
highly integrated air cargo system than would be the case for passenger systems.
In the first place, our system is characterized by low connectivity; a drastic
cutback in fuel might, therefore, render the system totally inoperative. In
the second place, we recommend vertical integration of cargo carrying modes.
Thus, a disruption of one element of the system might render a much larger
system inoperative. In the third place, the kinds of saving we expect shippers
to realize, when using air rather than truck, depend largely upon their being
able to lower inventories. Thus the users of air cargo will become extremely
vulnerable to any stoppage in the movement of their goods. It is probably
impossible to even begin to calculate the amounts and kinds of economic damage
that might occur if, after allowing the ACIS to be put into place, we then
permit the capricious disruption of the system. For, although it is true that
only a small part of all goods shipped will move by air, those goods that are
shipped by the ACIS will be essential to the utilization of things moved by
other modes. Therefore, whole industries might fail to function if ACIS fails
to function.
As has been mentioned before, the air transportation demand for fuel has
grown from a few percent of all transportation energy consumed in 1960 to
about 13 percent today. Of course, this growth calls attention to aviation's
demands on a petroleum supply which is being depleted; however, air transport
has demonstrated a continued history of improved energy efficiency. To give
perspective, when the 1976 demand for major petroleum products is compared
with the 1970 demand, the airlines have stabilized but other petroleum product
consumers have demanded large increases: 19.5 percent for motor gasoline,
23.2 percent for distillates, and 26.4 percent for residual fuel oil. These
"increases are the major cause of the continued rise in the nation's petroleum
consumption and a cause of the accelerating import problem. Indeed, the
increase in gasoline consumption from 1970 to 1976 exceeds the total jet fuel
consumed by all aviation in 1976." (ref. 31)
There are two other major factors which strengthens the airlines case for
the right to fuel: (1) The increased opportunity and productivity of passengers
because of the speed of aircraft which also allows a greater radius of communi-
cation and travel. This benefits the nations economy. (2) A healthy airline
industry assists the foreign trade balance of payments. Exports of commercial
air transports and associated equipment generate approximately $3 billion each
year. Airline competition has fostered a manufacturing industry whose products
dominate world air transportation.
We believe that from a cost/benefit viewpoint, aviation is vital to our
nation. Aviation provides vital services and capabilities that cannot be
achieved in any other way. Aviation is not grossly consumptive of energy and
airplanes of the future will be able to compete very favorably with other
forms of transportation on an energy basis. "Adequate air transportation
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today is not merely a convenience but a vital resource that cannot be given up
without major changes in lifestyles, business procedures and productivity in
government, industry, and private affairs" (ref. 25) The airlines provide a
service that is not duplicated by the other transportation modes. In future
restricted import situations, federal policy should be founded on a well
researched understanding of the needs and alternatives for all users rather
than a reactive solution based on the strength of political lobbies.
4.3.3. Alternative Fuels
Even if the aircraft industry is exceptionally successful in succeeding
to develop and implement all the fuel efficient programs listed previously.
They may still experience long-term difficulties in meeting jet fuel require-
ments from domestic and imported petroleum supplies. Not only is there an
increasing demand for the crude oil fraction that can be made into jet fuel,
there is a definite limit to the crude oil supply.
Therefore, it is assumed that in the early twenty-first century some
supplementary alternative fuels will be developed. A tremendous amount of
effort has been expended on trying to determine the actual alternative fuel to
be developed (refs. 17, 27, 32, 33, and 4). Because they must be readily
available, at a realistic price, compatible with existing aircraft and ground
facilities, and not disturb operational or other characteristics of the aircraft
used, it is believed they will be much like those in use today and will be
produced by utilizing coal and possibly oil shale as the basic source (refs.
35, 36, 37, and 38). There is also a chance that more unusual fuels, such as
methanol, methane, hydrogen, and even nuclear, may be used (refs. 39, 40, 41,
42, 43, and 44).
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4.4 GOVERNMENT ROLE AND MARKET FORCES
4.4.1. The Role of Transportation in the U.S. Economy
Because of the vital role of transportation in the life of the nation,
federal, state, and local governments have, in the past, participated in its
promotion, planning, and support. The U.S. has provided subsidies and aids to
various transportation modes in promoting commerce, the Postal Service, national
defense, and international trade. Transportation even in a capitalist or
market system, such as the U.S. is rarely left completely to the market.
Accordingly, it has been a mixed system of private and public enterprise.
The federal government has played a very important role in the development
of air transport. For example, from 1919 to 1923, the Post Office Department
experimented with mail transportation. After 1925, the Department of Commerce
took over the task of developing a system of civil airways and aids to navi-
gation. The federal government has also provided and operated the airways,
air navigation facilities, and air traffic control through the Federal Aviation
Administration. Local governments have also been involved in the development,
operation, and support of airports.
The promotion of the ACIS is also an important factor in employment.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, transportation's share in total
national employment will drop from 4.5 percent in 1968 to 2.8 percent by 1985,
but the proportion of civil aviation workers in the transportation labor field
should increase from 14 percent in 1968 to 28 percent by 1985 (ref. 45). An
ACIS could also beneficially affect gross national product and tax receipts.
4.4.2. Improvement of the Balance of Trade
The aerospace industry also plays a very important role in the U.S.
balance of trade. In 1977, while the U.S. suffered a trade balance deficit of
$29.113 billion, the aerospace industry had a trade balance surplus of $6.850
billion. Aerospace industry exported $7.581 billion and imported only $731
million. Aerospace industry was second only to agriculture in favorable contri-
bution to our balance of trade. Since World War II, the aerospace industry
has contributed a great deal to the U.S. balance of trade (Table 4.8).
4.4.3. Government Role in the International Market Place
Before and during World War II, the U.S. conducted an aeronautical research
and development program of extraordinary scale. In the post-war decade, U.S.
aircraft builders further benefited from new technology made available by
advancing research and development. Thus, the U.S. has continued its superiority
in the aircraft industry, but whether we can maintain our superiority in the
future is of great concern to many persons in this country.
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Table 4.8
TOTAL AND AEROSPACE BALANCE OF TRADE
(Millions of Dollars)
Yeari cci i
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
TOTAL
U f».S.
Trade
Balance
$ 5,369
6,096
4,180
6,061
7,555
5,875
4,524
4,409
1,133
1,599
2,834
-2,024
-6,351
1,222
-2,996
9,625
-7,803
-29,113
Aerospace
Trade
Balance
$ 1,665
1,501
1,795
1,532
1,518
1,459
1,370
1,961
2,661
2,831
3,097
3,830
3,230
4,360
6,350
7,045
7,267
6,850
Exports
$ 1,726
1,653
1,923
1,627
1,606
1,618
1,673
2,248
2,994
3,138
3,405
4,203
3,795
5,142
7,095
7,792
7,843
7,581
Imports
$ 61
152
128
95
90
159
303
287
333
307
308
373
565
782
745
747
576
731
Aerospace
Trade
Balance
as Percent
of U.S.
Total
31.0%
24.6
42.9
25.3
20.1
24,8
30.3
44.5
234.9
177.0
109.3
356.8
73.2
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Since the 1960's due to the Vietnam War, high rates of inflation and a
general decline in national economic health, federally funded research and
development in the United States has declined. In the meantime, the govern-
ments of Western Europe and Japan have provided strong financial support to
their aircraft industry in the area of research and development. The growth
rate in aerospace research and development for the Common Market countries has
averaged 15 percent annually, compared with 6 percent for the United States.
European governments are promoting the consortium approach to aircraft
development. For examples of such collaborative, efforts, see Table 4.9.
Cooperation among nations makes it possible to undertake programs that would
otherwise be impossible for an individual country. The consortium approach
makes it possible to utilize economic resources of the cooperating nations in
the most efficient way for research,'development, testing, and production. ' It
also allows nations to take advantage of economics of scale in production
because of internal market size. The Western European countries, taken togethei
now constitute a market equal to that of the United Stated. A cooperative
approach fosters development of a wider range of aircraft types because of the
broader market and differing kinds of service provided by the airlines of
the cooperating nations (ref.42). Thus the consortium approach provides a
potentially strong competitive challenge to American industry.
In order to improve the state of the aircraft manufacturing industy and
to compete with foreign countries, it is essential for this country to have
healthy airlines. A study of the ownership of airlines reveals that all major
foreign international airlines except CP Air are wholly or partially owned by
their governments (Table 4.9). Foreign governments are also involved in the
operations of the airlines and this enables foreign airlines to capture a
greater share of the international market. NASA Cargo/Logistics Airlift
System Study (CLASS) completed in June 1978 by the McDonnell-Douglas Corpora-
tion predicted that..market growth between 1978-1990 for U.S. international
airlines will increase by 8.3% annually whereas foreign airlines will increase
by 14.3%.
In the face of increased European national and multinational financial
involvement in the development of advanced technology, the production of air-
craft, and the operations of airlines, it is essential for the U.S. government,
not only to be involved in the development of the advanced air cargo system,
but also in the development of future cargo aircraft.
4.4.4. Capital Formation and Government Role
According to the Air Transport Association of America, the airlines will
need about $60 billion for the ten year period, 1980-1990 (ref. 47). Industry
leaders and stockbrokers feel this amount can be raised in the absence of de-
regulation, with only minor difficulties experienced by a few carriers. The
capital requirements after 1990 will depend upon the needs of new aircraft and
the investment in ground support. Because the investment in ground support,
such as terminals and equipment, is approximately 10 percent of the cost of
the planes, the major capital requirements for the near future will be for
aircraft. The airlines and aircraft manufacturers are the principal portion
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of the aircraft industry that require capital.
4.4.4.1. Carrier
There are five principal sources of funds .for transportation carriers:
debt financing, equity financing, retained earnings, the government and manu-
facturers.
Historically the air transport industry has had a high level of financial
leverage; a high debt-equity ratio. This is because of the heavy reliance on
debt instruments to finance aircraft and equipment. Such financing occurs be-
cause the cost of debt financing is low relative to equity financing. In the
early 1970s, debt-equity ratios peaked at 2:1 for the carriers as a group, and
individually some crossed the line of 3:1. Because of regulation, lower
levels of competitive risk and the assured nature of carrier route structures
and fare levels, the air transport industry was able to support a high level
of financial leverage. However, in a non-regulated market, financial institu-
tions and investors will want to see the debt-equity ratio at a 1:1 ratio; so,
carriers will have to undertake a combination of debt reduction and new equity
financing. Deregulation and the new attitude of the CAB, which indicates it
now will tolerate some carrier financial failure, at least for the short run,
will cause financial institutions and investors to be reluctant to lend capital
to already heavily-indebted airlines. However, some carriers, Delta and
Northwest Orient for example, will still be able to borrow without much diffi-
culty. Northwest's debt is small by trunk airline standards, and Delta,
although it has gone deeper into debt, has nonetheless stayed below a 1:1
debt-equity ratio.
In the long run, economic deregulation will.create a climate in which the
industry will prosper, even though some specific carriers may not. A general
increase in supply and capacity of the domestic air cargo industry can also be
expected because of deregulation. The market will tend to create more premium
services at higher prices in heavy traffic markets. The market forces will
also permit the emergence of intermodal transportation companies. This means
that some carriers will emerge as financially sound companies and will be able
to generate enough capital through retained earnings and equity financing to
purchase new aircraft. The successful sale" of equity depends on investor
confidence. If deregulation would make the air transport industry a growth
industry again, carriers would be able to raise capital without too much
difficulty.
4.4.4.2. Manufacturer
Developing a new aircraft calls for an enormous investment by the manufac-
turer. Costs have risen to the point where it takes more than one billion
dollars to design and build an operational airplane. Figure 4.9 presents the
financial history of the development program for a hypothetical new technology
subsonic jet transport. In the first four years of development, the program
would not reach the break-even point for about eight years or until after
about 330 aircraft have been delivered (Fig. 4.9).
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Table 4.9
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP:
24 FOREIGN AIRLINES, PAN AM AND TWA
Airline
Aerlinte
Eireann
(Irish)
Aeromexico
Air Canada
Air France
Air India
Air New Zealand
Alitalia
Argentine
Airlines
Ayl anca
British Airways
CP Air
Et al
Iberia
Iran Air
Japan Air Lines
Ownership
100 percent government owned.
100 percent government owned since 1959 through
Nacional Financiera S.A.
100 percent government owned through Canadian
National Ry.
98.55 percent government owned.
100 percent government owned.
100 percent government owned.
75.5 percent government owned thru Institute
per la Reconstruzione industriale (IRI).
100 percent government owned.
Substantially owned and effectively controlled
by Colombian government Pan Am owns 14 percent
but exercises no management control.
100 percent government owned.
Privately owned by Canadian Pacific Ltd.
Government owned except for a few shares.
Wholly government owned except for few shares,
thru Institute Nacional de Industira (INI).
100 government owned.
45 percent government owned. Government
effectively controls airline.
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Airline
KLM
Lufthansa
Pan Am
Philippine Air
Quantas
Sabena
SAS
Swissair
TWA
Varig
Viasa
Ownership
70 percent government owned; government
effectively controls KLM.
Government and government institutions own
70.15 percent.
Privately owned.
75 percent privately owned; quasi-government
insurance corp. owns 25 percent.
100 percent government owned.
65 percent government owned; rest by individuals
or in trust by government.
55 percent owned by governments of Denmark,
Norway, Sweden; 45 percent by private investors.
Government units and institutions own 23.6
percent
Privately owned.
96.11 percent privately owned, 3.89 percent by
state government.
Government of Venezuela holds 55 percent domestic
airline Avensa owns rest.
Source: Aviation Economics, Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Invests
gations and Review and the Subcommittee on Aviation on the Committee
on Public Works and Transportation, House of Representatives 94th
Congress March-April, 1976, Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, pp. 24-31.
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.The aircraft manufacturing industry has been and always will be dependent
upon government for research and development. However, in the past, the
American manufacturers have been able to finance their own commercial aircraft
programs. It can be assumed that they will be able to continue to do so in
the future. The financial positions of the manufacturers will allow them to
undertake development of new commercial aircraft programs if the demands of a
new aircraft justify the investment. Table 4.10 shows that the long-term debt
for Boeing is comparatively limited and the company will be able to go to the
market for borrowing. Boeing also has an unused line of credit. There will
be other sources of money available to the company as well. McDonnell-Douglas
'has limited its long-term debt. The need for a U.S. Government guarantee has
now been eliminated for Lockheed because of the improvement of its financial
position. Boeing has managed to retain equity well in excess of issued stock
value. McDonnell-Douglas has a smaller stock base, but its stockholders'
equity is close to the Boeing figure. Lockheed, of course, needs much strength-
ening in its equity (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10 shows that the net profit after taxes, as a percent of sales
for aerospace manufacturing corporations, has improved since the 1960s. If
the demands of a new aircraft justify the investment, the capital can be pro-
vided by air transport carriers and manufacturers.
4.4.4.3. Government
In buying aircraft, the financial arrangement is a dominant factor.
Foreign governments and foreign manufacturers are very much involved in the
financial arrangements related to the sales of their airplanes. For example,
Airbus Industrie came up with guaranteed financing for its $778 million package
sale to Eastern and Rolls-Royce Ltd., a British state-owned engine maker,
offered to guarantee financing for Pan American World Airways to purchase,
airplanes equipped with Rolls Royce engines. -Foreign manufacturers will have
an obvious advantage over American manufacturers because the latter cannot
offer guaranteed financing. By working with American manufacturers, the
United States government can get involved in guaranteed financing to purchase
American aircraft and help to offset the support that foreign industries are
getting from their governments. This support is needed if the positive trade
balance of the aerospace industry is to continue.
4.4.5. Conclusion
In the face of increased European consortium, nationalism, foreign govern-
ment financial involvement in the development of advanced technology and pro-
duction of aircrafts, and operations of airlines, it is essential for the U.S.
government, not only to be involved in the development of the advanced air
cargo system, but also in the development of future cargo aircraft. By 1980,
the U.S. government should be involved in guaranteed financing to purchase
aircraft in order to enable U.S. industries to compete effectively in world
markets, and to maintain their superiority in air transport and aeros'pace
industry. While the general philosophy of the United States has been to
idealize competition in our domestic economy, we must reexamine the concept of
"competition" in the light of foreign government involvement in international
economy and global politics in 1990.
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Table 4.10
U.S. AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING COMPANY BALANCE SHEETS
(millions of dollars)
Boeing Lockheed McDonnell Douglas
Fixed assets 400.7 256.1 249.6
Current assets
Current liabilities
Net current assets
Other assets
Capital employed
Long-term debt
Other 1 iabil ities
Net worth
Preferred stock
Common Stock
Share premium
Retained earnings
Treasury stock
Shareholders equity
1977 SALES
Aircraft
Spares and missiles
Other
Corporate income
1,771.0
1,029.9
741.1
268.7
1,410.5
104.1
75.1
1,231.3
553.9
- .
684.0
(6.6)
1,231.3
3,423
446
208
47
848.9
780.5
68.4
463.9
788.4
536.0
33.6
218.8
48.5
11.4
88.4
70.5
-
218.8
1,970
1,206
197
—
2,018.3
1,332.2
686.1
199.6
1,135.3
79.5
--
1,055.8
38.4
314.1
721.1
(17.8)
1,055.8
'
2,841
601
163
—
TOTAL 4,124 3,373 3,605
Source: Flight International, June 10, 1978.
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4.5 MILITARY AIR CARGO NEEDS AND DEFENSE POLICY
As American forces pull back from Europe and Asia, the demand on our
strategic airlift capability increases. An advanced air cargo system is im-
portant to our national defense. Not only does the system serve the needs of
our complex economy but at the same time it provides the military with a ready
capability through CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) to meet our strategic needs.
The post-Vietnam political environment has generated a number of perceptible
trends in American society that are relevant here.
The critics of military spending have argued that the expansion of mili-
tary budgets results in lower level of public expenditure on the development
of social programs (ref. 49). As Figure 4.10 shows, the world's arms budget
was almost double the public expenditure for health care in 1975. Such analyses
have generally contributed to critical orientations toward military spending
(ref.50).
In Western Europe, the younger generation has developed a negative atti-
tude toward military expenditure. In the words of a member of the Western
European elites, "There is growing up a generation which, mercifully, has had
no firsthand experience of war and all that it means in terms of human misery
and national disaster. This generation is now reaching the age where its
members are becoming influential in politics, commerce, industry, and all
aspects of life. It is therefore expected that its attitude toward defense
expenditure, and indeed to military strategy, will be very different from
those of the preceeding generation, which has experienced two disastrous
European wars (ref. 51).
In the United States, there are various sentiments toward the need to re-
duce military expenditures. At the height of the Vietnam war, as many as 52%
of a national sample wanted to see reduction in military spending. These
sentiments have recently waned and in 1977 the figure dropped to 23%.
Nevertheless, the American public does not seem highly supportive of
overseas military involvement (ref. 52). As Table 4.11 shows, only a minority
of the American public would recommend sending troops to foreign countries.
There is significant variation, however, in this dimension of public opinion.
Sending troops is recommended by 57% of the public if Canada is attacked,
however it drops to 7% in the case of India and Saudi Arabia.
In recent years, the American military has been the subject of critical
journalistic and scholarly writings (ref. 53). The military is perceived as
just another interest group trying to get a slice of the budget pie (Fig. 4.11).
Buzz phrases such as "military industrial complex" and "interservices rivalry"
are expressions of critical attitudes toward military projects and its R & D
requirements (ref. 54, 56). Arguments have been made in favor of more detailed
scrutiny of military budgets by the Congress. However, growing awareness of
the nature of government decision-making processes may have contributed to
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Table 4.11
ORIENTATIONS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC TOWARD
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OTHER NATIONS*
(1975)
Selected
Nations
England
West Germany
Canada
Israel
Japan
Mexico
Brazil
Taiwan
Turkey
India
Phil ippines
Saudi
Typologies
Sen'd Troops Send
37%
27%
57%
12%
16%
45%
16%
8%
10%
7%
29%
7%
of Public
Supplies
30%
32%
19%'
42%
35%
26%
36%
27%
36%
40%
34%
27%
Response
Do Not Involve
24%
33%
14%
37%
40%
19%
33%
54%
37%
39%
26%
54%
No Response
9%
8%
10%
9%
9%
10%
15%
11%
17%
14%
11%
12%
Source: Gallup Abstract July, 1975.
* Percentage of national sample suggesting different types of military
involvement overseas.
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these views. In recent years, there has also appeared in print increasing
criticism of government agencies in general, as well as those specifically
directed against the military. These developments may have influenced the
degree of public support of governmental institutions.
The air cargo needs of the American military are directly related to its
mission to move troops and material rapidly wherever they may be needed to
counter threats against "U.S. interests". The concept of U.S. interests is a
rather broad one seldom clearly defined. What sort of situation may be con-
ceived as a threat to U.S. interests? To which parts of the world will the
American military be called upon to move troops and material to protect such
interests? These are situations questions that directly relate to this con-
cept (ref. 57).
In the budgetary proposal for the Fiscal Year 1979, the Carter administra-
tion has explained the goals of the American military as follows:
Protect America's people, its institutions, and its lands from
aggression.
Preserve an overall military balance between the United States
and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, that is at
least as favorable as the present balance.
Maintain essential equivalence in strategic nuclear deterence
with the Soviet Union, preserving the capability to launch a
retaliatory second strike that would inflict unacceptable damage.
Maintain sufficient power, together with our allies, to defeat
any aggressors swiftly, with full recovery of any territory lost
initially.
Seek international agreements to limit and reduce all armaments,
to prevent proliferation of nuclear technology, to restrict arms
trade, to settle disputes by peaceful means, and to strengthen
international stability.
A broad interpretation of these defense goals might involve the mobiliza-
tion of American Armed Forces and their dispatch virtually anywhere in the
world. What will defense needs mean in terms of these goals in the year 1990
and thereafter? The post-Vietnam era has introduced some realistic changes in
the goals of the American Armed Forces. At present, the American military
perceives its international role in terms of the protection of NATO members.
In the absence of any significant political change in the individual countries
of Europe, it is most likely that the American commitment toward NATO will
continue.
Now, we may proceed to analyze the air cargo needs of the American military
as indicated in the documentary material (ref. 59). The Department of Defense
desires the following air cargo capability for the immediate future.
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Military Air Cargo Needs of the Future
General: Capability to Airlift 370 000 tons to Europe in 30 days
Cargo: 93 000 tons outsize - 230 000 tons oversize - 47 000 tons bulk
In a position paper prepared in March 1978, the Military Airlift Command
(MAC) outlined their concept of the military C-XX; a large cargo transport
aircraft that would meet their future transportation needs. A significant
aspect of their proposal is that the C-XX be an all-cargo advanced aircraft
that will meet both civil and military needs. These aircraft would be owned
and operated by the airlines for their civilian cargo services, but in case
of national emergencies, the military would acquire them for supporting their
overseas mission. The military projects a total buy of 60 C-XX aircraft
between 1990 and 1996 out of a total U.S. buy of 300.
This summarizes the military advanced air cargo needs as projected by the
military position, but an evaluation of such needs is extremely difficult
for a variety of reasons. In an earlier evaluation, the GAO criticized the
specific project of airlifting 370 000 tons of cargo the Europe (ref. 59).
The GAO criticisms were directed at a non-availability of airfields in
Europe, refueling problems, and expense of the airlift operation. These criti-
cisms are largely applicable in the case of C-XX proposal.
Since a major thrust in the military proposal for the advanced air cargo
aircraft involves the defense of the NATO nations, it seems pertinent to
examine this aspect in the context of the European nations.
In a meeting of the NATO leaders held in Paris on February 17, 1977, under
the auspices of the Atlantic Institute, the issue of new large transport air-
craft was discussed. A member of our research team interviewed an observer of
this meeting in Paris (ref. 60). This interview data and a review of the pro-
ceedings of the meeting led us to infer that the leaders of the European
nations present came to the following conclusions:
a. There will be a continuing and increasing need for strategic air
transport for deterence, mobilization, and resupply of NATO forces
in Europe.
b. International cooperation may be essential for the development of a
new large air transport aircraft.
c. Such cooperative approach would be a way to achieve weapons system
standardization desired by the NATO participants.
d. A major European delegate at this meeting suggested specific plans
for a joint European-U.S. effort to produce a large cargo aircraft.
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The nations of Western Europe face a continuing dilemma in respect to
their relationships with the United States. Most of the nations of Western
Europe perceive the need for U.S. presence, but they are extremely sensitive
about the dominant position of the U.S. aerospace industry (ref. 61). They
openly discuss the need to revive the European aerospace industry and achieve
access to protected American markets. These concerns have led European
nations to undertake projects like the Anglo-French Concorde and other
collaborative arrangements to produce aircraft (ref. 62) (Table 4.12).
A content analysis of the proceeding of the Symposium of European Armament
Policy held in Paris (3rd-4th March, 1977) provides some clues to understanding
their motivation (Table 4.13).
This analysis suggests the following inferences about the air cargo needs
of the American military and the options associated with such needs.
(1) First, it is clear that in the face of world-wide budgetary
pressures (including the U.S.A.), the air cargo needs of the
U.S. military may have to look toward the "concept of sharing".
. (2) Second, since the air cargo needs of the American military are
directly related to contingency plans for European.defense,
European collaboration deserves detailed study. There is adequate
evidence to suggest that European nations want collaboration in
at least one area of advanced cargo aircraft production.
4.5.1. European - U.S. Collaboration
The preceding discussion has been analyzed exclusively from the point of
view of the United States. Collaboration in aircraft production can also be
analyzed from the world point of view.
It seems all nations of Western Europe are concerned about cuts in their
defense budgets. Some are specifically concerned about the lack of support
for the military among the younger generation. They do not perceive a suppor-
tive attitude toward military expenditure among those members of their populations
that have not experienced war. Collaboration in meeting defense needs could,
ease pressure on their defense budgets. Collaborative production of a C-XX
type advanced cargo aircraft is one attractive option for the United States,
but as discussed earlier in this chapter, institutional constraints impede its
realization. There are many dimensions of collaborative aerospace enterprise
and therefore an European-U.S. collaborative venture raises many interesting
questions. What shall be the nature of aerospace enterprise? How will the
American aerospace industries participate in such organization? What will be
the role of the various governments involved? What will be the role of intra-
European political structures like EEC and WEA? There are many such questions
that deserve systematic exploration.
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Table 4.12
AVIATION RELEVANT CONCERNS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS*
Concerns Asian Nations African & Middle Latin American All Nat.
(N-12) East (N-25) Nation (N-7) (N-44)
Developing 66% 84% 71% 77%
Infrastructure
Equal Share In 16% 8% 0% 9%
Air Traffic
Expansion of 8% 4% 14% 6%
Market
Economic 41% 16% 14% 22%
Development
Through Aviation
Politics of 33% 28% 28% 29%
Aviation
Regulation of 16% 12% 0% 11%
Market
Concern of 8% 4% 0% 4%
Environmental
Impact
* Based on a thematic content analysis of the excepts from the speeches of the
delegates to the 22nd Assembly of ICAO, Montreal, Sept. 13 - Oct. 4, 1977.
Note: Percentages total more than 100% due to multiple themes identified in
the speeches of most delegates.
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4.5.2. Concerns of the Third World Nations
United Technologies has studied the relevance of less developed nations to
advanced aircraft transport (ref. 63). The findings of this study suggest the
following conclusions:
(1) Most of the aircraft required by developing countries could be the
same types as are used by the United States and other developed
nations.
(2) While the needs of developing countries for large cargo aircraft are
expected to be small compared with the developed countries, this
market sector may represent an important supplement to the production
base. Such optimistic suggestions have to be evaluated in the light
of certain broader questions about the aviation relevant concerns of
the third world nations. How do these third world nations perceive
their role in the world aviation industry? Are they also concerned
about the dominance of western countries (including the U.S.) in
aerospace market? How are their orientations toward such questions
likely to influence their willingness to accept the development of
advanced cargo aircraft by the U.S.
It appears that most developing nations are primarily concerned about the
cost of developing an infrastructure to support modern aircraft. A number of
problems may be identified in this area. The delegates to the assembly seemed
highly concerned about the cost of maintinaing such an infrastructure.
Secondly, considerable emphasis was placed upon what may be called "the
politics of aviation". Among other concerns, the developing nations emphasized
such problems as economic development, market expansion, market regulation,
and the environmental impact of the expansion of general aviation.
Such analyses suggest that the developing countries may be a potential
supplementary market for large cargo aircraft, but the politics of the third
world might create some problems for marketing American aircraft in these
areas.
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4.6 FUTURE AND LONG TERM IMPACTS
We have said earlier in this report that we wish to avoid catastrophic
failure through overcommitment of resources to the ACIS (Section 4.1). We
have also said that the supply of cheap oil will be progressively depleted in
the time period we are planning for (Section 4.2). 'We have not predicted that
the world will "run out of oil" during this period. A better way of con-
ceptualizing the situation is to consider that the most easily accessed oil
will be used first. Gradually, the easily accessible deposits will become
exhausted and even if oil is discovered, say at 15 000 feet under the sea, it
may be that as much energy will have to be invested to. reach this oil as will
be returned by burning it. Oil may still be recovered under these circum-
stances but obviously it will be for some other purpose than fuel.
Similar "energy budget" reasoning applies to substitute fuels such as
hydrocarbon derived from coal, oil shale, methane or methanol. The energy
return from these sources will provide a much smaller margin over the energy
cost than is the case for the easily exploited oil deposits which we are
currently mining out. These substitute sources might, however, sustain a "low.
energy economy" and we must therefore consider this as one of our options.
The role of government is crucial in planning for the development of air
cargo beyond 2015. The air transport picture beyond the period planned for in
this report is unclear, because we do not know what sort of energy base we
will have. This is crucial because the energy base will determine our economy
and. hence our transportation needs. In planning for the future, it is suggested
that we consider three alternative economies -- a hydrogen fusion economy, .a
high technology solar power economy, and a low energy economy. These appear
to be our possibilities. Since we are talking about planning for the future,
we will not even discuss a do-nothing or muddle-through approach; this is not
planning, and if we adopt it, there is no future, at least, for air cargo.
The hydrogen fusion option offers the greatest potential for development
but entails the greatest risk. In a hydrogen fusion economy, the available
energy would be almost limitless and almost free. As a result, the value of
time would increase inordinately and the demand for a high volume efficient
air transport system would be virtually assured. In this possible future, the
only constraints to growth would be the amount of pollution people could
tolerate; the space available for transport activity; and, political irration-
alities. The catch is, maybe it cannot be done.
The high technology solar power economy would be less energy-rich than a
hydrogen fusion economy. In addition, there would be more favored places
entailed by the very technology undergirding such an economy; e.g., bands
under satellite power stations, areas with higher levels of irradiation, and
regions near the sea coast. The distribution of population would conform to
these more favored places.
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The air transport system would thus be constrained in two dimensions —
energy availability and population distribution — and would play a modest
role in the overall economy. If this is the chosen future, then the 1990
system will form an admirable base for further modest incremental growth and
network modification.
We can imagine something like the following development: A network of
approximately fifteen hubs is in place by 1990. This network is served between
major hubs by a plane like the Boeing 747 or the C-5A. Sometime during the
1990-2015 period, a high energy solar economy first supplements and then
supplants our current hydrocarbon economy. As world surplus gradually builds
up, there is more and more traffic on the ACTS. When volume builds to the
point where three or four planes are required each transit period between most
of the hubs, it will then become a sound investment to build a fleet of
distributive-load aircraft to replace the old long haul planes.
If this is how things turn out we might see a production run of 600 0001 b
payload spanloaders. Naturally, if these large craft are put into service,
considerable investments will have to be made in airports and facilities. For
a good preliminary description of the system sketched here, the reader should
see reference 64. One design concept for a distributive load freighter is
shown on the right in Figure 4.12. The design on the left represents a plane
intermediate in size between the largest freighters now in service and the
span loader.
If the low energy economy is the option exercise, then the picture is
radically changed. There is still need for air transport in this alternative
future but we are talking about a world where the pace of events will be slow
and economic activities will have a greater degree of local orientation. In
this foreseeable world, the use of lighter than air ships to move large volumes
of low value commodities from the interior of the continents is quite likely
to occur.
In an economy where conservation is emphasized, human and animal labor is
substituted for power machinery, and commodities are stored for local con-
sumption rather than transported, there will be a general decline in the
efficiency of all land transport systems and air ship exploitation of markets
remote from water transport will become attractive.
As world population rises toward nine billion persons in the early part
of the next century, and as the trend toward concentration of people in urban
areas continues, sheer congestion and degradation of roadways should make the
small airship competitive with the truck for loads in the 20 tonne range.
Such an airship would (a) cost less than a comparable lift plane, and (b) have
a higher transport efficiency than a truck under the conditions described
above. A good discussion of these efficiencies can be found in ref. 65.
In order to plan beyond the next equipment cycle, we need to know what
kind of future we are planning for, because air cargo planning is directly
dependent on energy planning. Sometime soon a definite commitment to the
future will have to be made; we cannot hold our options open indefinitely.
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When we look toward the mid range future, we are quite optimistic about
the prospects of air cargo. As long as a cosmopolitan form of social organi-
zation persists, whether the energy expended per capita is low or high, there
should be a demand for freight moved by air. However, the level of energy
expended will probably determine what kind of air transport is employed.
We now turn to a consideration of the long range pervasive impacts of the
ACIS. The first of these is the impact of vertical integration. Vertical
integration should result in labor efficiencies; thus, short term impact will
be loss of payrolls in some areas. Furthermore, because integration will '
limit the number of competitors, some shippers may experience temporary loss
of service. It is expected that these adverse impacts will in the main be of
short duration and local in their affect.
If integration should work properly, cost-savings should result in
higher earnings for the firms involved. Higher earnings should lead to lower
rates for the same level of service or better service at the same rate. This
should lead to economically healthy firms. Lower rates, better service, and a
healthy air cargo system will be a stimulus to economic growth and will be
beneficial to the whole economy.
Integration may also cause the economy as well as the air cargo system to
attain a better balanced use of resources. Service by some modes would be
decreased and service by other modes would be shifted from less productive
uses to more productive employment. In the long run, labor, shipper, communities,
and the general public would benefit from better uses of resources. The
second long term pervasive impact we shall address is the ACIS second order
social impacts.
A convenient way of thinking about what we shall call the secondary
social impacts of the (ACIS) can be acquired by considering the predilection
of many contemporary sociologists to turn to a new paradigm.
The new paradigm portrays individual humans as nodes in a network with
each node having ramifying connections to many other nodes. In most instances,
these networks are perceived by sociologists as having low degrees of connect-
ivity. There is little feedback by way of intervening nodes to stabilize the
network and hold the individual in a nexus of expectations. Beyond the direct
"exchange" between parties, there is little effect on the parties to a social
transaction.
When we ask why this paradigm is displacing the simpler paradigm of
structural functional ism, derived primarily from anthropologists, with its
implicit assumption of ramifying secondary feedlock loops, we reach a con-
clusion which may surprise some persons: The new paradign simply fits
contemporary society better than the old one did.
What we are saying is that this is because the very nature of the ways
human beings relate to one another is different than it was seventy years ago.
Confronted with the modern scene the modern sociologists can, in most cases,
only arbitrarily draw group defining boundaries and any normative order he
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uses is of such a high level of abstraction as to convey almost no information.
Upon reflection, it is reasonable to expect that the ACIS will contribute
to a continuation of the trend toward rendering the social life of Americans
suitable to explanation only by means of network analysis. To the degree that
it makes it possible for larger numbers of persons to interact impersonally
with one another, it will help to create conditions which will make the network
paradigm necessary.
The third long term impact of the ACIS, we perceive, is that in the
international sphere it should tend toward generating interdependences among
the trading parties. It is quite possible that several nations could contribute
items which form some complex assembly. This is easy to conceive at the out-
set, but it is only the tip of the iceberg; over time this interdependence
could ramify throughout entire segments of the economy. We are here picking
up another thread of the same fabric we were considering in Section 4.3 The
message is the same in both instances; the ACIS is a force for interdependency;
depending upon ones value system, this can be judged as either good or bad.
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IMPACT OF THE ACIS
Introduction
It is one thing to use modern technology to develop a system; it is another
to ignore the impacts such a system will have on the surrounding physical and
cultural environment. The designers of any transportation system must insure
that the long-term viability of the environment is preserved.
The human race is constrained by its environment; specifically by such
aspects as food, land, water, climatic change, energy, hazardous substances,
non-fuel minerals, human stress, social tension, ecological stability, manage-
ment, and global organization (ref. 1).
Over the years the development of air transportation has resulted in many
social and economic impacts. In some of the earlier books on air transportation,
predictions were made about changes that would result from increased air trans-
portation. Many of these changes have become such an accepted part of everyday
life that they would no longer be regarded as impacts. For example, the follow-
ing social and economic impacts were predicted in 1951 (ref. 2).
1. Changes in population growth resulting from:
a. aerial warfare - decrease population
b. quick transportation of emergency supplies to disaster areas -
- increase population
2. Redistribution of population resulting from:
a. development of resources in inland Africa, Asia, and South America
b. population shifts to meet increased labor needs of the U.S. west
coast
3. Expanded markets for products
a. Aviation enables salesmen and buyers to make more frequent contacts,
b. California produce will be sold on the east coast.
4. Recreational impacts
a. Vacations to more distant places will become common.
b. Areas in which sports contests are held will be widened.
5. Impacts on education
a. Study of physics of flight as well as biology of organisms in the
air will become an important part of textbooks.
b. Concepts of geography will be transformed through the airplane's
ability to enter the spherical air ocean linking all points on
the earth's surface.
6. Measurement of distance will be in terms of time.
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Since 1970, when the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), PL 91-190
became a part of U.S. law, the procedure to determine the impacts of a system
or project has been addressed and in most cases better understood than at any
previous time. This was due to the creation of a major new responsibility for
those concerned with any planning project that may have a significant effect on -
the environment; they have to produce a detailed statement of the environmental
impact of the proposed action.
"Accordingly, agencies and consultants have had to consider a whole new set
of factors in project planning, and to do so in a systematic way. In preparing
 <
the environmental impact statement, all relevant factors must be identified, the
nature and seriousness of the project's impact on them must be assessed, and the
data must be so presented as to make informed, rational decision-making as
straightforward as possible." (ref. 3)
The obligation to be concerned about the environment, the importance of
impact assessment, and the recognition that many of the above factors would be
impacted by our designed system were responsible for the development of an im-
pact team to evaluate the possible impacts of the ACIS.
Structure
The team consisted of at least one member of each of the original four
teams (Fig. I.I).
Regulations
Ground
Support1
I mpact
Network
Analysis
Public
Policy
Figure I.I IMPACT INPUTS
In this way, inputs from all four teams were funneled into a central
group for discussion, organization, and evaluation.
A team objective was to identify and, if feasible, explain the interaction
of each task group's portion of the ACIS and possible cultural and physical
concerns.
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Two definitions of the word "impact" were recognized:
(1) Simply stated, "impact" means change -- any change, positive or nega-
tive -- from a desirability standpoint
(2) "An impact can be defined as any change in the physical -- chemical,
biological, cultural, and/or socioeconomic environmental system that
can be attributed to human activities relative to alternatives under
study for meeting a project need." (ref. 4)
Methodology
All participants received a memorandum which explained the need to identify
impacts of the ACIS. The memorandum included two examples of impact assessment
methodology; these examples are shown below (ref. 5).
Planning and Design Phase
1. Impact on land use through speculation in. anticipation of development
2. Impact of uncertainty on economic and social attributes of nearby areas
3. Impact on other planning and provision of public services
4. Acquisition and condemnation of property for project, with subsequent
dislocation of families and businesses
Construction Phase
1. Displacement of people
2. Noise
3. Soil erosion and disturbance of natural drainage
4. Interference with water table
5. Water pollution
6. Air pollution (including dust and dirt and burning of debris)
7. Destruction of or damage to wildlife habitat
8. Destruction of parks, recreation areas, and historic sites
9. Aesthetic impact of construction activity and destruction of or
interference with scenic values
10. Impact of ancillary activities (e.g., disposal of earth, acquisition
of gravel and fill)
11. Commitment of resources to construction
12. Safety hazards
Operation of Facility-Direct Impacts
1. Noise
2. Air pollution
3. Water pollution
4. Socioeconomic
5. Aesthetic
6. Effects on animal and plant life (ecology)
7. Demand for energy resources
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I. Physical and chemical characteristics
A. Earth
1. Mineral resources
2. Construction material
3. Soils
4. Land form
5. Force fields and background radiation
6. Unique physical features
B. Water
1. Surface
2. Ocean
3. Underground
4. Quality
5. Temperature
6. Recharge
7. Snow, ice, and permafrost
C. Atmosphere
1. Quality (gases, particulates)
2. Climate (micro, macro)
3. Temperature
D. Processes
1. Floods
2. Erosion
3. Deposition (sedimentation, precipitation)
4. Solution
5. Sorption (ion exchange, complexing)
6. Compaction and setting
7. Stability (slides, slumps)
8. Stress-strain (earthquake)
9. Air movements
II. Biological conditions
A. Flora
1. Trees
2. Shrubs
3. Grass
4. Crops
5. Microflora
6. Aquatic plants
7. Endangered species
8. Barriers
9. Corridors
B. Fauna
1. Birds
2. Land animals including reptiles
3. Fish and shellfish
4. Benthic organisms
5. Insects
6. Microfauna
7. Endangered species
8. Barriers
9. Corridors
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III. Cultural factors
A. Land use
1. Wilderness and open spaces
2. Wetlands
3. Forestry
4. Grazing
5. Agriculture
6. Residential
7. Commercial
. 8. Industrial
9. Mining and quarrying
B. Recreation
1. Hunting
2. Fishing
3. Boating
4. Swimming
5. Camping and hiking
6. Picnicking
7. Resorts
C. Aesthetics and human interest
1. Scenic views and vistas
2. Wilderness qualities
3. Open space qualities
4. Landscape design
5. Unique physical features
6. Parks and reserves
7. Monuments
8. Rare and unique species or ecosystems
9. Historical or archeological sites and objects
10. Presence of misfits
D. Cultural status
1. Cultural patterns (life-style)
2. Health and safety
3. Employment
4. Population density
E. Constructed facilities and activities
1. Structures
2. Transportation network (movement, access
3. Utility networks
4. Waste disposal
5. Barriers
6. Corridors
IV. Ecological relationships
A. Salinization of water resources
B. Eutrophication
C. Disease-insect vectors
D. Food chains
E. Salinization of surficial material
F. Brush encroachment
G. Other
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Impact Matrix
Throughout the project, impacts were noted by the participants, both
individually and in the task group teams. The impacts were collected by each
team's representative to the impact task group. Near the completion of the
project, the impact team developed a list of the identified impacts. These
were categorized as to type and used to develop an impact matrix. The matrix
went beyond just identifying the relationships because it enabled the team
to evaluate the significance of the impact via a numerical impact evaluation.
Each cell of the matrix indicated an interaction between a task group/
geographic area and an impact. The importance of an interaction was related
to the significance.(assessment of the consequences) of the anticipated
interaction. The assignment of the numerical value was based on the subjective
judgement of the appropriate task group team.
The impacts were divided into two categories: physical and cultural. Thesi
two categories were further divided into technology, natural resources, and
environmental in the physical category and economic, social, and political in
the cultural category. Each subcategory was further subdivided into impacts
recognized by the summer group.
Impact Matrix Results (See Interaction Matrix, Table I.I)
Following is the final list of impacts and the individual impact intensity
caused by the ACIS.
I. Physical
A. Technology
1. Maintain U.S.'s aircraft technology lead (High)
2. Further mechanization skills (Moderate)
3. "Lower storage inventories/quicker response times (Moderate)
B. Natural Resources
1. Fuel Consumption
2. Non-Fuel mineral consumption (Moderate)
3. Water supply demand (Moderate)
4. Wildlife displacement (Low)
5. Land Use (Moderate)
C. Environmental
1. Noise (High)
2. Air (Moderate)
3. Water (Low)
4. Solid waste (Low)
II. Cultural
A. Economic
1. Improve international trade balance (High)
2. Airline route system (High)
3. Ability of aircraft industries to attract capital (Moderate)
4. Older aircraft obsolescence (Moderate)
5. Taxpayer cost (subsidies) (Low)
6. Payroll (Moderate)
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7. Increased viability of airline industries (High)
8. Industrial developments close to airports (High)
9. Increased taxes to pay for greater public services (Moderate)
10. Residential values (Low)
11. Income levels change (Low)
B. Social
1. Unemployment-reduce (Moderate)
2. Unemployment-increase (Low)
3. Urbanization (Moderate)
4. Airport road access congestion (Moderate)
5. Organization structure of airlines (Moderate)
6. Organization structure of transportation system (Moderate)
7. Movement of population (Moderate)
8. Increased public service needs (Low)
9. Increased housing needs (Low)
C. Political
1. Area growth (Moderate)
2. Government elected representatives (Low)
3. New electorate boundaries (Low)
4. New labor-social force of carriers and forwarders (Moderate)
5. Regulatory agencies organization (Moderate)
6. Regulation change (Moderate)
7. Population characteristic change (Low)
8. International Markets (High)
9. Increased International Cooperation (Moderate)
The greatest positive interaction occurs in the following specific impacts:
Airline route system (Economic)
Fuel consumption (Natural Resources)
Industrial developments close to airports (Economic)
Improve international trade balance (Economic)
Increased viability of airline industry (Economic)
International Markets (Political)
Maintain U.S.'s aircraft technology lead (Technology)
Noise pollution - hearing loss (Environmental)
Many impacts that are of low or moderate importance could be rated high in
local situations or at local areas. Also, the importance of environmental
impacts are less than some individuals might suspect. Only noise pollution
was of high importance. This is due to ACIS representing only a small portion
of the environmental impact of the aircraft industry. This is also why the
social impacts were not as important as might be expected.
By totaling the rows and colums, the most important or serious grouped
impacts were determined. Table I.I is a further compilation in order that the
overall interaction of the major impact topics and the task group/geography
areas can be related.
The network section is dominant in positive effects, both nationally as
well as locally. The ground support interaction is strong locally while both
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the regulatory and public policy sections show a national interaction with very
little direct local involvement.
It becomes evident that the two most important impact sections, based on
average interaction per specific impact, are the economic (10.0) and technolog-
ical (9.6) with natural resources (8.4) third. This ranking indicates a cyclic
phenomena problem for the ACIS. Without the financial capacity and the advance-
ment of technology (which needs capital to be accomplished) the ACIS may not
be developed. However, it also indicates that by implementing the system, there
is a possibility of helping to alleviate the economic and technologic problems
which presently face the aircraft industry.
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
This report has investigated four selected aspects of the air cargo industry
with a view to system and aircraft advancement. These aspects are network design,
ground support, regulation, and public policy. All of these areas were consid-
ered in the context of the assumptions elaborated in the first chapter. The
assumption of an incrementally larger plane as the large .cargo aircraft of the
1990's is of particular importance to the analysis and conclusions in the
network and ground support sections.
Network Design
The 1990-2015 network was envisioned to differ from that in place currently
not in kind but in scope. Common carrier air freight operations would be arrayed
in a hub and spoke alignment with a limited number of high volume city pairs
connected by non-stop flights. The major hub, minor hub, and local airport
trichotomy would be reinforced by the increased use of the LCA (Large Cargo
Airport) among major national and international hubs.
Aircraft in the 1990's would vary according to the types of ports which
their flights connected. Flights between hubs would be carried out in new
large craft of recent integration and existing planes of longer service.
Between minor and major hubs a variety of craft could serve; we have recommended
a new dedicated freighter. A multiplicity of planes would serve between local
airports and hubs. These would range from advanced, yet to be marketed craft,
to possibly some residual venerable workhorses like the DC-3.
In an effort to use craft most economically, dynamic scheduling of full
freight flights is likely to be generally practiced, following the example of
Federal Express. This will also decrease the time taken in collector flights,
thereby enhancing the total delivery period capabilities of air cargo service.
These,capabilities will also be enriched by technical and institutional inno-
vations which will facilitate door-to-door movement of freight. The interstate
highway system will, in effect, become an extension of the air network in these
movements.
The environmental and social impacts of network design will be, on balance,
favorable to quite favorable. Little new land in urban areas needs to be
dedicated to airports and the aircraft mix will be better environmentally than
the current one. New industries with air eligible cargos are likely to locate
proximate to air cargo facilities, often in interstate beltline industrial parks
already in place or planned for development. On the negative side, it remains
that air freight is energy intensive compared to other modes, and that some
construction associated with large freighter capabilities may cause temporary
local disruptions. An increased intensity of night flights may be unpleasant
for residents near airports, primarily at major hubs.
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Ground Support
Ground support was construed broadly to mean physical structures, operation-
al procedures, and consumer information techniques which facilitate the move-
ment of cargo from and to the air system. The establishment of one carrier
responsibility for door-to-door shipments is considered essential to adequate
consumer service. Currently forwarders provide this sort of service and airlift
carriers need this capability to compete with the trucking and COFC modes.
There are several problems which must be resolved to allow single waybill ser-
vice. Which carrier insures which segment(s) of the total haul is problematic.
Does the company providing the airlift and issuing the waybill insure all segment
or only the air stages? Should the same amount of liability be assigned to all
segments of the haul, or should the varying levels of liabilities which currently
exist among modes be maintained? Should airlines be able to acquire trucking
companies? How are revenues divided when a single waybill is issued?
Assuming these issues are resolved and single waybills can be issued by
air carriers, several problems in marketing and services remain. First, sales
personnel usually have only the sketchiest notion of their client's operations,
hence they cannot offer users services appropriate to their needs. Second,
salespersons often are not totally familiar with their own operations and in
some cases even their tariffs. Third, service currently is geared around small
package and emergency cargos; rates and handling alternatives for other types
of air cargo limited.
In order that quick transit, with or without single waybills, can be exe-
cuted, the 1990 terminal will have to evolve both in capacity and function. In
addition to the small package building, which is the extent of the facilities
at many airports, terminals will need direct facilities for intermodal containers
and full air container loads. Total space for the terminal including staging
area, plane aprons, open storage, and enclosed storage will have to be expanded
on the order of three or four times compared to current facilities. This is
due to the number and types of vehicles which will interface with the airlines
in the 1990 system. It was concluded that both gate arrival and remote terminals
were infeasible because of cargo transfer problems and because they would
abrogate economies of scale in handling cargo.
All ground support developments link to efficient movement of intermodal
containers. The 6.1m (20ft) box is the container which will have greatest com-
patibility between air and other modes. This recognizes that the type of freight
which is air eligible in value and density considerations most often moves in
less than carload (LTC) lots. The 6.1m container is appropriate to this size
of shipment. A problem with intermodal containers is their high tare weight, a
weight which can be up to one-third of the total payload of the aircraft.
Insofar as improvements in consumer information and the marketing system
will increase traffic, detrimental impacts associated with more flights, e.g.
noise, can be associated with changes in the ground support system. There may
be considerable environmental conflicts at some airpots when the need for addi-
tional land for terminals becomes evident. The intensity of the problem will
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vary locally depending on the amount of property already held by the airport
authority and how much must be acquired. A third problem area is the increase
in volume of truck traffic on access roads during the hours of terminal operations.
Greater truck traffic on residential arterials proximate to the airport can
be expected. This may contribute more to air and audio pollution than the
aircraft for freight movement.
Regulations
Regulations which pertain to air cargo movements can emanate from federal,
state, and local governments. In addition, international agreements can affect
landing rights and rate schedules. In the United States, the primary direct
regulation of air cargo is done by the FAA and CAB. The FAA has historically
regulated and continues to regulate safety standards for airports and aircraft.
The CAB has regulated the economic aspects of the industry, i.e. tariffs, routes,
and schedules, The deregulation of air cargo is, in fact, an abrogation of
prerogatives by the CAB, which may be temporary. Its actions should have minimal
effect on the 1990 network or rates if this policy continues.
Intermodality of shipment is limited by current regulatory structures. A
primary problem exists in the fragmentation of authority between the CAB, FAA,
ICC, and the Maritime Commission. Currently, vertical integration of transporta-
tion companies is difficult, if not impossible, because of varying prohibitions
and procedures among these agencies. There are also some inherent differences
in mode economics and operational practices which limit intermodality of cargo
transportation. An airline cannot own a common carrier trucking fleet by regu-
latory prohibition. Even if it could, the operating cost structures vary enough
between these modes that the integration of these two operations is difficult.
While the economic regulation of the industry is being decreased by current
policy, the regulation of safety is not likely to be diminished. In anything,
as pollution standards become a routine part of public health and safety con-
siderations, the regulatory sphere of the FAA is likely to increase. In addition
to noise and emission standards for aircraft, the agency may expand its activities
in the area of design and configuration of airports on environmental safety
grounds. Certainly the traffic control function of the agency will not be dimin-
ished.
Whether or not the FAA enters the arena of airport design and restriction
of proximate land use, there will be local regulations in this area. Where new
designs are under consideration, it is likely that zoning limitations on single-
family residence in the approach affected land around ports will be common.
Where residential land use is already established adjacent to the airport site
and in flight paths, other local regulations can be expected, e.g., curfews.
The primary impacts of regulation will depend on the appropriateness of
rules and the timing with which they are implemented. Changing federal regula-
tory practices may adversely affect elements of the industry whose operations
are geared to a set of regulatory framework. Likewise, some policies pertinent
to proximate land use can create unfavorable situations of localized real estate
value.
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Public Policy
Government involvement in the research, development, promotion, financing,
and subsidy of aircraft and airlines is pervasive. The government is also a
major owner of freight and other military aircraft. It has legitimate spheres
of activity: 1) to provide an air force for national defense and 2) to insure
an adequate civilian fleet and ground support for common carriage. The way in
which these spheres are handled is quite different.
Military needs have generally been dealt with directly. A fleet of fighters,
bombers, freight, and other craft are owned by the federal government. These
are at the state of the art in technical applications and modified as new
advances occur. Often these advances are the result of government research
to improve the performance of military planes, e.g., the supercritical wing.
For reasons of economy, massive transport of troops by air is provided through
a national emergency reserve pool of the fleets of the major airlines. For
these same reasons, the military is interested in a reserve fleet of cargo
carriers and even joint development of a military/civilian large dedicated
freighter.
There are, however, considerable impediments to this development effort.
First, the military wishes entry to less developed and smaller airports than is
necessary for civilian purposes. This requires a less efficient design for
cruising, hence a less fuel efficient craft. Commerical freighting operations
are not willing to accept the increased operating expenses. Second, the
military requires high wing craft for loading and lift, again fuel efficiency
at cruising speeds is sacrificed. The military requires movement of outsized,
high density cargos, e.g., tanks. This calls for heavy decks and a roll-on,
roll-off capability. While the nose and tail bays to meet such needs are use-
ful to civilian freighters, the ground level entrance and exit are not needed,
and the heavy decks limit the amount of cargo which can be carried. Fourth,
the military has an upper limit on the size of aircraft it desires. This is
on tactical and versatility criteria. The size they desire is much smaller
than the economy of scale for air operations, hence the military requirements
again lock a commercial operator into a suboptimal craft. The discrepancy between
optimal military and civilian large cargo aircraft is considerable.
A more feasible alternative than civilian/military development of an advanced
craft built in the United States might be a multi-national consortium to pro-
duce a military freighter which may have civilian application. Models already
exist for this cooperation in Europe with military fighter planes and civilian
passenger craft. Perhaps a consortium of free world allies could produce the
large military or commercial cargo craft if the development costs and risks
were unacceptable to an individual country.
Some international cooperation and planning may be required in many future
developments of the aviation industry. The total system uses a great variety of
minerals, some of which are rare and some of which do not exist in the United
States. Profitable manufacture rests on stable supplies of materials at accept-
able costs. International and domestic programs affect stability and costs.
Fuel availability and policy also comes into play here. A limited allocation of
292
petroleum resources to air cargo could constrain the industry to its current
small package, emergency role. Successful commercial common carrier activity
may depend on the development of synthetic or alternative fuels by the end of
the 2015 time period.
These fuel limitations may necessitate new designs of radical departure
from current aircraft for cargo carriage in the 1990-2015 period. If fuel
is simply rationed, a larger aircraft would have a better efficiency rating
than the size generally assumed throughout this study. Designs like the
Boeing twin-lobe or the spanloader may be the response. In an extreme
traditional fuel scarcity, alternative fuels, i.e. hydrogen or methane,
would find use.
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Recommendations . . .
After reviewing the above information, the design team offers recommendations
in the following five areas: 1) aircraft, 2) network structure, 3) ground support
4) regulation, 5) public policy, and 6) future research and air cargo data devel-
opment.
Recommendations concerning aircraft:
1. A new intercontinental range dedicated freighter should be developed.
It should be capable of carrying at least 100 tonnes (220 OOOlb) at
U.S. coast to Europe stage lengths and somewhat less at longer distances.
It should be nose or tail loaded and have the capacity for at least
13 of the 6.1m (20ft) intermodal containers or their equivalent on
the main cargo deck. Some modifications of existing craft, e.g.,
the B-747-200F or 747-11/111F, meet these requirements.
2. A new midrange dedicated cargo plane should be developed for domestic
use. Normal stage lengths for it would be between 1600 and 2260km
(1000 to 1400mi). It should be nose or tail loaded and have the
capacity for 4 of the 6.1m containers or their equivalent. This would
be a payload capacity of 40tonnes (80 OOOlb).
3. New aircraft should be designed to carry 2.44 x 2.59 x 6.1m containers
as well as 2.44 x 2.44 x 6.1m ones.
4. The midrange aircraft should be quiet enough to conform to noise limit-
ations for night operations. It should be fuel efficient,.using
composites and new engines.
Recommendations concerning the domestic air cargo network:
1. An advanced air cargo system should have a hub and spoke network aug-
mented by point-to-point service between high traffic city pairs.
2. Three types of airports should be integrated into the hub and spoke
networks: major hubs, minor hubs, and local (feeder) ones.
3. The LCA should fly only between major hubs and high traffic pairs.
The intermediate range craft is'appropriate to service all three
types of airports.
4. At least three major hubs should comprise the axis of this system in
the United States. These would function as gateways for trade moving
to or originating from Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The ports of
San Francisco, New York, and Houston have been used for reference within
this report, however, these specific sites are merely exemplary. Other
sites in these regions may be more appropriate.
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5. Considerable operating line-haul cost reductions in cargo networks
accrue from "dynamic scheduling", that is, routines which are flexible
based on load factors and day to day variations in cargo at planned
ports of call. It is recommended that this technique be explored for
applications to large package freighter operations.
6. Network, schedule, ground operations, and aircraft design should be
simultaneous. The economics of all these elements are interdependent.
Recommendations concerning ground support:
1. The proportion of small package traffic handled by certificated freight
forwarders should be increased.
2. Individual airline companies should not develop off-airport cargo hand-
ling facilities or gate-arrival terminals. If these configurations
are used, union terminals, i.e., facilities held in common by all
freight carriers at a port, must be implemented.
3. New terminals must have a capability of handling at least the 6.1m
intermodal containers. At major hub terminals, this should include
the use of fixed conveyors for direct nose or tail landing. Containers
with limited intermodality, i.e., the M-2, should not be the axis
around which terminal operations are built.
4. Major international hubs should include spurs to access COFC rail
shipments.
5. Airport design concepts should minimize problems in interfacing trans-
shipment between all freight flights and transferability between belly
cargo moving on passenger flights with that on all freight flights.
6. All terminal operations systems should be automated to optimal economic
levels.
7. Computerized systems for routing of movements and documentation on
them should be integral to the system.
8. Containers of reduced tare weight should be developed using composite
materials and placed in the system as they are economically feasible.
9. A computerized reservation system would enable air freight carriers to
dynamically schedule aircraft and independent commission agents to
communicate the kind and type of freight service that is available
(unreserved) and at what cost.
Recommendations concerning regulation:
1. The area served by air freight forwarders should be extended to a radius
of at least 100 miles.
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2. Regulation of air freight should not include tariff and route approval for
the ACIS, unless the current policy in that direction proves unsuccessful.
New tariffs should still be filed with the CAB, but substantial notice
should not be required.
3. Airlines should be permitted to own common carriage interstate trucking
subsidiaries or divisions. Joint ownership or other combinations of firms
in transportation modes should be permitted, except as specific anti-trust
violations occur.
4. A single agency should regulate all transportation. Its divisions should
be functional. One division would do all economic regulations; separate
divisions would oversee safety and other areas.
5. International agreements concerning landing rights should allow aircraft
with authorization to land, to discharge, and take on any available cargo,
and to carry cargo on any .leg of their flight.
6. International negotiations concerning landing rights and other air operations
should recognize the importance of door-to-door service, rapid delivery, and
intermodal operations.
7. Bill of lading provisions should be sufficiently uniform between modes to
allow a single bill of lading to serve for shipments traveling on journeys
of several legs, even if the journey involves several modes and/or several
carriers.
8. Minimum insurance provisions, carrier liability provisions, and availability
of additional insurance should be uniform between modes. Where a shipment
travels via several modes or carriers, liability should be uniformly
defined so that the shipper or consignee knows who is responsible.
9. The ability of the national transportation network (as a whole) to carry
live animals, hazardous substances, etc., should be preserved or enlarged.
In this case, of course, a unified agency could relieve one class of
carriers from carrying, say, live animals, on a given route if carriage
by another mode was preferable and available.
10. There should be independent commission agents, comparable to travel agents,
able to arrange and prepare bills of lading for travel of freight whether
on single or multi-stage journeys, involving single or multiple modes or
carriers.
Recommendations concerning public policy:
1. The United States Government should continue to support research and develop-
ment of large cargo aircraft. An increased effort in the area of freighters
using alternative fuels is likely to produce useful long term returns and
may be important to the 1990-2015 time period.
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2. Uncertainty over the type and amount of fuel available confounds plan-
ning of air transportation systems. Clear allocations of fuel should
be made as a matter of national policy to facilitate and priorize de-
sign efforts.
3. Any government subsidy of large cargo aircraft should be for their con-
struction, promotion, and to facilitate their purchase, i.e. providing
favorable loans or loan guarantees to buyers. They should not sub-
sidize operations.
4. The military should maintain a fleet of large cargo aircraft sufficient
to meet their needs .for movement of outsized cargo and wheeled vehicles.
The major capacity for airlift of more routine commodities should be in
the CRAF fleet which is optimized to civilian needs.
5. International consortia possibly among NATO allies, for the development
and manufacture of both civilian and military large cargo aircraft should
be considered. Specific feasiblity studies in this area would be useful.
6. Customs procedures should be simplified; international agreements to for-
ward this goal should be sought.
7. United States dependence on foreign resources should be controlled by
1) encouraging the conservation of minerals; 2) increasing domestic
technological innovation; and 3) increasing the standby potential
by stockpiling resources with limited domestic reserves.
Recommendations concerning future research and air cargo data development:
1. Past and current automated techniques should be cataloged and analyzed
in order to identify successful and unsuccessful operations. The
tendency to assign all functions to machines, even where the human
operator is more efficient, must be avoided. Long-term reliability
and versatility may be more important than short-term handling capacity.
2. Statistics and rankings of airports for cargo should be based on the
larger of the enplaned or deplaned cargo moved. This is a more equit-
able base across airports sinc&, unlike passenger traffic, cargo flows
are often strongly unbalanced. This base would retain the peak hand-
ling nature of the airport's cargo operation, though total volume
would still determine the ranking for revenue purposes.
3. An organized gathering of information on existing civilian and selected
military airpots should be undertaken so that rational decisions can
be made on expansion potential in accommodating the larger freightports,
consolidation facilities needed for hub and feeder portions of the
system, and for locating new intermodal nodes in which air cargo may or
may not be the initiating force.
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4. Considerable effort should be devoted to studying means of making air-
ports more attractive to potential nearby residents. It would be
highly desirable to have some studies addressing this question as a
long-term, abstract problem, rather than in fashions strictly limited
by location or time frame. For instance, changes in property tax
practices not practical under present law might be a useful tool.
5. Research activity should be directed toward the development of quiet,
fuel efficient engines for new craft that can be retrofitted into
existing large mainframe cargo aircraft.
6. Research on composite materials and any other innovations to lighten
the weight of craft is critical to the intermodality of cargo air-
craft and should be emphasized.
7. Research on alternative fuels and freighter configurations employing
them should be continued. Public acceptance of hydrogen powered
cargo planes might be easier to achieve than passenger craft.
8. The role of the crane helicopter, on a limited scale and over short
distances, should be seriously considered. This craft must be able
to lift standard intermodal containers.
9. Research on the volume vs. weight capacities of aircraft is critical
to future aircraft design. Intermodality of the ACIS may depend on
designs which emphasize increased lift rather than -more cubic space.
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APPENDIX A
ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY
The systems design group first organized to set objectives for its summer
work. For this task the overall group of 20 was broken into four, five member
teams. Each team was designed to be as interdisciplinary as possible. Members
were assigned as follows: (the asterisk indicates the team chief)
Team #1 Team #2
R. J. Burns R. M. Eastman
A. H. Hagedoorn* A. Hargrove
N. Matthews E. Maier
M. K. Mohapatra F. E. Rogers
W. A. Rabiega J. T. Ying*
Team #3 Team #4
M. L. Cross J. B. Crittenden
E. E. Enscore A. E. Keaton
P. K. Grogger S. T. Koay
E. T. Ordman* R. A. 01 sen*
E. A. Thomchick M. T. Soberick
On June 16, 1978, after two weeks work the four teams met together and
settled on overall objectives. This meeting was conducted for a period lasting
approximately 12 hours distributed over a Friday and a Monday. The meeting
began with each team presenting its proposal for objectives. The four presenta-
tions were followed by a discussion. While considerable commonality was dis-
covered in the various teams' presentations, clear differences of opinion also
emerged. In an attempt to reconcile these differences the large group was
broken into smaller discussion groups. The assignments of individuals was made
in such a way that principal antagonists on major points were placed in the
same discussion group. This was done because we hoped that compromise could
be reached more effectively in the small group environment. Towards the end
of the second day of the meeting objectives could be stated by the groups with
a satisfying degree of consensus.
After the initial phase culminated in a statement of objectives, the group
was organized in such a way that the tasks pursuant to the stated objectives
could be accomplished. This led to the following task organization.
Network Design Team
R. J. Burns
J. B. Crittenden
A. Hargrove
S. T. Koay
E. Maier*
R. A. Olsen
301
Ground Support Subsystem Team
R. M. Eastman
E. E. Enscore
A. H. Hagedoorn
N. Matthews
W. A. Rabiega*
Regulatory Issues Team
M. L. Cross
E. T. Ordman*
F. E. Rogers
M. T. Soberick
E. A. Thomchick
Public Policy Team
P. K. Grogger
A. E. Keaton
M. K. Mohapatra*
J. T. Ying
Societal Impacts Issues Team
R. J. Burns
E. E. Enscore
P. K. Grogger*
A. E. Keaton
E. A. Thomchick
Economic Team
J. B. Crittenden
E. E. Enscore
E. T. Ordman
J. T. Ying*
* denotes team leader
The first four of these teams made up the basic task structure. The last
two were formed to satisfy a strongly felt need to integrate the consideration
of impacts and economics^ into the full systems design effort. Notice the
organization of these provides for liaison between task teams through commonal-
ality of membership. This method of providing for organizational "intersection"
is graphically illustrated in figure 1. This task organization was maintained
until the end of the program. A team was also found for the purpose of making
an oral presentation of results. The members of this team were:
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Presentation Team
J. B. Crittenden
M. L. Cross
P. K. Grogger
A. H. Hagedoorn
M. K. Mohapatra
A number of systems design group decision-making methodologies were
employed throughout the program. Notable among these were the use of inter-
preterie structural modeling in an interactive computer mode and del phi exer-
cises.
The interpretive structural modeling was used with the group of task team
leaders to produce the objective structure discussed in the introduction. The
computer software was produced at and purchased from the University of Dayton.
The team leaders spent approximately 12 hours initially interacting with the
computer to structure a list of 56 objectives which had been suggested by the
program participants. By individual and small group effort this structure
was reduced to th eone presented in the introduction. The exercise proved
valuable in forcing discussion of terms and concepts which led to a clarifica-
tion of the issues.
Delphi exercises were used twice. The first use resulted in the evolution
of the set of assumptions listed in the introduction. This was done by first
forming a long "grocery list" of assumptions (66 in all) and then by asking
for judgements on the acceptability of each (and some editing based on feed-
back) eventually determining the ten most acceptable ones.
The second del phi exercise was conducted in order to achieve a best esti-
mate on the time in which our air cargo system would be in place. The results
are clearly indicated in the text.
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